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WARMING UP TO USER-GENERATED 
CONTENT 
Edward Lee* 
Conventional views of copyright law almost always operate 
from the “top down.”  Copyrights are understood as static and fixed 
by the Copyright Act.  Under this view, copyright holders are at the 
center of the copyright universe and exercise considerable control 
over their exclusive rights, with the expectation that others seek prior 
permission for all uses of copyrighted works outside of a fair use.  
Though pervasive, this conventional view of copyright is wrong.  The 
Copyright Act is riddled with gray areas and gaps, many of which 
persist over time, because so few copyright cases are ever filed and the 
majority of those filed are not resolved through judgment.  In these 
gray areas, a “top-down” approach simply does not work.  Instead, 
informal copyright practices effectively serve as important gap fillers 
in our copyright system, operating from the bottom up. 
The tremendous growth of user-generated content on the Web 
provides a compelling example of this widespread phenomenon.  The 
informal practices associated with user-generated content make mani-
fest three significant features of our copyright system that have es-
caped the attention of legal scholars: (i) our copyright system could 
not function without informal copyright practices; (ii) collectively, us-
ers wield far more power in influencing the shape of copyright law 
than is commonly perceived; and (iii) uncertainty in formal copyright 
law can lead to the phenomenon of “warming,” in which—unlike 
chilling—users are emboldened to make unauthorized uses of copy-
righted works based on seeing what appears to be an increasingly ac-
cepted practice.  Although the warming phenomenon has been com-
pletely ignored in prior copyright scholarship, warming serves as a 
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powerful counterforce to the chilling of speech, even when copyright 
law is uncertain. 
The most significant copyright development of the twenty-first cen-
tury has not arisen through any law enacted by Congress or opinion ren-
dered by the Supreme Court.  Nor has it come from an organized group, 
movement, or industry seeking to effectuate a change to the copyright 
system.  Instead, it has come from the unorganized, informal practices of 
various, unrelated users of copyrighted works, many of whom probably 
know next to nothing about copyright law. 
In order to comprehend this paradox, one must look at what is 
popularly known as “Web 2.0,” a buzzword for the vast array of tech-
nologies and platforms on the Internet that enable users to generate con-
tent of their own, albeit often “remixed” with the works of others.  From 
blogs to wikis to podcasting to “mashup” videos and social networking 
sites like Facebook and MySpace, the Web 2.0 culture encourages users 
to engage, create, and share content online.  With users of copyrighted 
works no longer passive recipients, “user-generated content” (UGC) is 
now the watchword of today’s Web 2.0 culture. 
UGC challenges conventional understandings of copyright law un-
der which copyrights are understood largely as static and fixed from the 
top down.  Under some, if not most, conventional accounts, the author’s 
exclusive rights and the exceptions to those rights are all fixed in the 
Copyright Act, as delimited by Congress.  Under this view of copyright, 
copyright holders are at the center of the copyright universe and exercise 
considerable control over their exclusive rights.  Obtaining prior authori-
zation from the copyright holder is typically assumed to be necessary for 
others legally to reuse the copyrighted work, apart from a fair or other 
permitted use (which often is not easy to determine in advance).  Al-
though the language of the Copyright Act may be open textured in many 
places, courts can define the relevant copyright standards on a case-by-
case basis.  Under this formalist approach, there is little, if any, acknowl-
edgement of a possible role for users to shape copyright law from the 
bottom up. 
This Article challenges the conventional account of copyright law, 
particularly as applied to Web 2.0.  The formalist understanding of copy-
right law ignores reality.  It can explain some cases well, particularly 
those litigated, but it cannot address a welter of factual scenarios that 
never get resolved in court.  The Copyright Act is riddled with gray areas 
and gaps, many of which persist over time because so few copyright cases 
are ever filed and the majority of those filed are not resolved by a judg-
ment.1  While formal licenses allow the parties themselves to fill the gaps 
 
 1. Of the 1,889 copyright cases disposed in 2002, 77.6% were dismissed, including 42.3% by 
settlement.  Only 22.4% of the cases (423) led to a judgment, of which only 1.5% were settled by trial.  
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left open by formal copyright law by private ordering, often the transac-
tion costs associated with formal licenses are far too high for any negotia-
tion to occur, especially for noncommercial uses of copyrighted works.  
On some occasions, copyright holders may, in fact, prefer to “hedge” by 
allowing third-party uses of their works informally, instead of by formal 
license. 
My core thesis is that informal copyright practices—i.e., practices 
that are not authorized by formal copyright licenses but whose legality 
falls within a gray area of copyright law—effectively serve as important 
gap fillers in our copyright system.  They are necessary because formal 
copyright law has many gaps and gray areas that cannot possibly be filled 
or clarified fast enough to keep pace with the vast number of uses of 
copyrighted works that occur each day.  Formal copyright licenses might 
fill some of these gaps, but high transaction costs often make licenses 
cost-prohibitive or ineffective.  And sometimes copyright holders even 
prefer informal practices over formal licenses. 
Informal copyright practices have developed, most notably, for 
UGC.  Whether in blogs, fan fiction, videos, music, or other mashups, 
many users freely use the copyrighted works of others without prior 
permission and even beyond our conventional understandings of fair use.  
Yet, often, as in the case of noncommercial uses of copyrighted works on 
blogs or in fan fiction, the copyright holders do not seem to care, and, in 
some cases, publicly condone the general practice.  Moreover, the mass 
practices of many users of popular Web 2.0 sites, like YouTube, of ignor-
ing the need to obtain permission before using someone else’s copy-
righted work have even prompted the securing of commercial licenses 
between Web 2.0 sites and the copyright holders in order to ratify the 
mass practices of users.2  Thus, instead of being condemned as infringe-
ment, the unauthorized mass practices of users may have, in some in-
stances, turned out to be the catalyst for subsequent ratification of those 
practices, albeit in some bargained-for exchange not even involving the 
users themselves. 
Put simply, copyright law as we know it “on the books” is not ex-
actly how copyright law operates in practice.  Instead of being defined a 
priori by statute or at a single snapshot in time, the contours of an au-
thor’s exclusive rights in the Web 2.0 world are being defined by a much 
messier and more complex process involving a loose, unorganized “give 
and take” of sorts among users, copyright holders, and intermediaries.  I 
make no claim that this process of “give and take” is somehow unique to 
Web 2.0, but I do think it is far more noticeable on the Internet.  Perhaps 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
THEFT, 2002, at 8 (2004) [hereinafter STATISTICS REPORT]. 
 2. Although YouTube currently faces two major copyright lawsuits based on the allegedly in-
fringing activity of their users, the lawsuits do not challenge the general practice of user-generated 
content but instead focus on verbatim copying of copyrighted works.  See infra notes 201–07 and ac-
companying text. 
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most fascinating of all, users are often the ones driving the agenda from 
the bottom up; and copyright holders increasingly, although not always, 
are taking heed.  Users can institute a practice for using another’s copy-
righted works without prior permission that, over time, copyright holders 
can accept (or not) and, at times, openly embrace either informally or 
formally by contract. 
One clear example of an informal copyright practice involves fan 
fiction, a genre that allows users to make derivative works of popular 
copyrighted works and share them online.  This practice has flourished 
on the Internet—with knowing toleration and even open support by 
many copyright holders—even though people do not ever obtain formal 
copyright permission to make the derivative works.3  Another example of 
an informal copyright practice relates to the popular user-created, 
pseudo-movie trailers, such as a “scary” version of Mary Poppins or a 
Brokeback Mountain version of Back to the Future, made from mashups 
of scenes from copyrighted movies and publicly disseminated on the 
Internet.4  This user-generated practice has become very popular—a 
genre in itself—notwithstanding the lack of formal licenses from the 
movie studios.  Another popular genre involves citizen mashup videos 
for (or against) presidential candidates, such as the much ballyhooed 
“Obama girl” video.5  None of these “remix” practices is explained well 
by the conventional understanding of copyright, which does not recog-
nize a legitimate role for what it might call “technical” copyright in-
fringement.  Although a case for fair use could be made in some cases, 
conventional accounts of copyright law probably would consider fair use 
doubtful or, at the very least, contestable.  In my view, the concept of 
“informal copyright practice” can better explain these and other prac-
tices in the Web 2.0 world because it looks at the actual practices of the 
interested parties, collectively, as they develop over time. 
Lest there be any mistake, I am not suggesting that copyright hold-
ers no longer wield any legal control over their works.  Nor am I suggest-
ing that copyright law “on the books” is irrelevant or that users can do 
whatever they want because whatever users do is, ipso facto, OK.  In-
stead, my claim is far more limited.  By examining the practices of users, 
copyright holders, and intermediaries related to UGC, I hope to show 
how users can and do, in fact, heavily influence what may become a rela-
tively accepted informal copyright practice. 
Part I examines how copyrights operate in practice.  My approach 
draws from several different schools, including pragmatism, legal realism, 
and law and society. It provides a theory of how informal copyright prac-
tices can play an integral role in the development of copyright law as im-
portant gap fillers to formal copyright law and formal copyright licenses.  
 
 3. See infra notes 348–65 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 240–45 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 314–27 and accompanying text. 
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These gap fillers effectively serve as a kind of “soft law” to establish ac-
ceptable working practices among interested parties, albeit informally.  
Whether Congress or courts should expressly incorporate informal copy-
right practices into formal copyright law—and, if so, under what condi-
tions—are important questions that I discuss without final resolution in 
this Article.  Congress and courts have relied on informal copyright prac-
tices on many occasions.  Existing informal copyright practices can serve 
as helpful “laboratories of experimentation” for copyright policymakers 
thinking about formal changes to copyright law.  Yet ultimately I do not 
stake out a normative argument about what formal law should do; that 
issue I leave open for future inquiry.  My goal here is to establish what I 
believe is an even more important point: that informal copyright prac-
tices are vital to the copyright system in their own right, even apart from 
any later formal adoption by courts or Congress.  And they are vital in 
ways that have remained completely unexamined in legal scholarship. 
Part II then elaborates a Five-Factor Informality Test for determin-
ing whether we should embrace the development of a particular informal 
copyright practice as a gap filler.  Not all informal practices are legiti-
mate; some are nothing more than copyright infringement.  However, 
other informal practices serve a vital role in filling the gaps left open by 
formal copyright law. 
Part III examines the growing phenomenon of UGC on the Internet 
and explains why UGC serves important free speech and free press in-
terests.  Then, analyzing several different examples of UGC, including 
citizen campaign videos, movie trailer mashups, fan fiction, and fan Web 
sites, the Part explains why the informal copyright practices that have so 
far developed in these areas should be considered legitimate gap fillers 
for our copyright system under the Informality Test factors. 
Part IV draws out the significance of my theory for the copyright 
system.  First, the approach provides a more realistic assessment of how 
the entire copyright system operates.  By identifying where informal 
practices have developed, we can often see where formal copyright law 
has failed.  Second, my theory demonstrates that users play a far greater 
role in shaping copyright law than is commonly perceived.  In many in-
stances, users have initiated the prevailing practice with respect to 
UGC—often with later acceptance by the copyright holders. 
My theory introduces a new concept—warming—to explain how 
uncertainty in copyright law may influence behavior.  Copyright scholar-
ship has primarily focused on how uncertainty in copyright law may chill 
legitimate speech.6  This literature, although accurate for some instances, 
is incomplete.  The practices related to user-generated copyright suggest 
an opposite, cross-cutting force may also be in play, particularly on the 
Internet: what I call “warming,” in which users are emboldened to use 
 
 6. See infra note 410 and accompanying text. 
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copyrighted works without authorization based on the development of 
what appears to be an increasingly accepted informal practice.  The 
Internet is especially conducive to the “warming” phenomenon, given 
the social networking features and rapid development of community 
norms, such as in the blogosphere.  Warming is legitimate if the underly-
ing informal copyright practice serves as a gap filler in copyright law. 
This Article builds on insights offered by the growing body of legal 
scholarship that has taken a more pragmatic bent to legal questions—
new legal realism, microanalysis of institutions, new governance, and the 
like.7  These approaches all question the basic, formalist assumption that 
legal issues must be resolved from the “top down” by Congress, the 
courts, or administrative agencies.  Instead, the new legal realist ap-
proach recognizes that legal issues can—and often should—be resolved 
from the “bottom up,” by interested parties acting outside of formal legal 
institutions.  Although influential in many areas of law, this more prag-
matic, realist approach has, for whatever reason, escaped the attention of 
intellectual property (IP) scholarship.  This Article is offered as a begin-
ning to what I hope is greater research and IP scholarship in this area.  
Studying how informal practices shape the contours of IP law is a huge 
(if not herculean) endeavor that requires the sustained attention of many 
scholars, with greater empirical research of how people use works pro-
tected by IP in practice.  This Article provides just a start.  Far more is 
left to be said. 
I. COPYRIGHT IN PRACTICE 
Copyright law does not exist in a vacuum.  It influences and is influ-
enced by how people use copyrighted works in practice.  Yet, in discus-
sions of copyright law, copyright practices are often ignored as if they 
had no bearing on the formal law of copyright.  Under this formalist un-
derstanding, the law operates from the “top down.”  The Copyright Act 
establishes the “rules,” which, in turn, limit what practices can develop.  
Practices outside the “rules” are deemed infringing.  This simplistic, yet 
pervasive understanding of copyright is misguided, however.  It presumes 
that formal copyright has no gray areas, but instead provides clear guid-
ance ex ante to the public on the legality of uses of copyrighted works in 
most factual scenarios.  Of course, nothing could be further from the 
truth.  Copyright law is riddled with ambiguities.  Against such a back-
drop, informal copyright practices are vital to the functioning of the en-
tire copyright system. 
 
 7. See infra notes 32, 123–26 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Legal Realist Critique 
Legal realism has profoundly affected our understanding of many 
areas of law.  Our current understanding of contract law, for example, is 
heavily influenced by Karl Llewellyn’s successful efforts to update formal 
contract doctrines to be more reflective of commercial practices.  Lle-
wellyn’s efforts culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 
which all fifty states substantially adopted.8  Article 1 of the U.C.C. has 
sought, as its express purpose, to update formal contract law and com-
mercial law in the following ways: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commer-
cial transactions; 
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices 
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; and 
(3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.9 
Related to the second goal, the U.C.C. allows courts and parties to rely 
on custom, usage, and practices to a much greater extent to determine 
contracts and sales than did the prior approach under traditional com-
mon law.10 
Instead of thinking of the law purely in terms of abstract principles, 
the legal realist movement recognized the importance of seeing how 
things operated in context.  The U.C.C. took formal, abstract principles 
of contract and injected a healthy dose of reality into them by recogniz-
ing a greater role for custom, usage, and dealing in determining the law 
of sales and contracts.  This constitutes a “bottom up” approach,11 in that 
it allows practices to determine how the law treats the sale (instead of the 
other way around).  The universal adoption of the U.C.C. (at least in 
some form) by all fifty states bespeaks its attractiveness for commercial 
sales compared to the old common law approach. 
Given the importance of IP to many business and commercial deal-
ings, one might expect that a similar modernization would have occurred 
in IP laws to allow greater consideration of custom, usage, and dealing in 
the marketplace.  Surprisingly, however, that has not been the case, at 
least not in any explicit or systematic way. 
 
 8. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 2 (2d ed. 1991). 
 9. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2001). 
 10. For example, the U.C.C. relaxes the traditional parol evidence rule to allow evidence of us-
age of trade and course of dealing to supplement the four corners of a written contract.  U.C.C. § 2-202 
(2003).  It also gives sellers the right to cure, even after the time for performance, thereby facilitating 
informal adjustment of contract disputes.  Id. § 2-508.  The U.C.C. also allows parties to modify con-
tracts without consideration, id. § 2-209(1), and gets rid of the mirror-image rule, id. § 2-207(i), so par-
ties can form contracts by exchanging offers and acceptances that are not the same in all respects.  
Traditional contract law did not allow any of these considerations. 
 11. The New Legal Realist movement in legal scholarship has emphasized looking at the law 
from a “bottom up” approach with greater examination of empirical data of how things occur at the 
ground level.  See Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 335, 339–41. 
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This is particularly surprising given that formal copyright law often 
embodies customs and practices.  Many of the provisions of the Copy-
right Act were drafted by interested (primarily industry) stakeholders, 
who were in some sense creating new customs or incorporating existing 
customs; indeed, many of the exemptions to copyright in sections 108 to 
122 of the Copyright Act have the look and feel of a market practice or 
custom.12  For example, in the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act 
of 2005, Congress codified an exemption in section 110(11) that allows 
people to use existing technology such as Clear Play to program their 
DVD to skip parts of copyrighted movies that contain nudity, sex, vio-
lence, or profanity.13  The exemption effectively codifies a custom “for 
private home viewing” that had developed, particularly among families 
looking for ways to filter out content in movies that might not be suitable 
for children.  Congress also devised the notice-and-takedown procedures 
of the DMCA safe harbors for storage and information location tools 
based on developing industry practices.14  Congress sometimes even con-
siders some very local customs for codification.  In 2008, Senator Specter 
proposed a bill to allow churches to watch NFL games without violating 
the public performance right of the NFL—a bill that was specifically de-
signed to ratify the practice of Super Bowl parties held by Baptist 
churches that had received “cease and desist” letters from the NFL re-
garding the practice.15  So far, Congress has punted the issue. 
Courts also sometimes consider customs in deciding cases.  In doc-
trines such as fair use,16 implied licenses,17 laches,18 estoppel,19 and copy-
 
 12. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–122 (2000); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information 
Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 23 (1996) (“The current federal copyright statute (and its predecessors) were 
composed by representatives of copyright-related industries to govern interactions among them.”). 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (Supp. V 2005). 
 14. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45 (1998) (“This ‘notice and takedown’ procedure is a formaliza-
tion and refinement of a cooperative process that has been employed to deal effectively with network-
based copyright infringement.”). 
 15. See S. 167, 109th Cong. (2005); Jacqueline L. Salmon, Bill Would End Separation of Church 
and Super Bowl, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008, at A6. 
 16. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 17. A nonexclusive license can be implied from the circumstances.  See, e.g., I.A.E., Inc. v. 
Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776–77 (7th Cir. 1996); Effects Ass’n, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558–59 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 18. Laches is an equitable defense, although the circuits are split on its application in the face of 
the statute of limitations in the Copyright Act.  Compare Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 
F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the ju-
dicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an 
express statute of limitations.”), with New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 
(2d Cir. 1989) (applying laches for two-year delay), and Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 
227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a strong presumption against application of laches for any copy-
right claim brought within three-year statute of limitations).  Laches can be established if (1) the copy-
right holder inordinately delayed filing suit even though it knew or should have known of the potential 
claim and (2) the delay resulted in undue prejudice to the alleged infringer.  See Kling v. Hallmark 
Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000); Chirco, 474 F.3d at 234.  While the statute of limita-
tions does not start running until a copyright violation has in fact occurred, the period of delay for a 
laches defense can begin when the copyright holder has actual or constructive knowledge of an im-
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right misuse,20 courts routinely consider how informal or market practices 
bear on the legality of an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.  In-
deed, courts may recognize doctrines based on a customary practice in 
the marketplace that Congress later ends up formally adopting in the 
Copyright Act itself.  For example, the well-known Aiken exemption in 
section 110(5)(A) allows entities to play the radio or television without 
having to pay license fees for the public performance of copyrighted 
works being broadcast.21  The provision codifies the rule, at least in its ef-
fect, announced by the Supreme Court in Aiken, decided under the prior 
1909 Act.22  The Aiken Court’s rule was based in part on the customary 
practices at the time: 
The practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in Aiken’s 
position are copyright infringers is self-evident. One has only to 
consider the countless business establishments in this country with 
radio or television sets on their premises—bars, beauty shops, cafe-
terias, car washes, dentists’ offices, and drive-ins—to realize the to-
tal futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders 
to license even a substantial percentage of them.23 
The fair use provision also derived from judge-made doctrine that incor-
porated some notion of what was acceptable under customary practices.  
Indeed, in explaining the history of the fair use doctrine, the Court in 
Harper & Row traced the doctrine back to notions of “reasonable and 
customary” use: “[T]he fair use doctrine was predicated on the author’s 
 
pending violation.  Thus, laches “might in some cases obligate the [copyright holder] to investigate the 
defendant’s plans regarding the exploitation of that copyright.”  Kling, 225 F.3d at 1039. 
 19. Under copyright law, a copyright holder may be estopped from suing for copyright infringe-
ment if (1) the copyright holder knew of the facts of defendant’s infringing conduct, (2) “either in-
tended that defendant rely on his acts or omissions or acted or failed to act in such a manner that de-
fendant had a right to believe it was intended to rely on plaintiff’s conduct,” (3) the defendant was 
ignorant of the true facts, and (4) relied on the copyright holder’s conduct to his detriment.  Hampton 
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.07 (2007).  Both informal and industry practices are 
often relevant to estoppel.  See, e.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 2003) (copy-
right holder estopped from bringing a copyright infringement claim against defendant for using copy-
righted worksheet because copyright holder had freely allowed fellow employees to use and modify 
the worksheet); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006) (copyright holder es-
topped from suing Google for copying his work for automated cache system in search engine because 
author knew of Google’s caching system but failed to opt out of that system as was easily available by 
the “industry standard” of using “no archive” metatag in the Web site’s code). 
 20. Copyright misuse is based on the notion of “unclean hands,” meaning that the copyright 
holder’s own conduct may, in some cases, disqualify him from asserting any copyright infringement 
claim during the period of misuse.  See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 
1997); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am., 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977–79 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 21. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2000). 
 22. The Court held that the reception of music on the radio did not constitute a public perform-
ance.  See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162–64 (1975).  By contrast, 
§ 110(5)(A) simply exempts the reception from the public performance right, characterizing it as not 
an infringement.  See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A). 
 23. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162. 
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implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he released his 
work for public consumption . . . .”24 
Despite these copyright provisions and doctrines that derive from or 
actually consider the practices in the marketplace, neither Congress nor 
the courts have formally adopted a U.C.C.-type incorporation of custom, 
dealing, or usage within copyright law.  Formal copyright law shies away 
from expressly recognizing informal practices. 
Even more surprising, IP scholarship has all but ignored this issue.  
Mark Lemley offers one notable exception in a recent essay that pro-
vocatively suggests that entities routinely ignore patents while manufac-
turing products in the information technology (IT) sector that may in-
fringe someone else’s patent.25  According to Lemley, one of the key 
reasons IT companies ignore the patents of others is that patents are of-
ten just probabilistic in nature, meaning that the scope and even validity 
of patents are often highly uncertain and a large percentage of patents 
turn out later to be held invalid or not infringed.26 
This Article takes a similar, practical approach to examining copy-
right law.  My conclusion for the copyright context, though, is different 
from Lemley’s for patents.  The copyright context presents a different 
dynamic than the IT sector’s deliberate choice to ignore existing patents.  
The validity of copyrights are usually never in question, and most indi-
viduals dealing with copyrighted works probably do not make as in-
formed or even conscious legal decisions as IT companies do, with advice 
of legal counsel.  Yet the systemic uncertainties in formal copyright law 
do produce their own kind of informal practices.  Given the lack of clear 
rules for fair use and misappropriation, knowledge of copyright law is of-
ten no better than ignorance of copyright law.  Even though I am an ex-
pert of copyright law, my prediction of what is a fair use probably is no 
better than the person on the street—or it could be even worse, given 
that a jury will not typically be comprised of copyright experts and judges 
often are not well versed in copyright law.  My thesis is that, where the 
content of formal copyright law is so often vague on critical issues, leav-
ing the public with no specific guidance, informal practices will likely de-
velop as coping mechanisms. 
My approach to examining informal copyright practices is markedly 
different from prior copyright scholarship.  To the extent informal prac-
tices are discussed in copyright scholarship, they commonly are por-
trayed as operating contrary to formal law, typically as infringement, 
such as in Robert Ellickson’s now-famous account of the “lawlessness” of 
academic photocopying of material for course packs in universities27 or 
 
 24. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1985). 
 25. See Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22. 
 26. Id. at 27–28. 
 27. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
258 (1991). 
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the discussion of illegal file sharing.28  By contrast, my approach exam-
ines not those practices that are clearly infringing under formal copyright 
law, but those many practices whose legality or illegality is simply un-
clear.  In my view, these informal copyright practices are not operating 
outside of the law—they are instead a vital component of the entire 
copyright system. 
The first—and perhaps only—extended examination of custom’s 
role in IP law thus far appears to be the recent article by Professor 
Rothman published in December 2007.29  Rothman provides an excellent 
discussion of many issues that cannot be adequately summarized here.  
Overall, she is skeptical of the courts’ or Congress’s reliance on custom 
as a way to provide substantive IP law.30  While she is more willing to al-
low custom to be used as evidence for some issues, she proposes a list of 
six factors—(1) certainty of the custom, (2) motivation behind the cus-
tom, (3) representativeness of the custom, (4) application of the custom 
against whom it is asserted, (5) consideration for what proposition the 
given custom is asserted, and (6) implications of the custom—that all 
must be typically satisfied before custom is even considered by a court or 
Congress.31 
Although I am far more sanguine than Professor Rothman about 
permitting the use of custom by courts and Congress, my Article focuses 
on a different question than hers.  My primary concern is the role of in-
formal copyright practices that are not the subject of any litigation or leg-
islation.  I believe this category of informal copyright practice (i.e., those 
that never reach a court or Congress) is far more numerous, and, there-
fore, may be more important to understand as a practical matter. 
My approach is grounded in the legal realist school.  There is an in-
credibly diverse and rich body of legal scholarship written from this per-
spective—far too numerous to summarize here and only growing by the 
day in the “new legal realist” movement.32  I would not claim to be an 
expert in this literature—in part because IP law scholarship, the field I 
write in, has largely ignored these insightful discussions about legal real-
ism, pragmatism, microanalysis of institutions, and new governance tak-
ing place in other areas of law.  Victoria Nourse deserves (unknowingly) 
some credit for my recent turn to this approach; her engaging presenta-
tion of a work-in-progress got me thinking along these realist lines and 
wondering how IP law fits into this larger discussion taking place in legal 
 
 28. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 582 (2006). 
 29. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1899 (2007). 
 30. Id. at 1967–68. 
 31. Id. at 1969–80. 
 32. See Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, 
and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 482 n.16 
(citing examples of legal scholarship and the “new legal realist” movement). 
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scholarship.  This Article is my first attempt to tackle that question for 
copyright law, as applied to the growing phenomenon of UGC.  As I said 
at the outset, this Article is offered as an invitation for future research in 
this area rather than an attempt at the definitive last word. 
B. Defining the Terms: Copyright Practices 
The copyright world can be divided into two: (1) formal copyright 
practices consisting of formal copyright law and formal licenses and (2) 
informal copyright practices consisting of uses of copyrighted works that 
are not authorized by formal licenses and that fall either outside of for-
mal copyright law or within a gray area. 
“Practice” includes the entire range of activities involving a copy-
righted work—such as uses by third parties and/or licenses by authors—
that in fact occur after a copyrighted work is created.  In other words, it is 
whatever happens, in practice, to a copyrighted work over time.  I differ-
entiate the term “copyright practice” from two other similar terms, cus-
tom and social norms, which are perhaps more frequently used in legal 
scholarship.  Although a practice can overlap with a custom or social 
norm, the word “practice” captures better the generic notion of whatever 
occurs in practice, even if only between two parties in a single incident.  I 
intend to use the term “practice” to cover what happens in single isolated 
incidents, as well as in repeated, widespread fashion.  “Custom” and “so-
cial norm” may suggest something much larger in scale or more repeated 
than a single, isolated incident.33  Also, I think the term “practice” more 
accurately conveys the informal and fluid nature of how people actually 
use copyrighted works. 
1. Formal Copyright Practices 
Formal copyright practices are ones that have been either (1) au-
thorized by formal contract by the copyright holder or (2) specifically 
approved as legal by formal law, whether in a statutory provision or set-
tled court decision.  Thus, there can be no question that a formal copy-
right practice is legal.  It clearly is. 
The world of formal copyright practices is the one most familiar to 
courts, lawyers, commentators, and law professors.  Formal copyright 
practices take a formalistic view of copyright law.  Under such a view, 
rights are abstractly and neatly defined by the various provisions—or 
“black letter law”—of the Copyright Act.  A strong preference exists for 
obtaining formal licenses for every use of any copyrighted work.  Indeed, 
 
 33. Cf. Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 119, 127 (2007) (discussing the scale of custom for international law and proposing a definition 
of custom as a “body of practice that has become expected by a people to such a degree that it has be-
come law”); Rothman, supra note 29, at 1900 n.1 (discussing various definitions of custom and norm). 
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this preference is often converted into a simple rule: unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works are infringing.  Sometimes, it is described more fully 
with the following caveat: unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are 
infringing unless they are fair use or fall within another statutory exemp-
tion. 
Take, for example, the comment of the President of the Association 
of American Publishers Pat Schroeder against Google’s unauthorized 
copying of books for its Google Book Search database: 
Not only is Google trying to rewrite copyright law, it is also crush-
ing creativity.  If publishers and authors have to spend all their time 
policing Google for works they have already written, it is hard to 
create more.  Our laws say if you wish to copy someone’s work, you 
must get their permission.  Google wants to trash that.34 
Schroeder’s comment reflects what might be called the “permission first” 
mantra.  Taken to extreme, this view precipitates a kind of “clearance 
culture,” an environment in which businesses and individuals attempt to 
obtain a formal license for every single use they make of any copyrighted 
work, regardless of fair use, de minimis borrowing, and other exemp-
tions. 
Although it may be easy to dismiss Schroeder’s comment as rhetoric 
in the context of an ongoing legal battle, variations of the same, simplistic 
principle can be found in copyright hornbooks and treatises.  For exam-
ple, Arthur Miller’s Nutshell on Intellectual Property describes infringe-
ment as follows: “Infringement—a word that is not defined anywhere in 
the Copyright Act—occurs whenever somebody exercises any of the 
rights reserved exclusively for the copyright owner without authoriza-
tion.”35  William Patry’s new treatise describes copyright infringement in 
similar fashion: “[W]here an unauthorized material use of a copyrighted 
work does fall within one of those rights [in sections 106 or 106A], in-
fringement occurs, unless the use is excused by one of the privileges, ex-
emptions, or compulsory licenses found in sections 107 through 122.”36 
Another characteristic of the formalist approach to copyright is that 
it examines copyright questions at a single snapshot in time—namely, the 
moment of unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.37  The determination 
of whether an unauthorized use is infringement is like an on-off switch: 
 
 34. Pat Schroeder & Bob Barr, Reining in Google, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A18 (emphasis 
added). 
 35. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT 345 (4th ed. 2007). 
 36. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:2, at 9-14 to 9-15 (2007); see Julie E. Cohen, 
The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 353 (2005) (“Most of us [copyright 
scholars] readily concede that private copying is and should be infringement in the first instance, 
unless excused as fair use.”). 
 37. See Sonya K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 477 (2006) (“The property theme, which has taken on greater 
emphasis in modern times, suggests a sort of fixed, unitary, thing-like character that remains largely 
static, stable, and resistant to modern change.”). 
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the use is either infringing or not infringing at the moment of use.  There 
is no gray area or in-between.  Nor is there consideration of how the pas-
sage of time may affect the ultimate question of infringement. 
To draw an analogy, the formalist approach is similar to Newtonian 
physics.  Newton elaborated three laws of motion for a universe consid-
ered to be static, in which time and space were “immutable entities that 
provided the universe with a rigid, unchanging arena.”38  These laws of 
motion could be stated with mathematical precision.39  Newton viewed all 
matter as composed of neatly defined, indivisible atoms.40  Similarly, the 
formalist approach to copyright views copyright as atomistic and subject 
to black letter laws unchanged by time or space.  Under the formalist ap-
proach, every unauthorized use of copyrighted works is considered pre-
sumptively an infringement.  The formalist approach can be reduced to 
the following simplistic formula: unauthorized use − fair use − other ex-
emptions = infringement. 
2. Informal Copyright Practices 
By contrast, the world of informal copyright practices is much mess-
ier.  Informal copyright practices are those practices involving a copy-
righted work that have yet to be subject to a formal license or a settled 
court decision finding the practice or general type of practice non-
infringing.  They are “informal” in that the user of the copyrighted work 
does not have either a formal license or formal law (as in a statutory pro-
vision or court decision) that has clearly legitimized the use or type of 
use in question.  I would classify implied licenses as informal copyright 
practices, at least if the implied license was not ever recognized as such 
by a formal court decision. 
Informal copyright practices occur routinely every day.  Indeed, it is 
probably fair to surmise that the total number of informal copyright 
practices dwarfs the total number of formal copyright practices in the 
United States.  In other words, far more people make far more unli-
censed uses of copyrighted works than licensed or formally authorized 
uses. 
To return to the analogy of physics, examining informal copyright 
practices can be likened to Einstein’s view of physics, in which the uni-
verse is not governed by fixed, unchanging laws of motion.41  Instead, 
things are relative through space and time.42  Similarly, the way copyright 
operates is relative to the way people use copyrighted works, and the le-
gal status of those uses may evolve and become clearer—or even change 
 
 38. Omar Saleem, The Physics of Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
147, 158 (2007) (quoting BRIAN GREENE, THE FABRIC OF THE COSMOS 8 (2004)). 
 39. Id. at 157. 
 40. Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2002). 
 41. See Steven Goldberg, Albert Einstein, Esq., 93 GEO. L.J. 319, 320–21 (2004). 
 42. Id. 
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completely—over time.  Although the analogy to physics may seem a lit-
tle strained, legal realists have drawn on this comparison for some time.43 
To many who espouse the formalist view of copyright, informal 
copyright practices may all sound like a euphemism for copyright in-
fringement.  In the section that follows, I explain why this view is mis-
taken.  In some cases, the informal copyright practices could constitute 
infringement.  In other cases, though, they could be fair use or fall within 
another exemption.  In still other cases, the law might be unclear, or the 
copyright holders might tolerate or later condone the practice without 
ever granting a formal license.  The precise status of the practice in ques-
tion might, therefore, be unclear.  These “gray areas” should be recog-
nized as such.  If we were forced to depict this approach in a formula, it 
would resemble the following: unauthorized use + gray area of copyright 
law = informal copyright practice = what over time? 
C. Informal Copyright Practices as Gap Fillers in Copyright Law 
When discussing copyright law, it is easy for lawyers to discuss legal 
issues purely from the standpoint of the “black letter law” of copyright.  
Controversies over abstract legal principles are debated with little, if any, 
consideration of how informal practices—such as custom, dealing, and 
usage—may help to resolve the debate.  The expectation is that all an-
swers to copyright issues will come from either the Copyright Act or 
courts applying it.  This expectation does not square with reality, how-
ever.  The “formal” law of copyright can only go so far.  It is filled with 
many gaps and gray areas.  That is why informal practices are needed.  
They often serve as gap fillers in the copyright system. 
Before explaining my theory of “gap fillers,” it is important to dis-
tinguish my use of the term “gap” from how it is sometimes used in legal 
realist literature.44  I use “gap” to indicate those areas in formal law 
where it is relatively unclear ex ante how the formal law would treat a 
particular set of facts.  There is a gap in formal law because it is unclear.  
This is to be contrasted with a “gap” or divergence between formal law 
and law in action—i.e., circumstances in which people do not appear to 
be following the law at all.  For example, drivers might openly flout the 
speed limit and drive ninety miles per hour.  That, however, is not the 
kind of gap I speak of.  My theory is focused on gaps in the formal law 
itself, such as would be the case if there were no formal speed limit at all 
or if the law merely stated that the speed limit must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis.  I use the term “gap” and “gray area” to include those 
situations that describe when federal courts may appropriately create 
 
 43. See Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE. L.J. 238, 241 (1950). 
 44. See, e.g., Handler et al., supra note 32, at 499 (“The suggestion that the ‘gap’ between formal 
prescription and social actuality should be closed.”). 
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federal common law within a statute,45 as well as those circumstances in 
which the formal law is uncertain or indeterminate to such an extent that 
the public has little, if any, basis to determine whether a contemplated 
use is permissible. 
1. Using Informal Practices to Fill Gaps 
The idea of using practices to fill gaps in formal law is nothing new.  
In international law, for example, customary practices among nations can 
become a part of international law.46  In tort law, industry custom may 
provide evidence relevant to the reasonableness of certain conduct.47  In 
contract law, where we have seen probably the greatest discussion of gap 
fillers, performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade can fill gaps 
left open in a contract.48 
My theory of informal copyright practices builds on this basic intui-
tion: sometimes, practices can effectively fill gaps left open by formal 
law.  But my claim to relying on informal copyright practices as gap fill-
ers is far more modest than the examples above.  I do not here argue that 
courts should rely on informal copyright practices in the relatively few 
copyright cases that are litigated each year.  That issue I leave for an-
other day.  Instead, my theory focuses on the gaps left open for issues 
that remain unlitigated; that is where the greatest need for gap fillers ex-
ists in our copyright system.  We should rely on informal copyright prac-
tices for the vast amount of unlitigated uses of copyrighted works, par-
ticularly if the legality of the use in question falls within a gray area of 
formal copyright law.  However, if formal copyright law is clear (such as 
in holding that unauthorized music file sharing is illegal),49 an informal 
copyright practice is unnecessary. 
The primary reason we need gap fillers in copyright law is quite 
simple: formal copyright law is riddled with gray areas and gaps.  At a 
systematic level, the Copyright Act is not constructed to address ex ante 
the welter of circumstances involving uses of copyrighted works.50  Be-
 
 45. See Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2007) 
(discussing “the federal courts’ authority to craft federal common law—an authority that arises from 
the need to fill interstices in federal statutory schemes and the reality that courts are the only federal 
institution capable, at the time the case is before it, of filling those gaps”). 
 46. See Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
859, 859 (2006). 
 47. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.); Steven Hetcher, Creating 
Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 48. See U.C.C. § 2A-207(2) (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (1981); 
Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 389, 396–99. 
 49. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 50. Cf. Ben-Shahar, supra note 48, at 396–97 (discussing efficiency rationales for relying on gap 
fillers in contract law). 
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sides a few very detailed, but mostly industry-based, exemptions,51 the 
Copyright Act is written at such a high level of generality that many of 
the key concepts are often too indefinite to inform the public as to 
whether an anticipated use is infringing, fair use, or otherwise permitted.  
To be sure, some cases of blatant infringement and commercial piracy 
are easy to tell.  But, by the very way Congress has drafted the Copyright 
Act, many gray areas and gaps are necessarily created for the myriad of 
ways and settings in which copyrighted works can be used.  Although in 
other areas of law administrative agencies may help to fill gaps left open 
by general statutes through extensive rulemaking, regulations, and opin-
ion letters, the Copyright Office (as an Article I agency within the Li-
brary of Congress) has had only relatively modest authority in rulemak-
ing and clarifying gaps in copyright law.52  Though some copyright 
scholars argue that the Copyright Office’s role should be increased,53 
even if it is, I doubt it would be enough to handle all the gaps and gray 
areas in copyright law.  For a variety of reasons explained below, the cur-
rent copyright system cannot possibly handle, through either litigation or 
formal licensing, the millions of uses of copyrighted works that occur 
every day. 
Diagram 1 below provides an overall synopsis of my theory.  The 
large circle represents formal copyright law, which signals—or should 
signal—to the public what is permissible.  Yet formal copyright law is 
filled with many gray areas (depicted by the gray circles), created not 
only from open-ended, indeterminate concepts such as fair use, but also 
because of new technologies and new types of uses of copyrighted works.  
The gray areas can be removed by courts and Congress, as represented 
by the black-and-white circles that are added to formal copyright law.  
Unfortunately, however, the number of formal decisions and amend-
ments clarifying the Copyright Act cannot keep up with the fast devel-
opment of new technologies and new uses.  Against this backdrop of 
formal copyright law, which is riddled with gray areas that do not effec-
 
 51. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000) (first sale doctrine); id. § 110 (various exemptions for pub-
lic performances and displays); id. §111 (compulsory license for secondary transmissions by satellite 
and cable); id. § 115 (compulsory license for music covers); id. § 116 (compulsory licenses for juke-
boxes); id. § 117 (limited exemptions for archiving software and repairing computers); id. § 118 (com-
pulsory license for use of certain works in public broadcasting); id. § 119 (exemption for secondary 
transmissions by satellite carriers); id. § 120 (scope of rights in architectural works); id. § 121 (exemp-
tion for copying materials for blind and other people with disabilities); id. § 122 (compulsory license 
for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers within local markets). 
 52. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004) (“The Copyright 
Office’s regulatory authority has historically been limited to issues relating to its ministerial functions, 
such as registration and deposit.”). 
 53. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1123–41 (2007) (proposing a Fair 
Use Board within the Copyright Office to provide opinions on whether a contemplated use is fair use); 
Liu, supra note 52, at 151–52 (“[R]ather than enacting specific industry exemptions to copyright liabil-
ity, Congress could delegate to the Copyright Office the authority to promulgate additional exemp-
tions via regulation.  Thus, the Copyright Office could issue detailed provisions governing what types 
of uses of copyrighted works would be exempt from liability.”). 
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tively signal to the public what is permissible, informal copyright prac-
tices develop. 
DIAGRAM 1 















2. Why Formal Copyright Law Has Many Gaps 
a. Few Copyright Cases Are Ever Litigated 
The first reason that informal practices are important to copyright 
law is that so few uses of copyrighted works ever get litigated.  A formal-
istic, “black letter law” approach works best in copyright cases that are 
actually litigated to completion, setting a precedent from the “top down” 
for the type of practice in question. 
In 2006, the number of copyright cases filed was only 4,944, which 
was consistent with the low numbers in years past.54  Of the copyright 
cases filed each year, only a small fraction ever result in a trial court 
judgment; in 2002, for example, only 423 cases resulted in a judgment.55  
In 2007, the federal district courts issued only 130 published opinions in 
 
 54. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (2007) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS]. 
 55. See STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 1; supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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copyright cases at any stage of proceedings,56 of which only twelve con-
tained any discussion of fair use57—the all-purpose exemption typically 
most important for users.  During 2007, no published decision analyzed 
any copyright claim against UGC. 
The number of appellate copyright decisions is typically far less.  In 
the past five years, the Supreme Court has decided only two copyright 
cases.58  The so-called “copyright” circuit, the Second Circuit, had only 
six published copyright decisions for 2007.59  The Ninth Circuit had only 
six decisions as well.60  As shown in the chart below,61 most of the other 
circuits had even fewer copyright decisions. 
TABLE I 













First Circuit 6 0 0 
Second Circuit 6 0 0 
Third Circuit 1 0 0 
Fourth Circuit 4 1 0 
Fifth Circuit 1 0 0 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 56. Erin Holmes et al., List of Published Copyright Decisions by Federal District Courts in 2007 
(March 10, 2008) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). 
 57. See S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 213–15 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007); Red Bull GmbH v. RLED, LLC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (M.D.N.C. 2007); Tingley Sys., Inc. v. 
HealthLink, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1220 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Tech., 
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, 
Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 636–39 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Tavory v. NTP, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 
531, 538–39 (E.D. Va. 2007); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967–
72 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 190 (D. Mass. 2007); Blanch v. 
Koons, 485 F. Supp. 2d 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 641–44 (S.D. Tex. 2007); DSMC, 
Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 58. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 59. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007); N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, 
Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007); Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007); Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 60. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Welles v. Turner 
Entm’t Co., 503 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 
697 (9th Cir. 2007); Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 61. Edward Lee, Published Copyright Decisions by Federal Appellate Courts 2007 (March 10, 
2008) (listing relevant cases) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). 
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Sixth Circuit 9 1 0 
Seventh Circuit 3 0 0 
Eighth Circuit 0 0 0 
Ninth Circuit 6 2 0 
Tenth Circuit 2 1 0 
Eleventh Circuit 3 0 0 
D.C. Circuit 0 0 0 
Federal Circuit 2 0 0 
    
Total 43 5 0 
And out of all the circuits combined, only five decisions contained 
discussion of the fair use doctrine.  No federal appellate decision in 2007 
considered a copyright claim against UGC. 
The low number of published fair use decisions in 2007 is consistent 
with years past.  In an exhaustive study of fair use decisions from 1978 to 
2005, Barton Beebe found that the federal courts produced only 10.9 fair 
use decisions per year.62  During that time, the courts of appeals typically 
produced well under that amount.63  As Beebe concludes, “this is a sur-
prisingly low number of opinions for such an important area of copyright 
law, particularly one that has received so much academic attention.”64 
The number of federal copyright decisions represents an exceed-
ingly small number compared to the total number of optional registra-
tions of copyrighted works each year (approximately half a million),65 
and an even smaller number when compared to the total number of 
copyrighted works created annually (probably many millions, if not bil-
lions, around the world)66 and the total number of copyrighted works al-
ready in existence (billions more).  The number of copyright lawsuits 
filed recently may, in fact, be somewhat inflated by the numerous law-
 
 62. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (2008). 
 63. Id. at 567 fig.2. 
 64. Id. at 565. 
 65. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL 
YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, at 82 (2005). 
 66. All Internet Web pages, for example, automatically obtain copyrights as long as they have 
the modicum of originality required.  By August 2005, there were 19.2 billion Web pages indexed by 
Yahoo.  See Posting of Tim Mayer to YAHOO! SEARCH BLOG, http://www.ysearchblog.com/archives/ 
000172.html (Aug. 8, 2005).  By September 2006, Google had indexed about 25 billion Web pages.  See 
Danny Wirken, The Google Goal of Indexing 100 Billion Web Pages, SITE PRO NEWS, Sept. 20, 2006, 
http://www.sitepronews.com/archives/2006/sep/20.html. 
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suits brought by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
against illegal downloaders.67 
Thus, by any conservative estimate, only a tiny fraction—well under 
one percent—of all uses of copyrighted works are ever the subject of liti-
gation in court each year.  In other words, the vast majority—probably 
more than ninety-nine percent—of uses of copyrighted works are not ever 
litigated in court.  To make matters worse, federal courts produce an ex-
ceedingly low number of copyright precedents each year and an even 
lower number for fair use, the doctrine that is often most essential to 
members of the public in their use of copyrighted works. 
Several different reasons may help to explain the relatively low 
number of copyright cases.  First, litigation is expensive, and copyright 
holders may be able to achieve enforcement of their copyrights through 
cease-and-desist letters in many instances.  Moreover, probably many 
copyrighted works are not commercially valuable,68 which reduces the in-
centive for the copyright holder to enforce its copyright.  Third, it may be 
time-consuming and expensive for the copyright holder to catch all inci-
dents of infringement.  Fourth, some copyright holders may not be con-
cerned about unauthorized uses of their works, preferring (for any num-
ber of reasons) the unrestricted use of their work.  Some of these 
unauthorized uses may well be fair uses, but we probably have no way of 
knowing for certain if they are not ever litigated. 
The dearth of copyright lawsuits filed each year is significant for our 
copyright system.  It puts incredible pressure on copyright issues to be 
resolved outside of court, whether by formal law, formal contract, or 
other means.  Formal copyright law, however, does an extremely poor 
job of resolving issues outside of court if the law itself is complex or un-
clear, or if the issue is novel.  Unfortunately for our copyright system, 
that is often the case, as I explain in the next section. 
b. Copyright Law Has Many Gray Areas 
Given the high level of generality in the formal law, the relatively 
few copyright cases brought each year leaves many gray areas in copy-
right law.  As the name implies, a gray area is an area in which it is uncer-
tain how the law would treat the particular use in question.69  For a vari-
ety of reasons, formal copyright law is riddled with gray areas. 
 
 67. According to EFF, the RIAA has sued over 18,000 “John Doe” individuals (many of whom 
are college students) since 2003.  See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: 
FOUR YEARS LATER 6 (2007), http:/w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa_at_four.pdf.  It is not clear whether all of 
the “John Doe” suits are categorized as copyright cases in the Annual Report of the Director of the 
United States District Courts.  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 955 (2005) (sug-
gesting less than 1% of copyrighted publications are really commercially valuable). 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45. 
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Even without a high frequency of litigated copyright cases, the for-
malist, top-down approach to copyright law could work well if the Copy-
right Act were written in a way that ordinary people could easily ascer-
tain, ahead of time, whether their contemplated use of a copyrighted 
work was infringing.  If the Copyright Act were clear and easy to under-
stand, people would have an easy time following whatever it said. 
Of course, formal copyright law is far from clear or simple to under-
stand.  Courts and legal commentators alike have repeatedly acknowl-
edged the complexity and indeterminacy of many key provisions of copy-
right law.70  For example, Judge Learned Hand long ago lamented: “[N]o 
principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying 
the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its ‘expression.’  Decisions must therefore 
inevitably be ad hoc.”71  The basic test of substantial similarity for in-
fringement—which is vital for the public to evaluate whether its conduct 
is permissible—is, unfortunately, “largely subjective, thus permitting the 
finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived equi-
ties in a case.”72  And, of course, the fair use doctrine is notoriously fact-
specific, leaving little guidance for users of copyrighted works on 
whether a particular use is fair.73 
Even worse, fair use can act almost as a trap, dangling the lure of 
protection from lawsuits if one makes a more “transformative” use74—
which is exactly the same kind of use that can also constitute an infring-
ing derivative work.75  How one walks the line between fair transforma-
tive use and infringing transformation in a derivative work is harrowing, 
as shown in the Wind Done Gone case where a sequel to Gone with the 
 
 70. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 183 (2007) (“A variety of types of innocent infringement likely take place 
today, but perhaps the most important occurs when someone knowingly copies from an existing work 
and reasonably but erroneously believes, because of copyright law’s complex and often indeterminate 
scope, that her copying is permitted, not prohibited, by copyright law.”). 
 71. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 72. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990). 
 73. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that fair use cannot 
“be simplified with bright-line rules, for the [copyright] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for 
case-by-case analysis”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cypberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207, 209 (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”); 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Lecture, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1999) (“For all its exposure, 
our understanding of fair use has not progressed much beyond Justice Story’s observation [that the 
fair use doctrine] . . . was ‘one of those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in which it is not . . . 
easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all 
cases.’”).  A few rare decisions have established a more general principle of fair use, such as in time-
shift recording of broadcast shows or in intermediate copying of software for the limited purpose of 
interoperability.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (time shift 
recording); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (reverse-engineering).  
Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman argue for the creation of more bright-line “fair use har-
bors” that would indicate ex ante that certain uses are fair.  Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Gold-
man, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007). 
 74. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that transformative “works thus lie at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright”). 
 75. Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing how a preexisting work can 
be transformed to create a derivative work). 
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Wind was first considered an infringing derivative work by the district 
court,76 but later a protected fair use by the Eleventh Circuit.77 
Indeed, some copyright scholars compare the complexity of the 
Copyright Act unfavorably to the Tax Code.78  It is not surprising, then, 
that a Clinton administration “White Paper” on Intellectual Property 
and the National Information Infrastructure, which examined copyright 
law in the Internet age, concluded that few people actually understood 
copyright law.79  That conclusion was confirmed in a recent study on 
user-generated videos by Professors Aufderheide and Jaszi, who sur-
veyed fifty-one people who had made user-generated videos.80  Fifty-four 
percent of those surveyed admitted that they did not understand when it 
was permissible to use copyrighted works.81  During interviews of some 
of the participants, they showed “ignorance and confusion” about copy-
right law, even basic principles.82  For example, seventy-six percent rec-
ognized that fair use permitted them to use copyrighted materials, but 
none of those interviewed could describe accurately the fair use doc-
trine.83  I would not blame them, however, given how fact-specific and 
indeterminate the doctrine is. 
It should be easy to see why informal copyright practices will flour-
ish among the public at large when (1) the type of practice in question 
has never been subject to litigation and (2) the Copyright Act is unclear 
or indeterminate on basic concepts.  In these circumstances, informal 
practices are “gap fillers”: they fill the gap left by formal copyright law 
and let people go about their daily lives (utilizing copyrighted works) in 
the absence of settled precedent clarifying the legality of a particular un-
authorized use of copyrighted works. 
Take, for example, the unauthorized photocopying of copyrighted 
works for individual personal use.  This practice has been going on since 
the advent of the copy machine.  But the status of personal use photo-
copying still remains uncertain.84  In 1973, the Court of Claims in Wil-
liams & Wilkins held that the National Library of Medicine’s photocopy-
ing of copyrighted works for interlibrary loan (based on a one-copy-per-
individual request) constituted a fair use.85  The judgment was affirmed 
 
 76. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2001) 
(discussing the right to make a derivative work). 
 77. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268–76 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 78. See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 396 (2005). 
 79. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 204 (1995). 
 80. PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE CONFUSING: USER-
GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT 2 (2007). 
 81. Id. at 6. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 7. 
 84. See Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 208–09. 
 85. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
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by an equally divided Supreme Court, giving the decision no precedential 
value other than the bare result.86  Since that time, the courts have not 
decided the legality of personal use photocopying, and have even at-
tempted to avoid the question.87  To this day, the legal status of personal 
use photocopying remains uncertain, bedeviling legal commentators.  As 
Professor Litman has explained, some personal uses “seem to fall within 
the literal terms of copyright owners’ exclusive rights, and seem to be ex-
cused by no statutory limitation, but which are nonetheless generally 
considered to be lawful.”88 
Another example of an informal copyright practice is the custom 
that university professors retain the copyrights to their work, even 
though they are employees and therefore fall squarely within the literal 
terms of the work-made-for-hire provision of the Copyright Act.89  Al-
though no court has ever specifically held that professors are exempt 
from the provision under the 1976 Act, it is virtually uncontested that 
professors enjoy (thank heavens) a customary exception of sorts from the 
provision.90  This well-recognized customary practice is even harder to 
explain under the Copyright Act than personal use photocopying, given 
that the customary practice for professors appears to be contrary to the 
work-made-for-hire provision in the Copyright Act. 
c. Copyright Law Faces Novel Issues of Law and New Technology 
or Markets 
Even if we had a system of copyright that more frequently estab-
lished precedent governing particular uses of copyrighted work and that 
 
 86. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
 87. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We do not deal 
with the question of copying by an individual, for personal use in research or otherwise (not for re-
sale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an 
individual might well not constitute an infringement.  In other words, our opinion does not decide the 
case that would arise if Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying 
and creating files for independent research . . . .”).  Courts have held that the creation of university 
“course packs” without authorization from copyright holders was infringement.  See, e.g., Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. 
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 88. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2007). 
 89. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (definition of work made for hire). 
 90. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that “virtually no 
one questioned that the academic author was entitled to copyright his writings”); Weinstein v. Univ. of 
Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that “the academic tradition [of a professor excep-
tion to the work-made-for-hire doctrine] since copyright law began” was unchallenged by the Univer-
sity of Illinois).  But cf. Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 
2004) (unpublished assignments by high school teacher fell within work-made-for-hire); Rouse v. Wal-
ter & Assocs., L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1065 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (university professors’ creation of 
software program was work-made-for-hire).  For further discussion, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590 (1987) (discussing the 
debate); Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty 
Work, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 275 (2002); Russ VerSteeg, Copyright and the Educational Process: The 
Right of Teacher Inception, 75 IOWA L. REV. 381 (1990). 
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more clearly defined permissible uses in the Copyright Act, we would 
still face novel issues of copyright law.  Throughout the history of copy-
right law, new technologies—including the printing press, pianola, radio, 
jukebox, television, VCR, computer, MP3 player, and the Internet—have 
raised novel issues.91 
The number of novel issues has only accelerated with the advent of 
the fast developing technologies of the Internet and the digital age.92  Be-
cause formal copyright law has a hard time keeping pace with new tech-
nologies and markets, we will inevitably encounter novel issues of law for 
which the formalist, black-letter-law approach cannot provide a defini-
tive answer, at least not until a new precedent is established.  Thus, we 
can expect the development of informal copyright practices when new 
technologies related to the dissemination, copying, and creation of works 
are introduced into the market. 
d. Copyright Law Is Not Static 
One of the shortcomings of the formalist approach to copyright is 
that it attempts to examine copyright questions at a single snapshot in 
time—namely, the moment of unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.  
Under this approach infringement is an on-off switch: the use is either 
infringing or not infringing at the moment of use and for the rest of time. 
Yet this static approach to copyright ignores reality.  Copyright is-
sues do not exist in a timeless vacuum.  As discussed above, few unau-
thorized uses of copyrighted works are ever challenged in court—
meaning that how the copyright holder reacts to the unauthorized use 
can be just as important to the question of infringement as the user’s 
conduct.  Even if the use is later challenged, cases often settle before 
trial—thus resolving the case by a copyright practice hashed out between 
the parties.  And even in those cases that are fully litigated, other infor-
mal copyright practices may develop during the litigation that may influ-
ence the court’s decision. 
For example, the Sony case took three years of litigation in the trial 
court,93 another two years before the Court of Appeals,94 and nearly 
three years more before the Supreme Court rendered its decision.95  Of 
course, time did not stand still during the eight years it took for the case 
to resolve.  During that time, sales of VCRs dramatically increased, and 
the practice of American viewers recording television shows became 
 
 91. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622–26 (2001). 
 92. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1307 
(2002). 
 93. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 94. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 95. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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widespread.96  There was a growing public perception that the govern-
ment had no business trying to meddle with what ordinary people were 
doing in their homes.97  Some of that same sentiment appeared to color 
the Supreme Court’s decision, which in the end noted: “One may search 
the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of 
the millions of people who watch television every day have made it 
unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a 
flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying pos-
sible.”98 
Once we move from a static to a more dynamic view of copyright, 
we should recognize that just as the law develops over time, so too do in-
formal practices.  I think it is helpful to think of informal practices as 
having life cycles.  All have a beginning.  Some develop and become 
widespread.  Others go nowhere and possibly end.  In the Sony case, the 
informal practice of tape recording TV shows outpaced the courts’ vari-
ous decisions about its legality.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision to 
uphold the practice, “time shift” recording flourishes today like never be-
fore, albeit on more sophisticated DVR technology that has raised new 
legal questions.99 
Professors Hughes and Liu, in separate articles, have provided a 
helpful injection of time in the analysis of fair use, arguing that the case 
for fair use may increase as the copyrighted work becomes older.100  Al-
though their suggestion is a step in the right direction, it does not go far 
enough.  Time should be factored into our basic understanding of all 
copyright issues, on both a micro (individual) and a macro (systemic) 
level.  Every single use of a copyrighted work can be understood indi-
vidually as having its own life cycle on a micro level.  So, too, does every 
type of practice—such as time-shift recording of TV shows—have its own 
life cycle on a macro level.  Instead of examining snap shots, copyright 
law should examine the entire life cycle for a particular use in question. 
e. Costs of Copyright Enforcement Are High 
Gray areas in formal copyright law can persist over time because it 
may be impracticable for copyright holders to seek court resolution of 
many legal disputes.  Particularly for media companies and commercial 
works, the copyright holders must make some very practical decisions 
 
 96. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT 
OF THE VCR 163–67, 197 (1987). 
 97. See id. at 203–05. 
 98. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
 99. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 624 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (cable company’s DVR system allowing subscribers to record shows on company’s 
central servers and play back later facilitated copyright infringement—although defendant did not 
raise fair use defense). 
 100. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copy-
right and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002). 
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about what kinds of unauthorized uses of their works to go after.  The 
Internet facilitates the nearly instantaneous copying and sharing of works 
by billions of people around the world.  In this digital environment, cor-
porate copyright holders must effectively triage their litigation strategy to 
focus on those types of activities that are most worrisome to their busi-
ness—typically, commercial piracy and other unauthorized commercial 
uses that cut into their existing or planned markets.  Given these practi-
cal considerations, copyright holders may not ever challenge certain 
kinds of informal practices, which then continue to exist within a gray 
area of formal copyright law.  The major copyright holders’ need for tri-
aging their litigation efforts may lead systematically to the avoidance of 
court precedent for a range of unauthorized uses the copyright holders 
find less worrisome or not bothersome at all.  Given that strategy, formal 
copyright law cannot provide the answers to many uncertain issues that 
simply escape adjudication. 
3. Formal Licenses Cannot Fill All the Gaps in the Copyright System 
Formal contracts can help fill at least some of the gaps left open by 
formal copyright law.  Even if formal copyright law is uncertain, the par-
ties themselves can engage in private ordering, or licensing, to clarify 
their rights and obligations.  Copyright licenses routinely occur in com-
mercial contexts, such as in the movie and music industries.  These for-
mally licensed uses fall within the category of formal copyright practices.  
Software and media companies also try to impose contracts on users of 
their content through adhesion contracts called end-user license agree-
ments or user agreements, often deployed through “click-on” features on 
Web sites or shrink-wrap on packaging.101 
Although, in the past, formal licenses were probably used mainly by 
commercial entities with lawyers, Creative Commons has greatly 
changed the practice on the Internet.  Started by Lawrence Lessig in 
2001, Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that provides free 
digital licenses that enable copyright holders to attach a “Creative Com-
mons” license to their works.102  The license indicates the terms set by the 
author—such as allowing others to share, copy, and remix the work, as 
long as the use is noncommercial and attribution is given.  The terms are 
fixed ahead of time and made known with the work itself, so there are 
 
 101. The enforceability of these contracts has generated a considerable amount of discussion.  
See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON  
L. REV. 511, 513 (1997); Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are 
Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173 (2007); Matthew D. Walden, Note, Could 
Fair Use Equal Breach of Contract?: An Analysis of Informational Web Site User Agreements and 
Their Restrictive Copyright Provisions, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (2001). 
 102. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of 
Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 
285–86 (2007). 
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virtually no transaction costs for downstream users of the work.103  By 
2006, nearly 149 million Creative Commons licenses were in existence.104 
Although the Creative Commons movement has been a success by 
any measure, it still probably has not put a dent into the vast disparity 
between the number of formal and informal copyright practices.  It is 
probably safe to surmise that most uses of copyrighted works are not 
formally licensed.  For example, in the Grokster case alone, the movie 
studios provided evidence that “billions of files are shared across the 
FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month,” making the “probable 
scope of copyright infringement . . . staggering.”105  File sharing is only 
one small subset of the total number of uses of copyrighted works.  Peo-
ple use copyrighted works everyday without formal licenses, in a variety 
of contexts that are only growing by the day on the Internet.  In Web 2.0, 
the entire Internet is becoming the fodder for “cutting and pasting,” 
“dragging and dropping,” and reconfiguring and remixing to the user’s 
own preference.  Many unlicensed uses of copyrighted works have color-
able claims of fair use.  Many probably do not.  Regardless, given the 
sheer number of uses of copyrighted works, it is probably unrealistic to 
expect that formal licenses should be obtained in all cases.  In many 
situations, the transactions costs may be too high for the particular use in 
question. 
4. Copyright Holders Sometimes “Hedge,” Preferring to Avoid Formal 
Licenses 
Even beyond transaction costs, sometimes the copyright holders 
may actually prefer to allow third parties to use their copyrighted works, 
but without formal licenses.  This informal arrangement gives the copy-
right holders effectively a “hedge.”  Under the hedge, the copyright 
holders can “wait and see” what happens with all the different uses of 
their works.  Some uses the copyright holder may end up liking—
whether for free advertising, promotion, or even discovering new talent.  
For example, Nick Haley, a nineteen-year-old student in the United 
Kingdom, made an unauthorized mashup video of an iPod commercial, 
synchronized with a copyrighted song and posted it on YouTube.106  
Once Apple saw it, Apple hired Haley to produce one of Apple’s new 
television commercials.107 
The advantage of hedging instead of granting formal licenses is that 
copyright holders can get the best of both worlds: free promotion and 
 
 103. Id. at 285–94. 
 104. Id. at 286–87. 
 105. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005). 
 106. See Stuart Elliott, Student’s Ad Gets a Remake, and Makes the Big Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/business/media/26appleweb.html?_r=2&oref= 
slogin&oref=slogin. 
 107. Id. 
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talent trolling from various unauthorized uses of their works, combined 
with the ability to later protest other unauthorized uses of their works. 
One well-known hedge by a copyright holder involved the famous 
Saturday Night Live clip “Lazy Sunday,” a hilarious rap parody about 
The Chronicles of Narnia.  The skit aired on NBC on December 17, 
2006.108  Soon afterwards, someone reportedly uploaded a copy of the 
clip onto YouTube without NBC’s permission.109  NBC, however, did not 
demand that YouTube remove the clip until nearly two months later; by 
that time, the clip had already become a huge hit on YouTube, drawing 
five million views.110  After all the publicity, YouTube CEO Chad Hurley 
was the one who in fact phoned NBC to ask whether NBC had put the 
“Lazy Sunday” clip on YouTube.111  NBC’s response: we’ll get back to 
you.112  NBC did, eventually asking YouTube to remove the clip.113 
NBC learned a lesson from the huge popularity that YouTube pro-
vided to NBC’s show. Afterwards, NBC even agreed to a deal with You-
Tube to help promote its shows on YouTube,114 although the “Lazy Sun-
day” clip still remained only on NBC’s own site.  John Miller, chief 
marketing officer for NBC Universal Television Group, openly admitted, 
“[W]e want to fully embrace the viral activity that YouTube em-
braces.”115  NBC has experimented with having a channel on YouTube, 
but also developed its own video site called Hulu.116 
The hedge also is a cost-saving mechanism for major corporate 
copyright holders.  It is much cheaper for them to have a blanket policy 
against formally licensing their works to individuals.  Saying no—or not 
even responding—to users is far cheaper and easier than having to figure 
out what requests to approve and on what terms.  As Stephanie Marti-
 
 108. See Andrew Wallenstein, ‘SNL’ Skit Puts YouTube on Map, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Mar. 
21, 2006, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_ 
id=1002199880. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The Charlie Rose Show: A Conversation with the Founders of YouTube (PBS television 
broadcast Aug. 11, 2006), available at http://www.charlierose.com/shows/2006/08/11/3/a-conversation-
with-the-founders-of-youtube. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Sara Kehaulani Goo, NBC Taps Popularity of Online Video Site, WASH. POST, June 28, 2006, 
at D1. 
 115. Id. 
 116. NBC appears to be still working out—or hedging on—its online video strategy.  In June 
2006, NBC announced a strategic partnership with YouTube in which NBC created its own channel on 
YouTube to show NBC videos.  Press Release, YouTube, NBC and YouTube Announce Strategic 
Partnership, (June 27, 2006), at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=c0g5-NsDdJQ.  In 
2007, NBC suddenly removed its YouTube channel, preferring instead to launch its videos on its own 
NBC site and on Hulu, a joint project between NBC and FOX.  Owen Thomas, NBC Pulls YouTube 
Channel, VALLEYWAG, Oct. 21, 2007, http://valleywag.com/tech/online-video/nbc-pulls-youtube-
channel-313276.php.  Later, however, Hulu decided to launch another channel back on YouTube that 
included NBC videos!  Liz Gaines, Hulu Brings NBC (and FOX) Back to YouTube, NEWTEEVEE, 
May 1, 2008, http://newteevee.com/2008/05/01/hulu-brings-nbc-and-fox-back-to-youtube/. 
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nelli, a Disney clearance administrator, explained in response to one such 
request: 
It is difficult to respond to your request, since we certainly under-
stand your worthwhile intentions.  Unfortunately, however, I am 
afraid we are going to have to deny your request to include footage 
from MARY POPPINS in your home video project, as requested.  
Due to the growing number of requests that we are receiving from 
individuals, school groups, churches, corporations and other organi-
zations that wish to use clips from our productions as part of their 
video projects and other similar uses, we have had to establish a 
general policy of non-cooperation with requests of this nature.  Un-
fortunately, we simply do not have the staff necessary to oversee 
and review all of the details of each specific request that we receive 
in order to determine whether the requested uses fall within accept-
able guidelines or whether talent, music or film clip re-use pay-
ments to those featured in the footage and other legal clearances 
would be necessary to obtain before permission for requests of this 
nature can be granted.117 
Of course, an automated online system of licensing media content might 
alleviate this problem, but, so far, the major media producers have not 
invested in such a user-friendly system. 
The concept of “hedge” encompasses a variety of levels of accep-
tance or nonacceptance of an informal practice by copyright owners—
including tolerated use, acquiesced use, accepted use, publicly encour-
aged use, and uses that even might be supported by implied licenses.  
The “hedge” is most effective when the copyright owner cannot be 
pinned down as having formally authorized the use.  A copyright owner 
might merely tolerate the unauthorized use without stating a public posi-
tion on it.  Or she might speak vaguely in favor of a practice—though 
without committing to a license or while appearing to express reserva-
tions.  The copyright owner’s private and public positions may even 
change or evolve over time—initially against a practice, but then for it, or 
vice versa.  Even the levels of acceptance (or not) of the practice can 
vary.  At one point, the copyright owner might appear to be merely tol-
erating unauthorized uses.  At other points, she might seem to be coming 
close to approving it.  The key to the hedge is that the copyright owner’s 
precise position is unclear over some period of time, offering a possible 
strategic benefit to the copyright holder to keep all of its options open. 
D. Summary 
Thus, for a number of reasons, we can expect systematic gaps in 
formal copyright law.  Those gaps can be filled by formal contracts be-
 
 117. See J.D. LASICA, DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD’S WAR AGAINST THE DIGITAL GENERATION 72–
73 (2005). 
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tween the parties, but also by informal copyright practices consisting of 
unlicensed uses.  Informal copyright practices are most needed in copy-
right law where gaps or gray areas exist in formal copyright law. 
DIAGRAM 2 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMAL AND FORMAL COPYRIGHT 
PRACTICES 
Formal copyright 




develop in gray areas
New technologies









My theory is depicted graphically in Diagram 2, which injects the 
important element of time. The entire copyright system must be viewed 
on a timeline.  Copyright is not static.  In this dynamic context, formal 
copyright law attempts to govern copyright relations from the top down, 
as depicted by the circle at the top of the diagram.  For a variety of rea-
sons discussed already, formal copyright law does a relatively poor job at 
this task because it is filled with so many gray areas—uncertainties and 
indeterminacies spurred on by new technologies and copyright law’s 
preference for case-by-case adjudication over clear rules or guidelines. 
There are three primary ways to deal with these gray areas.  First, 
Congress and the courts can clarify the Copyright Act.  In some cases, 
Congress may even codify a developing or preexisting custom; in such 
cases, the informal copyright practice “bubbles up” to the top and is in-
corporated into the Copyright Act.  However, the relatively few pub-
lished copyright decisions and even fewer copyright amendments each 
year make this option inadequate to address all of the many uncertainties 
in copyright law.  Second, the parties themselves can engage in private 
ordering by formal contract, as depicted by the small white circles, which 
attempt to make the relations between parties more black-and-white.  
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Commercial licenses fall within this category, as do Creative Commons 
licenses.  High transaction costs and strategic hedging preclude formal 
contract from being a panacea, however.  Third, informal copyright prac-
tices can and do develop, especially for noncommercial uses.  As de-
picted in Diagram 2, informal copyright practices (developing within the 
gray circles) far exceed the number of formal contracts (depicted by the 
white circles), although informal practices cluster more around noncom-
mercial uses, which are less often subject to a lawsuit or a formal license. 
Of course, there is crossover among the categories.  Gray circles can 
become white circles through adjudication of a court decision, which 
then feeds back into formal copyright law clarifying the legality of the 
type of practice in question.  Congress could also step in to clear up gray 
areas, as was the case with the Clear Play-type exemption in section 
110(11).118  But, often, the gaps in formal copyright law persist over time.  
Informal practices are therefore necessary for our copyright system to 
survive. 
II. EVALUATING INFORMAL COPYRIGHT PRACTICES—GOOD OR BAD? 
This Part examines whether some informal copyright practices can 
be distinguished as “good” versus “bad.”  Although I favor a broad, plu-
ralist approach to accepting informal copyright practices, I believe some 
practices can be considered illegitimate or contrary to our copyright sys-
tem.  I propose a set of factors—what I call the Five-Factor Informality 
Test—by which to judge whether we should allow or reject an informal 
copyright practice. 
A. The Pluralist Approach and the Neutrality Participation Principle 
The starting point of my theory is that determining the “right” bal-
ance for our copyright system is indeterminate.  People have different 
views on how best to “to promote the Progress of Science” as the Fram-
ers envisioned in drafting the Copyright Clause.119  Some people—e.g., 
the major corporate copyright holders, including the movie and music 
industries—prefer a maximalist approach to copyright, giving strong 
rights to copyright holders.  Other people prefer a more moderate or 
minimalist scope to copyrights, so that users can have greater freedom to 
reuse copyrighted works as a part of their own creative endeavors.  Your 
view on how well our copyright system functions will inevitably be 
shaped by where along the spectrum you fall.  Although the Copyright 
 
 118. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (Supp. V 2005). 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Clause imposes certain limits (e.g., originality, limited times),120 Congress 
has considerable latitude within which to maneuver. 
Although we could debate what the proper scope of copyright is, I 
strongly doubt we would ever reach a consensus.  For the purposes of 
this Article, it is far more productive to recognize the pluralism on this 
issue and devise a theory that is neutral and fair to all sides. 
My theory therefore begins with the basic premise that the devel-
opment of informal copyright practices should be open to all.  Copyright 
holders do not hold a monopoly over developing informal copyright 
practices.  Nor do users.  Everyone should have an equal opportunity to 
participate in the creation of an informal copyright practice.  Thus, gaps 
in formal copyright law present both a shortcoming and an opportunity.  
It is a shortcoming in that the law fails to inform the public on how to act.  
It is an opportunity in that the gaps can be filled informally by users, in-
termediaries, and copyright holders, acting individually or collectively at 
the ground level. 
This is what I call the neutrality-participation principle.  It is based 
on a pluralistic view of the overall scope of our copyright system and al-
lows everyone to participate in the process of developing an informal 
practice.  For example, the movie studios can originate industry practices 
governing copyright issues, such as the need for licenses for commercial 
uses of a copyrighted work.  Likewise, users can also develop informal 
practices related to copyrighted works, such as photocopying works for 
personal use.  Whether either practice should ultimately be embraced (or 
rejected) should not depend on who created it. 
In this regard, I disagree somewhat with the approach proposed by 
Professor Rothman in her excellent article on the role of custom in IP.121  
She is skeptical of customs that are not “develop[ed] with input and par-
ticipation of both IP owners and users and large and small players in the 
IP industries.”122  She prefers customs that are representative of the ma-
jor interests involved, at least when courts are considering whether to 
rely on the custom in deciding a copyright issue. 
My theory does not focus on the same problem as Rothman’s—a 
court’s incorporation of custom into copyright law.  Regardless, I do not 
see why the fact that a custom originated from one side—whether a 
copyright holder or a user—should necessarily make the custom be con-
sidered suspect.  In my view, informal copyright practices often develop 
in a far more loose and fluid fashion.  Sometimes, interested parties do 
meet together to hammer out a set of guidelines or “best practices.”  But 
often they don’t.  Instead, what happens is that someone just starts an in-
formal practice on her own and sees what happens.  The practice might 
 
 120. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 (1991) (originality); El-
dred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 (2003) (limited times). 
 121. Rothman, supra note 29. 
 122. Id. at 1972. 
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eventually be followed by others, or it might be rejected or provoke 
blowback.  Or the reaction might fall somewhere in between these out-
comes, with others starting an alternative practice of their own.  Under 
my theory, the lack of representativeness in the creation or development 
of the practice would not necessarily mean that it should be discounted.  
As long as the opportunity for developing copyright practices is available 
to all on a neutral basis, my theory does not attempt to evaluate the le-
gitimacy of an informal practice based on who instituted or developed it. 
The concept of informal copyright practices shares some character-
istics with the New Governance model—the so-called “‘third way’ vision, 
between state-based, top-down regulation and a single-minded reliance 
on market-based norms”123—much discussed today in health care, em-
ployment and labor law, and environmental law.  As Orly Lobel de-
scribes, “The new governance model supports the replacement of the 
New Deal’s hierarchy and control with a more participatory and collabo-
rative model, in which government, industry, and society share responsi-
bility for achieving policy goals.”124  Like the New Governance model, 
my concept of informal copyright practice is “open, dynamic, and diverse 
with a built-in temporal dimension.”125  Informal copyright practices offer 
a third way of resolving copyright issues.  One way is through formal law 
and litigation.  Another way is through formal licensing.  But a third way 
is through informal copyright practices, a kind of “soft law” approach to 
dispute resolution.126 
Ultimately, however, my concept of informal copyright practice 
does not fit neatly within the New Governance paradigm.  For starters, 
most of the informal copyright practices I discuss do not involve any state 
actors, not even for the coordination or development of the practices.  In 
that respect, New Governance scholars might consider these informal 
copyright practices nothing other than the market operating—an alterna-
tive that New Governance seeks to move beyond with state involvement 
in coordinating the process by which private actors develop norms in a 
transparent manner.127  Moreover, when informal copyright practices de-
velop, they may not necessarily result from any collective negotiation or 
decision making among interested stakeholders, or even consciousness of 
a governance issue.  Informal practices can develop without any con-
stituency ever forming or convening to decide what to do.  For example, 
I might use a short clip of a copyrighted show as a part of mashup video 
to share online, or reproduce on my blog (with proper attribution) some-
 
 123. Handler et al., supra note 32, at 494. 
 124. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004). 
 125. Id. at 348. 
 126. See id. at 388–89 (discussing various ways in which “soft law” is used in legal scholarship). 
 127. Cf. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal 
State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (2006–2007) (discussing how New Governance attempts to move 
beyond the state-market dichotomy). 
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one else’s entire article, all noncommercially but without permission.  My 
conduct may not be a New Governance tool, but it is an informal copy-
right practice.  If others follow the same sort of informal practice on their 
own, it gains more of the complexion of a governance development.  Yet 
it still is far more diffuse, uncoordinated, and random than the kind of 
collaboration that the New Governance movement seeks.128  However, if 
major copyright holders end up supporting the practice too, the informal 
practice does take on the air of a New Governance solution hashed out 
loosely by the various actions and reactions of the interested parties over 
time. 
Although our copyright system might be well served if it openly en-
couraged “New Governance” collaboration among users and copyright 
holders over the scope and enforcement of copyrights, I am skeptical that 
big media copyright holders would agree to a process that was so formal-
ized.  Crucial to the “hedge” for media companies is the ability to avoid 
being pinned down on how they enforce their copyrights.  Even appear-
ing at the table with users would make it appear that their copyrights are 
all negotiable.129  I think big media prefer to maintain a public front es-
pousing an “all rights reserved” approach to their copyrights, while at the 
same time hedging on whether to allow certain unauthorized uses of 
their works without protest.  In any event, I do not stake out the strong 
normative position that our copyright system should be formally re-
vamped to incorporate greater “New Governance” participation and col-
laboration.130  We do have a modest example of this kind of formal struc-
ture in the rulemaking process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DCMA) that allows users to seek limited exemptions to the DMCA an-
ticircumvention provision,131 as well as in the possibility of negotiated 
fees for statutory licenses for jukeboxes and other industries.132  Whether 
we need more “New Governance” structures within copyright law I leave 
open for future inquiry.  My theory here focuses instead on how informal 
copyright practices already operate within our existing copyright system. 
B. The Five-Factor Informality Test: When Informal Copyright 
Practices Are Needed Most 
As discussed above, informal copyright practices serve as important 
gap fillers in our copyright system.  They fill the gaps left open by formal 
 
 128. See Lobel, supra note 124, at 400 (describing the New Governance goal of orchestration to 
make “the governance model meaningful”). 
 129. Other scholars have questioned whether the New Governance paradigm can work in con-
texts where there are inequalities of power or disputes between strong and weak actors.  See, e.g., Amy 
J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
503, 535, 540 (2008). 
 130. Cf. Lobel, supra note 124, at 377 (discussing the goals of the New Governance model). 
 131. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2000). 
 132. See, e.g., id. §§ 112(e)(2) (ephemeral recordings), 114(e) (sound recordings), 115(c)(3)(B) 
(covers), 116 (jukeboxes), 118 (public broadcasting). 
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copyright law, which is often unclear or unable to resolve new issues de-
finitively without a court decision.  Informal copyright practices also fill 
the gaps created by high transaction costs in obtaining licenses from 
copyright holders.  When formal licenses are not easy to obtain, we can 
expect that users will rely more on informal practices.  Without informal 
copyright practices, our system of copyright would likely grind to a halt. 
With the gap-filling purpose of informal copyright practices in mind, 
I outline below a nonexhaustive list of five factors that make the devel-
opment of an informal copyright practice more likely and more legiti-
mate: 
The Five-Factor Informality Test for Informal Copyright Practices 
(1) unlitigated use and the absence of settled case law finding the 
practice or type of practice in question constitutes an infringe-
ment; 
(2) the existence of a novel issue of law, such as one involving a new 
technology; 
(3) the existence of a colorable fair use defense, or other exemption 
or defense; 
(4) high transaction costs in obtaining formal licenses from copyright 
holders; and 
(5) no express objection by the copyright holder as to the particular 
use in question or the type of practice, or some indication that 
the copyright holder might allow it. 
Factors 1 through 3 focus on the more common situations in which 
formal copyright law is uncertain.  These situations create gaps and gray 
areas because it is impossible to know ex ante from formal copyright law 
whether the particular use in question is legal.  The use or even type of 
use may not have ever been subject to a court decision.  It may also pre-
sent a novel issue of law for which it is not easy to analogize to existing 
case law governing other types of uses.  The user may have a colorable 
claim of fair use or other exemption. 
Factor 3 can also be grouped with Factors 4 and 5 to target those 
situations in which a user might, for practical reasons, forego obtaining a 
formal license from the copyright holder.  The user might have a color-
able claim of fair use or other exemption, or the transaction costs may be 
too high to locate and negotiate with the copyright holder for a formal 
license.  The law and economics school has suggested, of course, that 
high transactions costs should be considered as a part of fair use.133  Also, 
the reaction of copyright holders is very important.  Under Factor 5, the 
level of protest by the copyright holder (or lack thereof) acts as an im-
 
 133. See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
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portant signaling device to the public at large for whether an informal 
practice is relatively accepted by copyright holders.  If copyright holders 
vehemently protest an activity (such as unauthorized music file sharing), 
people will have little, if any, basis to believe that copyright holders con-
done the practice.  By contrast, if copyright holders publicly encourage 
the practice, people will have a reasonable basis to conclude that it is 
OK, notwithstanding the lack of a formal license.  In some circumstances, 
there might even be a basis to imply a nonexclusive license or apply es-
toppel principles that would effectively negate the copyright holder’s 
ability to challenge the particular use of her work in question.  However, 
Factor 5 is not contingent on any determination of estoppel or implied 
license.  It is meant to gauge the informal cues copyright holders send to 
the public with respect to various uses of their works. 
Although some copyright lawyers and scholars may advise a “per-
mission first” approach to all uses of every copyrighted work, that ap-
proach seems inefficient and impracticable in our modern world.  The 
law and economics school has persuasively shown how transaction costs 
for negotiating IP can pose significant impediments and even be cost-
prohibitive for users to seek permission in every case.134  As Professor 
Gordon explained in the context of fair use: 
A particular type of market barrier is transaction costs. As long as 
the cost of reaching and enforcing bargains is lower than anticipated 
benefits from the bargains, markets will form.  If transaction costs 
exceed anticipated benefits, however, no transactions will occur.  
Thus, the confluence of two variables is likely to produce a market 
barrier: high transaction costs and low anticipated profits.135 
The factors do not all have to be present to justify an informal copy-
right practice.  One factor could weigh very heavily in a particular cir-
cumstance, providing sufficient justification for the informal practice.  
Also, it is important to remember that copyright issues are not static.  
Any of the five factors could shift over time, thereby strengthening or 
weakening the need for an informal copyright practice.  The five factors 
can be written along a spectrum to further indicate that each factor may 
change over time: 
Spectrum for the Five-Factor Informality Test for Informal 
Copyright Practices 
1. Unlitigated use or type of use ............. Litigated use or type of use 
 
 134. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8, 16 (2003) (discussing why the scope of intellectual property must be 
narrower than physical property, given the high transaction costs for intellectual property); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357 
(1989) (arguing for fair use when “costs of a voluntary exchange are so high relative to the benefits 
that no such exchange is feasible between a user of a copyrighted work and its owner”). 
 135. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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2. Novel issue of the type of use............................ Settled issue of law 
3. Colorable fair use defense or exemption......No colorable defense 
4. High transaction costs to license..Low transaction costs to license 
5. No protest by copyright holder ........... Protest by copyright holder 
The Five-Factor Informality Test does not hinge on establishing a fair 
use.  Part of the problem with fair use is that it is so fact specific, if not 
completely subjective.  Even if the case for fair use or other exemption is 
doubtful, the other parts of the Five-Factor Informality Test may in some 
cases militate in favor of allowing the informal practice.  For example, if 
copyright holders have never challenged or spoken against the practice 
for many years, that factor alone may tip the balance in the practice’s fa-
vor, even if it is not a fair use. 
C. Examples Applying the Five-Factor Informality Test 
With the five factors now on the table, we can apply them to a few 
well-known practices to see if they aid our understanding.  I have se-
lected two examples that should be very familiar to most people: (1) pho-
tocopying material for personal use and (2) unauthorized music file shar-
ing.  I contend that the former is a legitimate informal copyright practice, 
while the latter is not. 
1. Why Photocopying for Personal Use Is a Legitimate Practice 
Photocopying copyrighted material for purely personal use offers a 
stark example of a huge gap or gray area in formal copyright law.  The 
case for a gap-filling informal copyright practice is compelling. 
First, the practice has, for decades, escaped litigation and a settled 
court precedent.  Williams & Wilkins was decided by the Court of Claims 
in 1973,136 but its force as authority is shaky or at least unclear, in part be-
cause of the Supreme Court’s 4-4 split in reviewing the case.137  The 1976 
Copyright Act now includes a specific exemption for libraries to engage 
in limited photocopying of works for their patrons for noncommercial 
purposes.138  Curiously, though, the exemption does not speak to the le-
gality of an individual patron’s copying for personal, noncommercial use.  
A library could be deemed exempt under section 108, while an individual 
patron could be held liable under the Copyright Act.  The gap in the law, 
which has persisted for decades, is not likely to ever be resolved, as copy-
 
 136. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
 137. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).  To borrow Judge Leval’s de-
scription, this issue might be the kind of “question[] that never need[s] to be answered” in copyright 
law because it is never presented.  Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1449, 1457 (1997). 
 138. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). 
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right holders have avoided settling the issue (not wanting to sue an indi-
vidual for personal photocopying and suffering the negative publicity).  
Courts, too, have gone out of their way to avoid the issue.139  Thus, Fac-
tors 1 and 2 cut heavily in favor of the development of an informal prac-
tice. 
Factor 3 cuts in favor as well.  Few would dispute that individuals 
have at least a colorable (if not successful) claim of fair use in photocopy-
ing material for noncommercial, personal use.  The noncommercial pho-
tocopying of different works can facilitate a person’s ability to engage in 
research, scholarship, and learning.  We might be concerned if entire 
books were being copied, but the labor and cost involved in doing so 
probably is a sufficient deterrent to keep such practice in check. 
Factors 4 and 5 also militate in favor of the development of an in-
formal copyright practice related to noncommercial photocopying.  Ob-
taining permission to photocopy portions of a work for personal use 
would all but defeat the very practice.  The transaction costs are too high.  
Often a person intending to photocopy a work is seeking to use the ma-
terial right away or in the foreseeable future, such as for a school project 
or for the ability to highlight and write on the material.  But obtaining 
copyright permissions can typically take months, if not longer, assuming 
the copyright holder can be readily identified and located.  Even if lo-
cated, there is no guarantee that the copyright holder will even respond.  
By all indications, copyright holders are simply not concerned with such 
personal photocopying of their works.  Based on the lack of litigation or 
protest by copyright holders over the last four decades, users can rea-
sonably surmise that copyright holders do not mind the noncommercial 
photocopying of portions of their works for personal use. 
Under these circumstances, and especially because of the length of 
time the issue has remained unsettled and escaped court decision, an in-
formal practice is appropriate to fill the gap left open by formal copyright 
law.  All five factors support the informal practice here as a gap filler. 
2. Why Unauthorized Music File Sharing Is an Illegitimate Practice 
Unauthorized music file sharing, even for alleged personal use, pro-
vides a contrasting example.  Most of the five factors do not indicate any 
gap that needs to be filled.  An informal copyright practice of music file 
sharing cannot, therefore, be justified as a gap filler. 
Factors 1 and 5 militate very strongly against the development of an 
informal copyright practice as a gap-filler.  The unauthorized sharing of 
music files has been the subject of thousands of lawsuits, including sev-
eral resulting in court decisions that are all in agreement that such activ-
 
 139. See cases cited supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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ity is illegal copyright infringement.140  In considering the scope of secon-
dary liability for developers of file sharing software in Grokster, the Su-
preme Court has also taken the same view.141  Several district courts have 
recently grappled with the question of whether merely “making avail-
able” a copyrighted file online when using file-sharing software—without 
proof of an actual distribution—constitutes infringement.142  However 
that question as ultimately resolved will not undo the basic ruling that 
unauthorized music file sharing is illegal.  The “making available” cases 
could change the level of proof required, but not the illegal nature of 
copying or distributing music files without authorization.  No one can 
dispute that the major labels and RIAA have vigorously protested the 
practice of music file sharing, almost from the start.  On these two factors 
alone, we probably could rule out the need for any gap filling practice. 
The other three factors also cut against the recognition of an infor-
mal copyright practice.  Although some proponents of music file sharing 
might assert that the law could eventually adopt their position, as it 
stands the formal law of copyright has rejected their arguments.  Today, 
the law is fairly settled that unauthorized music file sharing is infringe-
ment and that fair use does not apply.  As to transaction costs, people 
can always buy music files at relatively cheap prices (ninety-nine cents 
per file) and obtain exactly the same thing as they would obtain through 
illegal music file sharing.  By contrast, that is not necessarily the case with 
photocopied works, which often provide a format more conducive to 
highlighting, annotation, and note-taking than the original work. 
When we tally up the Five Factors, they all militate against the need 
for an informal copyright practice here.  Although some proponents of 
file sharing might contend that eventually formal law will be amended to 
allow the practice (such as by compulsory license), the existence of the 
informal practice of music file sharing—which appears to be widespread 
on the Internet—cannot be justified as a gap filler.  There is no gap. 
The informal copyright practice of unauthorized music file sharing 
would have to be defended, then, as a potential agent of future reform, 
not as a gap filler.  However, I do not include such basis within my the-
 
 140. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 141. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005). 
 142. Compare Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV-06-020760-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1927353, 
at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2008) (stating infringement of a distribution right requires actual dissemination 
of copies or phonorecords, not just proof of making a copy available), and  London-Sire Records, Inc. 
v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 (D. Mass. 2008) (“[M]erely exposing music files to the internet is not 
copyright infringement . . . [but] [t]he evidence and allegations, taken together, are sufficient to allow a 
statistically reasonable inference that at least one copyrighted work was downloaded at least once.”), 
and Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281–82 (D. Conn. 2008) (explaining that 
actual distribution, not just making a file available, in file-sharing case may be required to prove a vio-
lation of distribution right), with Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, No. 05-CV-7340, 2008 WL 
857527, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (holding that the distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) may be 
infringed by “[t]he offer to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of 
further distribution, public performance, or public display”). 
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ory, which defends the development of informal copyright practices only 
as gap fillers.  Whether informal practices should also in some cases be 
defended as legitimate reform agents, I leave for future inquiry. 
D. Using Informal Copyright Practices as Laboratories of 
Experimentation 
One benefit of allowing the widespread development of informal 
copyright practices as gap fillers is that they can provide “laboratories of 
experimentation” for formal copyright law.143  As discussed earlier, Con-
gress has repeatedly codified customs, especially as exemptions, in the 
Copyright Act.144  Informal copyright practices have the advantage of be-
ing tested in the marketplace.  Instead of starting from scratch, Congress 
can learn from actual market experiences before deciding whether an 
amendment to the Copyright Act is needed and, if so, in what way.  
Some informal copyright practices might appear to be undesirable after 
producing negative effects in the market.  Congress might consider other 
informal practices worthy of formal protection, as in the section 110(11) 
exemption for use of Clear Play-type technology for private home view-
ing of DVDs.145 
Because informal copyright practices can be freely altered, re-
shaped, and tested against other informal copyright practices without the 
need to change formal copyright law, they provide much greater flexibil-
ity for resolving copyright disputes and tinkering with the overall balance 
of the copyright system.  Informal copyright practices may well be better 
suited to deal with the fast-developing technologies in the digital age. 
III. USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
The most exciting development on the Internet today is the prolif-
eration of content created by ordinary individuals, who often collaborate 
with each other.  UGC offers the promise of furthering important free 
speech and free press goals, yet it also raises a serious question of possi-
ble copyright infringement.  This Part shows how informal copyright 
practices have developed for UGC, which serve as legitimate gap fillers 
to formal copyright law. 
A. Web 2.0 and User-Generated Content 
Surf the Internet and you will find a considerable amount of content 
that has been created, not by the major media producers, but by ordi-
nary, everyday individuals, both young and old alike.  In Internet par-
 
 143. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 144. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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lance, these individuals are known as “users” of the Internet, and the 
works they produce are known as “user-generated content,” sometimes 
abbreviated as UGC.  To some people, “user-generated content” may 
seem just a fancy, if not confusing, term to describe authors who are cre-
ating works like others have before.  I think that is a fair criticism, and I 
have no particular attachment to the term.  However, because “user-
generated content” is widely used in both technology and media circles 
to refer to certain kinds of amateur creations typically distributed on the 
Internet, I will stick with the term most commonly used.  UGC is one of 
the key attributes of “Web 2.0,” which describes the development of 
greater opportunities for user participation, creation, and collaboration 
on the Internet. 
1. The Phenomenal Growth of User-Generated Content 
Web 2.0 applications now allow ordinary people to create expres-
sive works of their own and to share them immediately with millions of 
others.  In a recent Deloitte survey of 2,000 Internet users ranging in age 
from thirteen to seventy-five, close to half said they had created con-
tent—blogs, music, photos, videos, and Web sites—for others to view 
online.146  In 2008, the number of blogs alone exceeded 112 million (al-
though some may not be active).147  Nearly seventy percent of the people 
polled said they viewed the UGC of others.148  I make no strong empirical 
claim that the tremendous growth of UGC could have only developed 
from gray areas in copyright law.  Some practices, such as music file shar-
ing, flourish in spite of clear copyright decisions finding them illegal.  It is 
also very possible that many individuals would ignore copyright law, 
even if it were crystal clear.  Yet, to the extent we believe that formal 
laws can shape conduct, uncertainty in law completely thwarts that aspi-
ration.  Uncertainty in copyright law has provided the backdrop in which 
UGC has flourished—perhaps surprisingly with the increasing support 
from the major media copyright holders whose content is remixed by us-
ers. 
We can expect that the amount of UGC will only grow, probably 
exponentially, as more and more software companies are developing 
Web 2.0 applications to enable users to create content of their own.  Al-
ready web developers have begun talking about the next phase of the 
Internet—“Web 3.0”—in which the Internet essentially takes over tradi-
tionally desktop-based applications (such as word processing, spread-
sheets, and PowerPoint) and converts them into Web-based applications 
that are greatly enhanced by access to unbelievable amounts of informa-
 
 146. User-Generated and -Watched Content, Opinions, L.A. TIMES.COM, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www. 
latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-content14jan14,0,3327482.story. 
 147. Technorati tracks 112.8 million blogs.  See Technorati: About Us, http://technorati.com/ 
about/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 148. Id. 
LEE.DOC 9/3/2008  4:50:06 PM 
No. 5] WARMING UP TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT 1501 
tion stored in the so-called “clouds”—huge data centers that serve com-
puters through the Internet.149  As Nicholas Carr discusses, the shift to 
“cloud computing”—where software applications and data storage come 
not in the personal computer, but through the Internet connected to 
powerful databases—has the potential to transform fundamentally how 
we communicate.150  Control over media “shift[s] . . . from institutions to 
individuals.”151 
The incredible growth of UGC is the direct result of technological 
innovation, largely driven by the Internet.  The Internet is a vast network 
for communication built on a platform that is open to all.  Blogging soft-
ware, photo- and video-sharing sites, and social networking platforms 
such as Facebook and MySpace have all made it possible for one person 
on the Internet to rival the reach of the huge media conglomerates.  Each 
person can now be a publisher, TV network, radio station, movie studio, 
record label, and newspaper, all wrapped into one. 
A considerable part of the development of Web 3.0 is the offering 
of powerful Internet applications for everyone to remix content as a ba-
sic feature of experiencing the Internet.  Startup companies like 
Tumblr152 and Sprout153 are developing innovative platforms for mashups, 
as are giant tech companies like Microsoft (in its Popfly program)154 and 
Intel (in its Mash Maker program).155  These technologies, though still 
developing, will fundamentally transform how people use the Internet.  
The standard operating functions of the Web will enable people to cus-
tomize and mashup all content on the Web in whatever ways each person 
chooses.  As Robert Ennals, the Mash Maker Architect at Intel explains, 
“We’re trying to change the nature of what the Internet is, where it’s not 
a collection of pages, but collection of information.  And we want to al-
 
 149. See Stephen Baker, Google and the Wisdom of the Clouds, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 24, 2007, at 
49–53 (discussing cloud computing); Eric Schmidt, Web 2.0 vs. Web 3.0, posting of channy to YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T0QJmmdw3b0 (Aug. 2, 2007). 
 150. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH 21–23 (2007). 
 151. Id. at 23. 
 152. Tumblr is a microblogging site that enables users to post quickly all sorts of content within a 
blog platform.  It is meant for much shorter and more frequent postings than a traditional blog.  
Tumblr’s motto is “Post anything.  Customize everything.”  Tumblr, http://www.tumblr.com (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2008); see also Blake Robinson, Davidville, Inc. Tumbles into the Spotlight with Tumblr, 
TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/04/02/davidville-inc-tumbles-into-the-
spotlight-with-tumblr/. 
 153. Sprout is a Web site that allows users to mashup content on the Internet and convert it into 
embeddable widgets.  Sprout Builder, http://sproutbuilder.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2008); see also 
Mark Hendrickson, Sprout Raises $5 Million for Flash Widget Creation, TECHCRUNCH, May 13, 2008, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/05/13/sprout-raises-5-million-for-flash-widget-creation/. 
 154. See Microsoft Popfly, http://www.popfly.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).  Microsoft describes 
Popfly as follows: “[A] fun, easy way to build and share mashups, gadgets, games, Web pages, and ap-
plications.”  Overview, Microsoft Popfly, http://www.popfly.com/Overview/Default.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
 155. See Intel Mash Maker, http://mashmaker.intel.com/web/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).  The 
Mash Maker is a browser extension that allows users to create mashups of whatever they browse on 
the Web.  Learn More: FAQs, Intel Mash Maker, http://mashmaker.intel.com/web/faqs.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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low users to collaboratively choose how they see that information.”156  In 
Web 3.0, people will no longer “surf” the Web—they will mash it. 
Of course, building great technology does not necessarily mean that 
people will use it.  However, in the case of Web 2.0 applications, most of 
which are offered for free on the Internet, people have used them in 
droves.  Part of the attraction of the user-generated culture is very sim-
ple: people can now participate.  As J.D. Lasica explains, “Hundreds of 
millions of us are flocking to the Internet as an alternative media source 
not because it’s more authoritative (although it can be), but because 
we’re lured by a medium that allows people like us to become part of the 
conversation.”157 
Another distinct feature of the user-generated culture is that it is of-
ten collaborative and part of a larger, social network.  The immense 
popularity of YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook can be attributed to 
their social networking features (such as adding of “friends”) that allow 
users to establish connections with people from all around the world.  
These connections can facilitate all sorts of collaboration, ranging from 
users simply providing comments to another user’s video or singing per-
formance, to users “remixing” parts of someone else’s video into video 
responses of their own.  Sometimes, the collaborative projects are quite 
large, as is the case with Wikipedia where users add to, critique, and edit 
the world’s largest, user-generated encyclopedia.158 
Professor Benkler calls this phenomenon peer production, which he 
argues can be more efficient than firm- or standard market-based ap-
proaches in two ways.159  First, peer production is better at processing in-
formation about human capital because it “does not require contractual 
specification of effort but allows individuals to self-identify for tasks.”160  
In this way, people can self-select for those endeavors for which they are 
most suited.  Second, peer production can produce allocation gains.  Ac-
cording to Benkler, 
As peer production relies on opening up access to resources for a 
relatively unbounded set of agents, freeing them to define and pur-
sue an unbounded set of projects that are the best outcome of com-
bining a particular individual or set of individuals with a particular 
set of resources, this open set of agents is likely to be more produc-
tive than the same set could have been if divided into bounded sets 
in firms.161 
 
 156. Martin LaMonica, Intel Mash Maker: Mash-ups for the Masses, CNET NEWS BLOG, Apr. 22, 
2008, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9921313-7.html. 
 157. LASICA, supra note 117, at 14. 
 158. See id. at 83; see also Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 159. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 
369, 381 (2002) (defining the term as the “production by peers who interact and collaborate without 
being organized on either a market-based or a managerial/hierarchical model”). 
 160. Id. at 414. 
 161. Id. at 422. 
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Finally, UGC is often noncommercial—although this line is getting 
fuzzier with the growth of symbiotic relationships between commercial 
entities and individuals engaged in noncommercial pursuits.  UGC is 
typically noncommercial at least in this sense: it is all free.  Users usually 
are not paid to create their own content, and they typically do not charge 
for others to view their content.  Although some users who create may 
hope one day of “being discovered,” vast amounts of UGC are offered 
for free on the Internet, unaccompanied by any ads.  Of course, there is 
crossover by users from noncommercial to more commercial enterprises.  
Google AdSense enables everyone with a blog to incorporate ads.162  
Sometimes, users become discovered through their noncommercial con-
tent and sign deals with media companies.163  Big media corporations are 
now even trying to cultivate or sponsor UGC through contests and pro-
motions.164  Many companies even create videos for users to embed (typi-
cally with a logo from the media company) on other blogs.165  And a few 
well-known professional artists, such as the musical groups Radiohead 
and Nine Inch Nails, have embraced aspects of the user-generated model 
by offering their works entirely for free or at whatever price the con-
sumer desires to pay.166  Mainstream musicians are even allowing the 
public to remix their works. For example, hip-hop producer Amplive re-
mixed Radiohead’s album In Rainbows without permission and offered it 
for free online; Radiohead representatives objected but then later al-
lowed Amplive’s remix after a backlash began brewing on YouTube 
against Radiohead.167  Nine Inch Nails (NIN) went a step further than 
Radiohead and released NIN’s latest album The Slip under a Creative 
Commons license, allowing anybody to reuse and remix the music non-
commercially, as long as attribution is provided and the user allows other 
noncommercial remixes.168  On its Web site, NIN openly encouraged peo-
ple to remix its music and share it with others, all for free.169  In short, the 
lines between noncommercial and commercial, and between media-
generated and UGC, are becoming more fluid and blurred. 
 
 162. See Google Advertising Programs, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ads/ (last visited Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 163. For example, Dutch teenager Esmee Denters was signed by Justin Timberlake’s new label, 
Interscope, to a recording contract after Timberlake heard about the buzz that Denters was creating 
on YouTube.  See Stephen M. Silverman, Justin Timberlake Signs YouTube Singer to His Label, 
PEOPLE, June 5, 2007, http://www.people.com/people/artivle/0,,200414427,00.html. 
 164. See infra notes 259–68 and accompanying text. 
 165. See infra notes 280–85 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Jeff Leeds, Nine Inch Nails Album Is Free Online, N.Y. TIMES.COM, May 6, 2008, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06arts/music/05cnd-nine.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; David Malitz, Ra-
diohead’s ‘Rainbows’: Is Free Release a Potential Pot of Gold?, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2007, at C1. 
 167. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Mp3s: Amplive’s ‘Rainydayz’ Remix of Radiohead’s ‘In Rainbows’ 
Album, WIRED BLOG, Feb. 13, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/02/mp3s-amplives-r.html. 
 168. Nine Inch Nails, The Slip, http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 169. Id. 
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2. The First Amendment Benefits of User-Generated Content 
The shift from consumers being passive viewers of material (i.e., the 
couch potato model) to now more active participants in the creation of 
expressive works is good for society.  There are numerous reasons one 
could offer to support generally the growth of UGC on the Internet,170 
putting aside for the moment the difficult copyright issues that may, in 
some cases, arise with UGC.  My reason focuses on the First Amend-
ment.  UGC greatly facilitates both the freedom of speech and the free-
dom of the press. 
First, the freedom of speech.  In 1997, the Supreme Court consid-
ered its first case involving the Internet.171  In striking down, as facially 
overbroad, provisions of the Communications Decency Act that re-
stricted the transmission of indecent material to minors over the Internet, 
the Court recognized the tremendous potential the Internet offers for 
speech: 
It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communica-
tion of all kinds. The Government estimates that “[a]s many as 40 
million people use the Internet today, and that figure is expected to 
grow to 200 million by 1999.” This dynamic, multifaceted category 
of communication includes not only traditional print and news ser-
vices, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, 
real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with 
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates 
farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web 
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can be-
come a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, “the content on 
the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”172 
A decade later, the “dynamic” and “multifaceted” features of the Inter-
net as a tool of mass communication have become only better, quicker, 
and more empowering for the ordinary individual.  From the perspective 
of the freedom of speech, UGC is valuable because it enables ordinary 
people to participate in the marketplace of ideas, potentially reaching 
audiences never imaginable before.  The very “purpose of the First 
Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”173  By increasing the ability of 
ordinary individuals to participate in the marketplace of ideas, UGC in-
 
 170. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 37, at 470–79 (discussing performance theory); Madhavi Sunder, 
Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 555–67 (2001) (arguing that identity and personhood are de-
veloped by the ability to participate in cultural material). 
 171. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 172. Id. at 870. 
 173. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
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creases not only the creation and dissemination of speech, but also peo-
ple’s education and ability to interact in a global marketplace.174 
UGC also serves the freedom of the press.  The Framers under-
stood the freedom of the press as a separate but related right to the free-
dom of speech.175  As historically understood, the freedom of the press 
meant the freedom of the printing press—a right that was intended to 
make clear that individuals had a First Amendment right to use the tech-
nology of mass publication, free of intrusive government regulations.176  
Reacting to the past abuses of the British Crown in restricting the num-
ber of presses in England, the Framers hoped to foster the development 
of technologies that enabled individuals to engage in mass publication 
and communication in the new Republic.177  Throughout its cases involv-
ing new technologies, the Supreme Court has recognized the important 
First Amendment goal of preserving access to speech technologies.178  
The amazing Web 2.0 technologies that facilitate the vast amounts of 
UGC created today all serve this free press interest. 
While some may dismiss UGC as amateurish drivel,179 the First 
Amendment does not attempt to judge the worth of speech, particularly 
not based on one person’s elitist view.  As Justice Harlan famously de-
scribed, “it is . . . often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.  
Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make 
principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of 
taste and style so largely to the individual.”180  Justice Holmes, years ear-
lier, expressed a similar view in the context of copyright law: “It would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to consti-
tute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside 
of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”181 
 
 174. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[M]ajor American businesses have made 
clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”). 
 175. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 339–51 (2008). 
 176. Id. at 339. 
 177. Id. at 334–39. 
 178. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (Internet); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 727, 791–92 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“[Public access channels] provide groups and individuals who generally have not had access 
to the electronic media with the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic mar-
ketplace of ideas.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-934); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 
(1994) (plurality) (cable); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253 (1974) (newspaper); 
Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 390 (radio); see also Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 1622–26. 
 179. See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 16 (2007) (“What the Web 2.0 revolution 
is really delivering is superficial observations of the world around us rather than deep analysis, shrill 
opinion rather than considered judgment.”). 
 180. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 
(1993) (“The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a 
forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of 
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the 
value of the information presented.”). 
 181. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
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3. Types of User-Generated Content 
UGC includes a variety of forms, such as user-generated blogs, pho-
tographs, videos, podcasts, music, wikis, mashups, and personal Web 
pages on Facebook, MySpace, and other sites.  All UGC can be grouped, 
however, into two categories: (1) pure UGC in which all of the content is 
produced by the user(s), and (2) mashup or remixed UGC in which the 
user’s content is mixed in with content from others, often without their 
permission.  Excluded from my definition of UGC is a mere copy of 
someone else’s work.  Thus, time-shift recordings of popular TV shows 
do not constitute UGC, since the user has added nothing to the mate-
rial.182  (Of course, there can be gray areas between the two categories, 
such as where someone uses a time-shifted clip in a blog that provides ex-
tensive commentary.  The entire blog may well be considered within the 
remixed category, since some content is added by the user.) 
a. Pure User-Generated Content 
Much UGC on the Internet falls into the first category of pure 
UGC.  Here, there is no problem with potential copyright infringement, 
since the user has not borrowed material from other copyrighted works. 
For example, millions of blogs exist now on the Internet, with thou-
sands of new blogs started each day.183  Many blogs consist of original 
content created by the bloggers who post to the blog.  The range of sub-
ject matter covered by different blogs spans the range of human thought, 
from news, politics, sports, technology, fashion, design, music, entertain-
ment, travel, the environment, dieting, sex, personal diaries, and even the 
law.  Although many blogs also include posts that remix content from 
other sources, such as parts of news articles, photographs, and videos, a 
good deal of the blogosphere falls into the pure UGC category. 
 
 182. Rebecca Tushnet has criticized the notion that wholesale copying of works serves First 
Amendment interests somehow less than transformative fair uses.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This 
Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 
(2004).  Tushnet sees pure copying of copyrighted works as potentially furthering self-expression and 
participation in culture through persuasion and affirmation based on works with which the speaker 
identifies.  Id. at 564–82.  She points out that the Copyright Act itself contains numerous exemptions 
that allow for straight out copying of works, without any transformation of the original work.  Id. at 
553–54.  I agree with Tushnet’s basic point that a First Amendment interest exists in the widespread 
dissemination of works through straight out copying.  In an earlier article, I made a similar argument 
with respect to works in the public domain, which serve “an even more elemental role” than spurring 
creativity by simply “ensur[ing] universal access to our common culture and knowledge.”  Edward 
Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control 
Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 162 (2003).  Once we 
move to copyrighted works, however, I believe the First Amendment interest in widespread copying 
and dissemination of works must be balanced with the Copyright Clause’s goal to incentivize the crea-
tion of works.  Even Tushnet admits that “[t]radeoffs are inevitable” in striking this balance.  Tushnet, 
supra, at 537. 
 183. See Robert Sprague, Business Blogs and Commercial Speech: A New Analytical Framework 
for the 21st Century, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 129 n.7 (2007). 
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Other examples of pure UGC can be found in the music world.  
Scores of amateur artists post their original music on MySpace, You-
Tube, and other sites.  Many of these musicians are hoping to become 
discovered by the music industry, so they share their original music on 
social networking sites and peer-to-peer networks as a way to reach a 
larger audience.  Although it is still difficult today to become discovered 
as a musician, we have seen some major successes from UGC.  For ex-
ample, Ingrid Michaelson is an unsigned singer-songwriter who became 
noticed through her music postings on MySpace Music.184  Eventually, 
her manager helped land her song “Breakable” on a 2006 episode of the 
television show Grey’s Anatomy.185  Later that year, Michaelson also got 
a deal with Gap to use her song “The Way I Am” in an Old Navy 
sweater commercial.186  The producers of Grey’s Anatomy liked her mu-
sic so much they later played two other Michaelson songs and even asked 
her to compose an original song for the season finale in 2007.187  Michael-
son’s music soon received heavy airplay on radio and VH1,188 all while 
she has resisted going with a major label—preferring to remain on her 
own. 
The other big source of pure UGC today is video.  I discuss the 
growth of YouTube and online video in the next section, but let me 
throw out a few examples of pure user-generated videos.  Within a span 
of two years, users and media companies alike have collectively uploaded 
more than seventy-five million videos on YouTube.189  YouTube does not 
provide statistics on the breakdown of user-generated versus media-
generated content on its site, but, by my guesstimate, the majority of vid-
eos on YouTube are user-generated.  Of the millions of user-generated 
videos, many are mashups.  But many others are pure UGC. 
In fact, the channel with the most subscribers all-time on YouTube 
is “Smosh,” otherwise known as Anthony Padilla and Ian Hecox, two 
twenty-year-olds from California.190  Being the Most Subscribed channel 
on YouTube is akin to being the No. 1 show on TV.  Smosh typically re-
ceives more than two million views per video, and the duo’s most popu-
lar video has generated more than twelve million views.191  What is amaz-
 
 184. See Chuck Crisafulli, Success Hasn’t Changed Up-and-Comer Michaelson, BILLBOARD.COM, 
Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.billboard.com/bbcom/search/google/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id= 
1003683959. 
 185. Ingrid Michaelson Charts Course for Indies, BUS. TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www. 
btimes.com.my/Current_News/BTIMES/BizFocusPDF/1012cmfc48.pdf. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Crisafulli, supra note 184. 
 189. Web Scout, From the Sunday Calendar: YouTube Hits 75 Million Videos, and What That 
Means, L.A. TIMES BLOG, Feb. 28, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/webscout/2008/02/from-the-
sund-1.html. 
 190. See Smosh’s Channel, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/user/smosh (last visited Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 191. See Smosh’s Videos, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/profile_videos?user=smosh&p=v 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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ing about Smosh’s success—even over all of the major media producers 
on YouTube—is that nearly all of the videos Padilla and Hecox produce 
are pure UGC.  The two basically perform comedic skits of their own.  
It’s that simple. 
Because pure UGC does not raise problems of copyright infringe-
ment, it is not the focus of this Article.  In the following sections, I focus 
on the more problematic category of UGC involving “mashups,” where 
some UGC has borrowed the copyrighted content of others.  Before I do, 
however, a couple caveats are in order.  First, the reader should not get 
the mistaken impression that UGC is mostly just mashups, works with 
potential copyright problems.  My short discussion of pure UGC reflects 
not the lack of many examples of this category of UGC, but instead, sim-
ply the lack of copyright problem for these works.  Second, although I 
speak about the two categories separately, there are synergies between 
the two.  Pure UGC often is the source for mashup UGC. Particularly 
within the YouTube community, there appears to be an informal practice 
of sharing content among many users who are inspired or provoked by 
the content of other users.  For example, users on YouTube who want to 
respond to another user’s video sometimes may borrow content from 
that video to include in a video response. 
In the case of singer-songwriter Terra Naomi, who signed with Is-
land Records after being discovered on YouTube, people from all 
around the world started singing their own “cover” versions of her irre-
pressible song “Say It’s Possible” and posted them in videos on You-
Tube.192  Several of the covers were in foreign languages, including Chi-
nese,193 Italian,194 and Spanish.195  A few tech-savvy musicians “remixed” 
Naomi’s video, incorporating their own drums, electric guitar, bass, and 
even vocals to accompany Naomi and her acoustic guitar.196  There were 
also several speeded-up versions that sounded like chipmunks singing197 
(which apparently is a popular style on YouTube), and one fan even did 
a cover singing with a sock puppet!198 
 
 192. A search on YouTube generated 275 clips.  YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/results? 
search_query=terra+naomi+say+it%27s+possible+cover&search_type= (last visited Aug. 31, 2008). 
 193. See, e.g., Say It’s Possible. . . .Chinese Rendition, posting of aureliaz to YouTube, http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=I0iCKLsQyew (Nov. 22, 2006). 
 194. See, e.g., Say It’s Possible, Italian Version (Terra Naomi Cover), posting of ConstantinoSeby 
to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLa11YRHnV4 (Oct. 13, 2007). 
 195. See, e.g., Terra Naomi “Say It’s Possible” Translated in Spanish, posting of gabrielederose to 
YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMxDX-mcpQg (Feb. 18, 2007). 
 196. See, e.g., Terra Naomi—Say It’s Possible Remix, posting of marone42 to YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zapd3MLOr04 (July 26, 2006); Terra Naomi—Say It’s Possible 
(Complete Band Version), posting of henrio70 to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
DLp5Dgja6Os (Dec. 14, 2006). 
 197. See, e.g., Say It’s Possible (Double Speed Version), posting of isellsoap to YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHX4aEofnB0 (Nov. 13, 2006). 
 198. See Re: Say It’s Possible, posting of kfuzd to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=jmX9ccwpNrQ (Apr. 2, 2007). 
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The Naomi example indicates how pure UGC can feed mashups.  
Naomi was so impressed with her fan support that she even made an-
other video for her song “Say It’s Possible,” this time a mashup of her 
own containing footage from her fans.199  UGC had come full circle: from 
pure UGC in Terra Naomi’s music video to mashups of her work by her 
fans, and then finally to her remix video, which mashed up the videos of 
her fans.  In the process, hundreds of works were created. 
b. Mashup or Remixed User-Generated Content 
As mentioned above, the more problematic category of UGC from 
the perspective of copyright law are mashups, which are works that in-
corporate—i.e., “mashup” or “remix”—portions of copyrighted material 
from elsewhere into their works. These mashups raise copyright issues 
because the UGC has borrowed from other copyrighted works, often 
without permission from the copyright holders.  Such unauthorized use 
of portions of copyrighted material might infringe the copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public per-
formance, and public display.  On the other hand, the borrowing might 
be fair use, de minimis, or simply not misappropriation under the test of 
infringement. 
A copyright traditionalist or formalist might view all user-generated 
mashups as copyright infringement, even if they are noncommercial.  By 
taking portions of the work and remixing them into another work, the 
mashups infringe at least the author’s right to copy or make derivative 
works.200 
This simplistic view is misguided.  Even in the commercial context, 
the law allows some borrowing of content from copyrighted works, while 
not allowing others.201  The copyright cases against famed “appropria-
tion” artist Jeffrey Koons provide the perfect illustration.  Although 
some of Koons’s artwork has constituted infringement,202 in Koons v. 
Blanch203 the court found a fair use.  In Blanch, Koons used, without 
permission and for overtly commercial purposes, a copyrighted fashion 
photograph of a woman’s feet dressed in fancy Gucci sandals.  Koons 
placed the copyrighted image within his collage painting featuring three 
 
 199. See Terra Naomi’s “Say It’s Possible,” posting of terranaomi to YouTube, http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=AlXlhFlHR8A (Dec. 31, 2006). 
 200. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 201. See id. § 107. 
 202. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding Koon’s sculpture “String of Pup-
pies” infringed the Art Rogers photograph “Puppies,” which Koons closely copied); United Features 
Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding infringement by Koons’s sculpture 
“Wild Boy and Puppy,” which included a figure that closely copied the “Odie” character from the car-
toon Garfield); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91-CV-6055, 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (finding 
infringement by Koons’s sculpture “Ushering in Banality,” which closely copied a photograph of two 
boys trying to push a pig into a gift box). 
 203. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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other women’s legs and feet—juxtaposed next to images of donuts, a 
brownie, and apple Danish pastries—against the backdrop of Niagara 
Falls and a grassy field.204  The collage, titled “Niagara,” was intended to 
“comment on the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for 
food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular images.205  In finding fair 
use, the Second Circuit identified a clear transformative purpose in 
Koons’s use of the fashion photograph to comment on “the social and 
aesthetic consequences of mass media.”206  The court noted that Koons 
had changed the “colors [in the photo], the background against which it 
is portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects’ de-
tails and, crucially, their . . . purpose and meaning.”207 
But there is no easy way to draw the line between what is permissi-
ble copying and what is not.  The line may be even harder to draw in the 
noncommercial context, since so few reported cases ever involve non-
commercial uses of copyrighted works. 
In the commercial context, sometimes taking even very small por-
tions of a copyrighted work and reusing them in another work is consid-
ered an infringement.  For example, the Second Circuit in Ringgold v. 
BET208 held that a cable TV network’s use of a print of a copyrighted 
quilt as background to a scene was probably an infringement, even 
though the quilt was only visible for periods of 1.86 to 4.16 seconds at a 
time, for a total of only 26.75 seconds and never in full view.209  The Sec-
ond Circuit sent the case back down to the district for a reweighing of the 
fair use factors, with some suggestion that there was no fair use.210  In 
other cases, fair use has been denied for taking even a very small portion 
of a copyrighted work if it takes the “heart” of the work, such as the brief 
copyrighted footage of the Reginald Denny beating during the L.A. ri-
ots.211 
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,212 the Sixth Circuit 
took an even more parsimonious view of music sampling—i.e., taking 
parts from a sound recording and using them within another recording, a 
practice popular in rap music and hip hop.  In Bridgeport, the court held 
that unauthorized sampling of just seven seconds of a copyrighted sound 
recording—which might be shorter than the time it takes to read this sen-
tence—infringed the sound recording copyright, absent a fair use (an is-
 
 204. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 427. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 253. 
 207. Id. 
 208. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 209. Id. at 73, 77, 81. 
 210. See id. at 81. 
 211. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 1997); 
see also Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629–31 (9th Cir. 2003) (use of copy-
righted footage of Elvis for documentary unlikely to be fair use). 
 212. 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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sue the court remanded to the district court below).213  The Sixth Circuit 
took a very dim view of unauthorized sampling and suggested that any 
amount of music sampling, no matter how short, would be infringing.214  
The Sixth Circuit believed the “music industry . . . [is] best served if 
something approximating a bright-line test can be established.”215  But 
the exact scope of the ruling is somewhat unclear: the court expressly 
limited its decision to only music sampling,216 and also sent the case back 
to the district court for consideration of the fair use defense.217 
In other cases, however, courts have allowed modest borrowing of 
copyrighted content as fair uses in commercial works.  For example, the 
Southern District Court of New York held that a cable television net-
work’s use of twenty seconds of copyrighted footage from a movie trailer 
for a biography of the actor Peter Graves was a fair use.218  In another 
case, the same court found a likely fair use based on the copying of be-
tween forty-one seconds to two minutes of copyrighted footage of Mu-
hammad Ali for use in defendant’s movie.219  Another court found in a 
different case that a cable network’s use of 14.87 seconds, 21.33 seconds, 
43.77 seconds, and 37.43 seconds of copyrighted movies and video for a 
documentary was likely fair use.220  Although the Ringgold case involved 
a copyrighted quilt, not video footage, and did not resolve the fair use 
question,221 these district court cases seem far more receptive to fair use 
than Ringgold. 
To cloud the picture even further, the Second Circuit has also held 
that a book publisher’s reproduction of the entirety of seven copyrighted 
concert posters, in reduced size, for use in defendant’s book about the 
Grateful Dead was a fair use.222  And in an earlier case, the court held 
 
 213. Id. at 796, 805.  A musical work means the composition—music and/or lyrics—written by the 
composer.  The sound recording is the performance of a musical work that is captured on a recording.  
The Copyright Act treats the scope of rights differently, according greater protection for musical 
works.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (2000). 
 214. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802 (rejecting de minimis defense for sampling); see also Grand Up-
right Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  For further discus-
sion, see Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for 
Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660 (1999); A. Dean Johnson, Music Copyrights: The Need 
for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135 
(1993); Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of Unauthorized Composi-
tional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119 (2003); 
David Sanjek, “Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the “Autonomous” Creator, 10 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607 (1992); Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music 
Samples Defeat the De Mimimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179 (2002); Amanda Webber, Note, 
Digital Sampling and the Legal Implications of Its Use After Bridgeport, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 373 (2007). 
 215. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799. 
 216. Id. at 798. 
 217. Id. at 805. 
 218. Hofheinz v. A & E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 219. Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 220. Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 139–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 221. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 222. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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that a movie studio’s use of seven copyrighted photographs in the back-
ground of the movie Seven was de minimis, where the photographs were 
only partially or poorly visible for 35.6 seconds (broken down in incre-
ments lasting up to six seconds).223 
Even with music sampling, some case law has allowed limited sam-
pling under the de minimis doctrine.  In Newton v. Diamond, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the Beastie Boys’ sampling of six seconds of a copy-
righted jazz composition was too trivial to constitute infringement.224  Al-
though the case did not involve the copyright for the sound recording 
(the Beastie Boys had obtained a license from the sound recording copy-
right holder),225 it is at least an open question as to how circuits other 
than the Sixth Circuit (in Bridgeport) would analyze music sampling un-
der the sound recording copyright.  The Nimmer treatise, for one, has 
roundly criticized the Bridgeport decision as contrary to prior case law 
and Congress’s intent.226  It is possible that other circuits would allow 
some limited forms of sampling, even in that context. 
Even the synchronization of music as background in a film some-
times is fair use. In Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., the Southern 
District of New York denied a request for a preliminary injunction by 
Yoko Ono Lennon to stop the showing of the movie Expelled—a movie 
by Ben Stein intended to promote intelligent design and criticize nega-
tive portrayals of religious views of creation among the scientific com-
munity and media.227  The court found that the movie studio’s use of only 
fifteen seconds and ten words from John Lennon’s famous song “Imag-
ine” was likely fair use, given that the movie’s use of the song was in-
tended, in part, to criticize the very message in the song (particularly in 
Lennon’s lyric “no religion”) by juxtaposing the song with incongruous 
visual images of schoolchildren in a circle and then a little girl spinning 
happily, followed by footage of a Soviet nation parade and then Joseph 
Stalin.228  Such use of the song was transformative, regardless of whether 
it was necessary at all to include the Lennon song in the film.229 
Suffice it to say that even in the commercial context, some borrow-
ing of content from copyrighted works is permissible under the fair use 
and de minimis doctrines.  Exactly how much is hard to say, given the ex-
isting case law, and even harder yet for noncommercial uses, given the 
absence of case law.  Ultimately, the question of infringement will turn 
on the facts of each case, such as the amount of taking of the copyrighted 
 
 223. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216–18 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Gordon v. 
Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining the de minimis use of copyrighted il-
lustrations for roughly twenty seconds total in defendant’s television commercial, with poor visibility). 
 224. 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 225. Id. 
 226. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 19, § 13.01[A][2][b], at 13-59 to 13-65. 
 227. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., No. 08 Civ. 03813(SHS), 2008 WL 2262631 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 2, 2008). 
 228. Id. at *3, 8–9. 
 229. Id. at *9, 12. 
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work, how the work is transformed, and whether for a commercial pur-
pose.  It also may well depend on what judge or jury decides the issue.  In 
the next section, I consider several concrete examples of mashups and 
suggest why they present gaps or gray areas in formal copyright law. 
B. YouTube and the Growth of User-Generated Videos 
Within a short span, YouTube has fundamentally transformed the 
Internet.  By designing an easy way for people to share videos online, 
YouTube has made videos a dominant component of the way informa-
tion is communicated on the Web. 
The growth of YouTube has been phenomenal.  By December 15, 
2005—when YouTube officially launched—people were viewing three 
million videos a day on YouTube, while people were adding another 
8,000 videos each day to the site.230  Within the first six months of 2006, 
the growth rate was staggering: the number of visitors grew by 300%, 
from 4.9 million to 19.6 million per month.231  By July 2006, YouTube 
served 100 million videos a day, which marked an increase of over 
3,200% from the three million per day in the last December.232  By Sep-
tember 2006, the number of video uploads jumped to 65,000 per day, in-
creasing more than eight-fold from December.233  According to Hitwise, 
by May 2006 YouTube had captured the leading position in the online 
video market with a 42.94% market share (based on the number of visits 
to the site).234  By October 2006, the number of unique visitors to You-
Tube had grown to 34 million per month, elevating it to one of the top 
fifteen most visited Web sites worldwide.235  Within just nine months, the 
number of visitors to YouTube grew by a staggering 600%.  With its sim-
ple motto “Broadcast Yourself,” YouTube has appealed to the masses. 
1. The Scope of the Copyright Lawsuits Against YouTube 
Currently, YouTube faces two major copyright lawsuits in the 
Southern District of New York, a suit brought by Viacom and a class ac-
tion by several music publishers and professional soccer leagues, among 
 
 230. YouTube, YouTube Opens Internet Video to the Masses, http://www.youtube.com/press_ 
room_entry?entry=OcN9xXYar1g (Dec. 15, 2005). 
 231. Nielsen/NetRatings, YouTube U.S. Web Traffic Grows 75 Percent Week Over Week, Accord-
ing to Nielsen/NetRatings, July 21, 2006, http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr_060721_2.pdf. 
 232. Marshall Kirkpatrick, YouTube Serves 100m Videos Each Day, TECHCRUNCH, July 17, 2006, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2006/07/17/youtube-serves-100m-videos-each-day/. 
 233. Bob Garfield, YouTube vs. Boob Tube, WIRED, Dec. 2006, at 226. 
 234. Hitwise, Hitwise Data Shows Overall Visits to Video Search Sites Up 164%, May 24, 2006, 
http://www.hitwise.com/press-center/hitwiseHS2004/videosearch.php. 
 235. Scott Woolley, Video Fixation, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/ 
2006/1016/=100a.html. 
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others.236  (In an unrelated lawsuit, Universal has sued the social net-
working site MySpace for alleged copyright infringement based on 
MySpace users sharing Universal’s copyrighted music and music vid-
eos.237)  These lawsuits will test the scope and requirements of the 
DMCA safe harbor for Internet service providers, which Congress en-
acted in 1998 to provide Web sites with some forms of immunity from 
monetary damages in copyright cases.238 
It is important to recognize several points about the scope of these 
two copyright lawsuits against YouTube.  The complaints focus on the 
wholesale copying of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted clips by YouTube users, 
such as highlights of Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show or broadcasts of Eng-
lish Premier League soccer matches.239  I would characterize these alleg-
edly infringing clips as basically “time shift” recordings of copyrighted 
content that do not even fall within the category of UGC.  The user has 
not created any content of her own; she has simply recorded someone 
else’s show.  Although the course of litigation could expand the facts al-
leged by the plaintiffs, it is noteworthy that neither complaint takes issue 
with any user-generated video that mixes in copyrighted footage as a part 
of a larger, creative work.240 
For our inquiry, the more difficult issue is raised by the synchroniza-
tion of copyrighted music into user-generated videos.  In the class action, 
several music publishers also challenge the unauthorized use of copy-
righted sound recordings and musical works, such as “Black Magic 
Woman” and John Denver’s “Thank God, I’m a Country Boy,”241 which 
have been synchronized into YouTube user videos.  This issue is more 
troublesome for UGC, given the Bridgeport decision for commercial 
sampling of music, as discussed above. 
 
 236. See The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-3582 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed May 4, 2007); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-02103 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 13, 
2007). 
 237. Universal’s lawsuit objects to unauthorized copies of Universal’s music and music videos on 
MySpace, as well as unauthorized synchronization of Universal’s music into user videos.  See Com-
plaint, ¶ 17, UMG Recordings v. MySpace, Inc., No. 06-CV-07361 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 17, 2006), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ip/umgmyspace111706cmp.html/. 
 238. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 239. See Complaint, ¶ 61, The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-
3582 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 2007), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2007cv03582/305574/1/; Complaint, ¶ 3,Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-
02103 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/ 
new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164/1/. 
 240. See Complaint, The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-3582 
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 2007), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2007cv03582/305574/1/; Complaint, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-
02103 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/ 
new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv02103/302164/1/. 
 241. See Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 99 18–19, The Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, 
Inc., No. 07-CV-3582 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/ 
district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv03582/305574/58/. 
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2. Major Copyright Holders Increasingly Support Mashups 
From a copyright perspective, one of the biggest developments in 
the Web 2.0 world has been the reaction of major copyright holders to 
UGC.  By all appearances, major media copyright holders initially took a 
“wait-and-see” approach, allowing the practice of user-generated mash-
ups to develop.  The computer game industry provided the first real 
glimpse of UGC, with game software companies allowing their users to 
modify their games and create new versions, dating back to 1999.242  The 
next really big phase of UGC occurred with the growth of video sharing 
and YouTube in 2005.  Today, many of the major media copyright hold-
ers have gone on record as supporting the user-generated practice. 
For example, even Viacom (which is suing YouTube for copyright 
infringement) has publicly embraced user-generated mashup videos.  
The lead counsel for Viacom in the case against YouTube, Don Verrilli, 
stated during a debate about the case that the transformative, noncom-
mercial type of unauthorized uses were not problematic.243  Instead, Via-
com objected to the “wholesale” copying and redistribution of copy-
righted clips on YouTube—a position that is consistent with its complaint 
against YouTube.  Viacom General Counsel Michael Fricklas expressed 
the same view in what was to become Viacom’s official policy contained 
on its Web site.244  The Viacom position stated: 
Regardless of the law of fair use, we have not generally challenged 
users of Viacom copyrighted material where the use or copy is oc-
casional and is a creative, newsworthy or transformative use of a 
limited excerpt for non commercial purposes.245 
Viacom’s position is not atypical for the entertainment industry.  A 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) representative ex-
pressed the same view about allowing transformative reuses of copy-
 
 242. See LASICA, supra note 117, at 250–51. 
 243. The Utube Blog, Viacom v. Google: Their Lawyers Debate the Lawsuit, Apr. 15, 2007, 
http://theutubeblog.com/2007/04/15/viacom-v-youtubegoogle-their-lawyers-debate-lawsuit/. 
 244. Viacom posted the letter on its Web site, but the link is no longer operational.  The policy 
was developed after Viacom mistakenly sent a DMCA notice to take down a Stephen Colbert parody, 
“Stop the Falsiness,” video on YouTube that contained some Viacom content.  See Eric Bangeman, 
Viacom: We Goofed on Colbert Parody Takedown Notice; Case Dismissed, ARS TECHNICA, April 23, 
2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070423-viacom-we-goofed-on-colbert-parody-takedown-
notice-case-dismissed.html.  In a recent interview, the General Counsel of Viacom, Michael Fricklas, 
expressed Viacom’s position in support of transformative reuses of its copyrighted content in non-
commercial user-generated mashups and parodies.  Interview by Andy Plesser with Michael Fricklas, 
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Viacom (Sept. 9, 2007), available at http://blip.tv/file/ 
378755. 
 245. Letter from Mark C. Merrill, Deputy General Counsel, Viacom, to Fred von Lohmann, Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (Apr. 17, 2007) (available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/moveon_v_ 
viacom/0417_letter_fvl.pdf); see also Alexandra Wharton, Getting into the Mashup, REVENUE, Sept./ 
Oct. 2007, http://www.revenuetoday.com/story/Getting+Into+the+Mashup+Mix&readpage=2 (discuss-
ing statements by Viacom lawyer Mark Morrill that Viacom “is only interested in pursuing infringe-
ment of Viacom material on YouTube for nontransformative, verbatim use.  Viacom is not pursuing 
transformative uses—which is the description that mashups and remixing fall under”). 
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righted material in a law school panel discussion in which I partici-
pated.246  As discussed below, the movie studios have generally allowed 
the use of their content in user-generated movie trailers that often spoof 
the movie itself, such as the artful and hilarious one-minute trailer that 
recasts Mary Poppins into a scary movie.247  That user-generated video 
has been up on YouTube since October 8, 2006 and has generated more 
than five million views,248 with no complaints from the copyright owner, 
Disney.249 
Dean Marks, a senior vice president of IP of Warner Brothers En-
tertainment has stated publicly that Warner Brothers supports the prac-
tice of YouTube mashups.250 
There’s “a lot of creativity going on” in mashups posted on You-
Tube, he said, “and I don’t think you’ve seen a lot of lawsuits” al-
leging infringement.  There’s a “difficult line to draw” between pro-
tected parody and copyright violations. . . . Urging “breathing room 
on this” for creators, he noted that content owners have shown suit-
able “restraint.”  They distinguish between such use of copyright 
work and “wholesale copying and redistribution of the entire work” 
cutting into their own businesses.251 
Warner Independent Pictures, a part of Warner Brothers, even held a 
mashup contest to create a trailer for an upcoming movie.252 
Likewise, CBS’s CEO Les Moonves has supported allowing users to 
use clips from CBS shows: 
If somebody spends the time to take 20 clips from “CSI Miami,” I 
think that’s wonderful . . . . That only makes him more involved 
with my show and want to come to CBS on Monday night and 
watch my show. And we’re going to get paid for the clips this guy 
takes off our air as well. It’s win, win. 
Some technologies will work, others will not.  We learned a lot 
watching what happened to the music industry with Napster, and 
we’d like to avoid those mistakes.253 
 
 246. The conference was held at the Villanova Law School on February 24, 2007.  The MPAA 
representative was Michael O’Leary, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel for Federal Affairs and 
Policy. 
 247. The Original Scary ‘Mary Poppins’ Recut Trailer, posting of moviemkr to YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2T5_0AGdFic (Oct. 8, 2006). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Disney CEO Bob Iger spoke generally about UGC, not seeing it as a threat to traditional 
media.  In fact, he stated that he wished Disney had come up with the idea for YouTube first. See 
Chrystia Freeland & Matthew Garrahan, Transcript: Interview with Bob Iger, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2007, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto013120071326082907&page=2. 
 250. Louis Trager, We’re Friend of YouTube Mashups, P2P, Fair Use, Warner Executive Says, 
WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 12, 2007. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Art and Marketing All Mashed Up, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006, at D1. 
 253. Mike Sachoff, CBS Playing on the Digital Field, WEBPRONEWS, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www. 
webpronews.com/topnews/2007/01/10/cbs-playing-on-the-digital-field. 
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CBS even agreed to deal with Sling Media, maker of the Slingbox DVR, 
to allow people to record and post clips of CBS shows on the Internet.254 
NBC Universal’s General Counsel Rick Cotton expressed similar 
views: 
It bears repeating that short-form mashups, parodies and the like 
are NOT the primary focus of content owners’ anti-piracy activities. 
Let’s be clear that sympathy for parodies and “re-interpretations” 
should not be used as a justification for inaction in addressing ag-
gressively the wholesale trafficking in complete, unchanged copies 
of movies and TV programs. 
Having said that, most major content owners today want to see 
fans fully engage with their favorite content and are working hard 
to provide legitimate ways to do that. 
[L]ooking forward, one of the exciting characteristics of the 
new, digital world is that technology will allow us greater flexibility 
to respond to consumer desires. . . . We’ve offered fans material 
from Battlestar Galactica and The Office to create mashups.  And 
we expect to expand those offerings both on our websites and on 
hulu.com.255 
As Cotton’s remark indicates, major corporate copyright holders 
have actively encouraged their users to make mashup videos on their 
Web sites256 and sometimes even on third-party sites.  For example, at 
Universal Pictures, “for each new [movie] release, Universal’s marketing 
team sends out a digital ‘tool kit’ to sites like YouTube with studio-
approved graphics, clips, sound effect and music videos that can be 
shared.”257  As Chairman of Universal Marc Shmuger explained, “If you 
want to be involved in the cultural debate, you have to allow consumers 
to be more actively involved.  That’s a different world order which we 
are not used to.”258 
Many companies and artists also hold contests for user-generated 
mashups, often allowing people to use some of the companies’ or artists’ 
 
 254. CBS to Allow Viewers to Post Clips on Net, CBS NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/09/ces/main2344251.shtml. 
 255. Saul Hansell, Bits Debate: On the Rights of Readers and Viewers, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG, 
Jan. 18, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/bits-debate-on-the-rights-of-readers-and-
viewers. 
 256. Lucasfilm, for example, has promoted user mashups of Star Wars on its site, complete with 
video clips and editing tools, although with restrictions against nudity and pornography.  Sarah 
McBride, Make-It-Yourself ‘Star Wars,’ WALL ST. J., May 24, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/article/ 
SB117997273760812981.html.  Viacom and Sony BMG have also promoted user mashups on their 
sites.  Id.  To launch its famous swimsuit issue in 2008, Sports Illustrated held a video mashup contest in 
which users could remix footage of the photo shoots taken by the magazine and create mashup videos 
of their own.  See SI Swimsuit Video Mash Up Sweepstakes, http://simashup.secondthought.com/ 
index.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 257. Laura M. Holson, Hollywood Asks YouTube Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at 
C1. 
 258. Id. 
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own footage or music.259  For example, MTV held contests for the best 
remix video of Kelly Clarkson’s “Never Again” and Nelly Furtado’s “All 
Good Things (Come to an End),”260 as well as a contest to spoof movies 
for the MTV Movie Awards.261  Other notable contests include: Sony 
BMG’s contest for remixing an old Duran Duran video,262 David Bowie’s 
contest for his “Rebel Never Gets Old” video,263 Nike’s contest for best 
sports video mashup,264 Ford Fusion’s contest to remix music videos by 
Tegan and Sara,265 Samsung’s lip synch video contest on YouTube,266 and 
Missy Elliott’s mashup contest of her music.267  YouTube regularly co-
hosts contests of this sort in the Community section of its Web site.268 
Of course, we should not overgeneralize from these statements and 
examples.  Part of my theory is that copyright practices evolve and de-
velop over time.  Viacom, NBC Universal, CBS, and others could change 
their positions (although, at least so far, the evolution appears to be to-
wards growing acceptance of the practice of video mashups).  In late 
2007, a number of these media companies, along with Microsoft, 
MySpace, and two video-sharing sites, Veoh and Dailymotion, proposed 
so-called “principles for user generated content services” that were de-
signed to encourage web services to implement filtering of infringing ma-
terial uploaded by users, but the principles did not attempt to define 
what constituted infringement.269  In fact, the companies openly admitted 
that “we may differ in our interpretation of relevant laws,” and “we do 
not mean to resolve those differences in these Principles, which are not 
intended to be and should not be construed as a concession or waiver 
with respect to any legal or policy position or as creating any legally 
 
 259. See, e.g., AT&T, News Room, AT&T Launches Mash-Up Madness Video Contest for Hoops 
Fans, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=23442; 
WashingtonPost.com, Video Mash-Up, Aug. 1, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
video/2006/08/01/VI2006080100794.html. 
 260. See Antony Bruno, MTV Service Seeks Revenue from Fan Remixes, BILLBOARD, July 10, 
2007, available at http://www/reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN0620281220070707. 
 261. See My MTV Movie Awards ’07 on Yahoo!, http://mtvmovieawards.yahoo.com/spoofs/ 
toolbox (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 262. See Duran Duran: “Falling Down” Video Mash-up Challenge, http://www.duranduranonline. 
com/fallingdown/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 263. See Bowie Net, http://www.davidbowie.com/neverFollow/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 264. See Nike: 6.0 Auction Sports Video Mashup Contest, http://www.nike.com/nkeb/v5/#/insider/ 
post_705 (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 265. See ACIDPlanet.com, Fusion Flash Concerts’ Tegan and Sara Mash-Up Contest, http://www. 
acidplanet.com/contests/fusionflash (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 266. See YouTube, The UpStage by Samsung Contest, http://www.youtube.com/profile?user= 
SamsungContest (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 267. See Michael Paoletta, Exclusive: Missy Elliott, Doritos Team for Multi-Platform Campaign, 
BILLBOARD.BIZ, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/ 
e3i4951dddd30e582138477721299144162. 
 268. See YouTube, Community, http://www.youtube.com/community (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 269. The group included CBS, Dailymotion, Disney, Fox, Microsoft, MySpace, NBC Universal, 
Veoh, and Viacom.  See Principles for User Generated Content Services, http://www.ugcprinciples. 
com/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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binding rights or obligations.”270  (The media consortium’s proposal 
sparked an alternative proposal for protecting fair use by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) and other public interest groups.271) 
Moreover, some Hollywood content producers might be more sus-
picious of the practice, even though they have not publicly challenged the 
legality of noncommercial mashup videos.272  And, although directors and 
screenwriters often do not hold any copyrights to the studios’ movies, 
they might be appalled at having their artistic creations “mashed up.”273 
The music industry also has had a mixed response.  The major labels 
seem to be supportive.  In a partnership with Fliptrack, APM Music (a 
joint venture of EMI and BMG Music Publishing) has set up a site for 
users to make their own mashup music videos, with music provided by 
Fliptrack and APM.274  All of the major labels have struck partnership 
deals with YouTube, some even allowing the synchronization of re-
cordings from the label’s collection into user-generated videos.275  In fact, 
these partnership deals with the music labels came about only after many 
users on YouTube had engaged in the informal practice of using copy-
righted music in user-generated mashups.  In this fascinating develop-
ment, users engaged in an informal practice of unauthorized use of copy-
righted recordings that eventually precipitated the recording industry’s 
adoption of the practice in formal contracts with YouTube. 
However, not all in the music industry see the issue in the same way.  
Several music publishers and owners of copyrights to various musical 
works have joined the class action lawsuit against YouTube.276  Com-
pared to the remixing of parts of copyrighted footage within user-
generated videos, a practice that appears to be openly tolerated and even 
endorsed by a number of Hollywood studios, the unauthorized synchro-
nization of music in user-generated videos has generated a far more di-
vided view.  Even before the mashup video, mashup audio tapes and 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. See EFF, Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, http://www.eff.org/issues/ 
ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-usergen (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 272. For example, Ron Wheeler, senior vice president of content production at Fox Entertain-
ment Group, stated that “[w]e are not in the business of just saying no, but we do consider it unauthor-
ized use.”  Holson, supra note 257. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Fliptrack/APM Music Deal to Create World’s Largest Mashup Music Library, 
DATAMONITOR, May 15, 2007, http://www.datamonitor.com/industries/news/article/?pid=774C9F31-
D0BF-40C0-86D4-8D46AB7e88B7&type=NewsWire. 
 275. See Wharton, supra note 245 (“YouTube has deals with Warner, Sony BMG, EMI and Uni-
versal Music Group that enable people to legitimately incorporate works from these record labels’ 
artists into their user-generated content on YouTube.”). 
 276. They include Bourne Company, Murbo Music Publishing, Cherry Lane Music Publishing, 
Cal IV Entertainment, National Music Publishers’ Association, The Rodgers & Hammerstein Organi-
zation, Stage Three Music, Edward B. Marks Music, Freddy Bienstock Music, Alley Music, X-Ray 
Dog Music, The Music Force Media Group, The Music Force, and Sin-Drome Records.  See Amended 
Class Action Complaint, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-3582 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://docs.justicia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nysdce/1:2007cv03582/305574/58/. 
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CDs (such as DJ Danger Mouse’s mashup of Jay-Z’s The Black Album 
with the Beatles’ The White Album to make his own The Grey Album) 
drew the ire of some in the music industry.277 
On the other hand, the informal practices and even public state-
ments by many major media producers cannot be dismissed out-of-hand.  
They are significant.  Even among musicians, the mashup may be receiv-
ing greater acceptance by the efforts of some luminaries in the music 
world, such as David Byrne and David Bowie, who are encouraging 
mashups of their music.278  To facilitate sampling, Creative Commons has 
established easy, online sampling licenses that musicians can attach to 
their work.279  The fact that all of the major labels have signed partner-
ships deals with YouTube is also significant.  These collective responses 
of the major content industries serve as informal signaling to the public 
that UGC is increasingly considered an acceptable practice. 
The “mashup” world that we live in seems to be growing by the 
minute.  Vast amounts of professionally produced content are being 
“unbundled”—by the media companies themselves—to allow users to 
“cut and paste” the content onto any other site of the user’s own choos-
ing.  For example, more and more major media companies and profes-
sional artists are freely allowing a vast amount of their own content to be 
embedded on any Web site or blog through embeddable videos and 
“widgets” (anything that can be stuck in any Web site).  For example, the 
Associated Press,280 the Los Angeles Times,281 the New York Times,282 the 
Wall Street Journal,283 and the Washington Post284 all create videos for us-
ers to embed freely on their own sites.  So do ESPN,285 Yahoo,286 the 
BBC,287 CBS,288 NBC,289 FOX,290 Showtime,291 and Comedy Central.292  
 
 277. See Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt 
to New Re-Contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 280–86 (2005). 
 278. See Joshua Schwartz, Thinking Outside the Pandora’s Box: Why the DMCA Is Unconstitu-
tional Under Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 93, 144 (2005) (discussing 
David Bowie); My Life in the Bush of Ghosts, http://bushofghosts.wmg.com/home.php (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008) (discussing David Byrne and Brian Eno’s reissued album My Life in the Bush of 
Ghosts, under Creative Commons license allowing remixes). 
 279. Creative Commons, The Sampling Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/about/sampling (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 280. See Associated Press’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/AssociatedPress 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 281. See Los Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 282. See N.Y. Times’s YouTube Channel, http://youtube.com/user/thenewyorktimes (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
 283. See Wall Street Journal Video, http://online.wsj.com/public/page/8_000b.html (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
 284. See Washington Post, Camera Works, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/ 
newsvideo.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 285. See ESPN Video, http://sports.espn.go.com/broadband/video/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 286. See Yahoo! Video, http://video.yahoo.com/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 287. See BBC’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/BBC (last visited Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 288. See CBS’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/CBS (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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NBC and FOX have even developed their own site, hulu.com, which al-
lows users to post entire episodes of their popular TV shows, such as The 
Office and The Simpsons, on other Web sites.293  Many music labels (e.g., 
Polydor,294 Warner Brothers295) and popular musicians (e.g., U2,296 My 
Chemical Romance,297 Timbaland,298 Carrie Underwood299) follow a simi-
lar practice allowing users to freely embed their music videos.  NBC has 
gone even one step further in allowing people to freely download copies 
of NBC shows.300  NBC, in other words, is turning into its own Napster. 
Of course, it would be naive to think that Hollywood and media 
companies have purely altruistic motives in allowing user-generated 
mashups, along with the embedding of media content.  Major media pro-
ducers have their own financial motives.  First, users represent potential 
new talent, and a number of new artists have already been discovered on 
YouTube and other Web 2.0 sites.301  Moreover, the industry has an ob-
vious financial interest in catering to all the consumers of its content, in-
cluding the growing number of users who enjoy making mashup videos.  
As NBC Vice President of Intellectual Property Gillian Lusins admitted, 
“Users taking our content and doing what they want with it, we have to 
deal with it. . . . We’re actually trying to co-opt the YouTube model our-
selves [by allowing mashups of NBC shows on NBC’s site].”302 
 
 289. See FOX Broadcasting’s YouTube Channel, http://youtube.com/user/FoxBroadcasting (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 290. See NBC, Official Site, http://www.nbc.com/Video/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 291. See Showtime’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/showtime (last visited Aug. 
11, 2008). 
 292. See Comedy Central: Exclusive Videos and Show Clips, http://www.comedycentral.com/ 
funny_videos/index.jhtml? (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 293. See Hulu, http://www.hulu.com/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 294. See Polydor’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/polydor (last visited Aug. 11, 
2008). 
 295. See Warner Brothers Records’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/profile?user= 
warnerbrosrecords (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 296. See U2official’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/U2official (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008). 
 297. See My Chemical Romance’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/ 
mYcheMicALroMaNcE (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 298. See TimbalandMusic’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/TimbalandMusic 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 299. See Carrie Underwood’s YouTube Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/carrieunderwood 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 300. See NBC Official Site, http://www.nbc.com/Video/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 301. See supra notes 163, 184–88, 192–99 and accompanying text (discussing discoveries of Esmee 
Denters, Ingrid Michaelson, and Terra Naomi). 
 302. Marianne Richmond, User Generated Content: NBC and YouTube Mash Up May Have  Bo-
nus Outcome, Less Zapping, RESONANCE PARTNERSHIP BLOG, June 26, 2006, http://www. 
resonancepartnership.com/2006/06/user_generated_.html. 
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Put simply, the entertainment industry hopes to “monetize” UGC 
one day.303  As Alan Bell, the Executive Vice President of Paramount 
Pictures, stated: 
Regardless of the outcome it behooves the content industry to be 
involved and figure out a way to leverage user generated content, 
harvesting talent, building buzz, people editing and mashing up con-
tent and building communities and monetizing the ad stream. If I 
were running a VOD [video-on-demand] or download-to-own 
video site, I would figure out a way to bring UGC into it.304 
Already, the line between traditional media and UGC has begun to blur, 
as more traditional media attempt to incorporate—and profit from—
UGC.305  Because user-generated ads or mashups are often viewed as 
more authentic or “closer to home” to consumers, media companies are 
trying to figure out ways to tap into the “user-generated” culture to reach 
more consumers. 
As Kori Bernards, an MPAA spokesperson admitted, “[C]opyright 
laws come into play here, but the idea of mash-up videos is obviously 
very popular, and film companies have been moving to harness that as a 
means of advertising.”306  The movie studios have even purchased the 
copyrights to some clever fan films.307 
3. User-Generated Political Candidate Videos 
It would be impossible to summarize the millions of user-generated 
videos on YouTube.  I have chosen a few well-known examples where 
informal copyright practices have developed to fill the gaps left open by 
formal copyright law in positive ways for society.  Given how famous 
these videos are, there can be no doubt that the relevant copyright hold-
ers know about the videos and have decided (thus far) not to challenge 
the unauthorized uses of their works in the mashup videos.308 
 
 303. See Julian Goldsmith, Media Gurus: User-Generated Content a Big Threat, CNET NEWS, 
Apr. 17, 2007, http://www.news.com/2100-1026_3-6176823.html (noting that two-thirds of media execu-
tives surveyed believed they would be able to make money out of user-generated content). 
 304. Dan Farber, Hollywood Execs Still Cautious About User Generated Content, BETWEEN THE 
LINES BLOG, ZDNET, May 2, 2007, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=4973. 
 305. One notable example: the BBC has begun a radical redesign of its entire Web site to incor-
porate user-generated blogs, videos, and social networking.  The BBC’s new design is based on three 
principles, “share,” “find,” and “play”—with the emphasis on “sharing” of content among users.  See 
Mark Sweney, BBC Unveils Radical Revamp of Website, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Apr. 25, 2006, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/apr/25/news.media; Simon Nelson, BBC Three Everywhere, 
BBC INTERNET BLOG, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/bbcinternet/2008/01/bbc_three_ 
everywhere_1.html. 
 306. See Goo, supra note 252. 
 307. Rafer Guzman, Now That’s Reel Devotion: Fanboy Films Put Viewers Behind Camera to 
Remake Their Favorites, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 2008, at B4. 
 308. It goes beyond the scope of this Article to attempt a comprehensive survey of user-generated 
content online.  That task would be daunting for any organization, let alone a single person, particu-
larly given how much new UGC is created daily.  Other than campaign videos prepared by the presi-
dential candidates (which I track in detailed monthly reports online), the evidence I present consists of 
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This first area involves user-generated political campaign videos.  
For the first time in history, ordinary citizens have the ability to create 
and disseminate campaign videos to a national audience in order to in-
fluence the outcome of national elections.  YouTube has actively fos-
tered citizen participation in the electoral process by organizing a feature 
called “YouChoose.”  All of the presidential candidates in the 2008 elec-
tion were given their own YouTube channel, where they posted cam-
paign videos online.  By every measure, the YouChoose program on 
YouTube has been a smashing success.  By the beginning of January 
2008, at the start of the primary season, the presidential candidates had 
posted more than 3,300 campaign videos on YouTube.309  Collectively, 
the videos were viewed nearly 43 million times.310 
YouTube (along with CNN) also hosted two debates for the candi-
dates in which all of the questions came from videos submitted by You-
Tube users.  After the debate, YouTube made all of the candidate re-
sponses available for repeated viewing on its site.  At the initiative of 
Professor Lessig, CNN even agreed to allow users to freely use its foot-
age of the presidential candidate debates without any copyright restric-
tion whatsoever.311  Lessig had attempted to persuade both the Republi-
can and Democratic parties to ensure that other networks televising 
debates of the presidential debates would do the same.312  Lessig pointed 
to what I have called a “gray area” of copyright law, to persuade the two 
parties to allow free use of footage from the presidential debates: 
Unfortunately, however, the uncertainty about the scope of copy-
right regulation is increasingly one such burden on Internet political 
speech. This next political cycle will see an explosion of citizen gen-
erated political content. Some of that speech will be crafted from 
clips taken from the Presidential debates. Some of that will be fan-
tastically valuable and important. Yet as the law is right now, it is 
extremely difficult for an ordinary citizen to understand the 
boundaries of “fair use,” or the limits to copyright law. It is likewise 
difficult for companies such as YouTube, or Blip.tv. Indeed, it is 
even difficult for a skilled practitioner. That uncertainty, if not 
checked, could produce a cloud over much of this political speech, 
as sites and universities don’t know how much is too much. It will 
 
anecdotal but well-known examples, supplemented by a few surveys conducted by others.  Future em-
pirical studies should be made in this area. 
 309. See Edward Lee, Analyzing the Presidential Candidate Videos on YouTube, Jan. 9, 2008, at 5, 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/241079/The-Utube-Blog-study-Analyzing-the-Presidential-
Candidate-Videos-on-YouTube-Aug-2007. 
 310. Id. at 6. 
 311. CNN stated: “CNN debate coverage will be made available without restrictions at the con-
clusion of each live debate.  We believe this is good for the country and good for the electoral process. 
This decision will apply to all of CNN’s presidential debates, beginning with the upcoming New 
Hampshire debates in June.”  Lessig Blog, Free Debates: CNN Has Announced It Will Free the De-
bates, http://lessig.org/blog/2007/05/free_debates_cnn_has_announced.html (May 5, 2007, 10:03 PST). 
 312. Lessig Blog, A Call on the RNC & DNC to Eliminate Unnecessary Regulation of Political 
Speech, http://lessig.org/blog/2007/04/a_call_on_the_rnc_dnc_to_elimi.html (Apr. 25, 2008 04:08 PST). 
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certainly create a temptation by some politicians to invoke copy-
right law to block particularly effective speech critical of them.313 
For the most part, users have been able to freely use TV clips of 
presidential candidates in user-generated mashups.  This environment 
has cultivated an incredible amount of citizen campaign videos.  Users 
have made scores of “mashup” campaign videos on their own.  I high-
light a few of the more notable ones below and explain why these user-
generated political videos should be considered a legitimate informal 
copyright practice, filling a gap in our formal law. 
a. “Hillary 1984” Video 
The most famous campaign video to hit YouTube in 2007 was a 
slick “mashup” video created by an ordinary citizen, Phil de Vellis.  De 
Vellis’s video was titled “Vote Different,” and it attacked Hillary Clin-
ton.314  De Vellis remixed scenes from Apple’s famous “1984” commer-
cial depicting scenes of totalitarianism reminiscent of George Orwell’s 
1984 (the Apple ad had introduced the new Macintosh against IBM’s 
computers back in 1984).  De Vellis took the entire Apple commercial, 
but spliced in video of Hillary Clinton speaking like Big Brother.  At the 
end, a female rebel hurls a hammer at the screen where Hillary speaks, 
exploding it to pieces.  The video ended with the following message, “On 
January 14th, the Democratic primary will begin.  And you’ll see why 
2008 won’t be like ‘1984.’”  Then, “BarackObama.com” flashed on the 
screen. 
Barack Obama had nothing to do with the creation of the video, as 
de Vellis later confessed on Ariana Huffington’s popular blog.315  As for 
the reason behind the ad, de Vellis explained, 
I wanted to express my feelings about the Democratic primary, and 
because I wanted to show that an individual citizen can affect the 
process.  There are thousands of other people who could have made 
this ad, and I guarantee that more ads like it—by people of all 
political persuasions—will follow.  This shows that the future of 
American politics rests in the hands of ordinary citizens.316 
The attack ad became an instant Internet sensation, drawing 
coverage even from the mainstream media.  The ad (and several copies 
of it) drew close to 4.5 million views on YouTube by June 2007.317  To put 
the number into perspective, de Vellis’s video gained more than three 
times as many views as all of Hillary Clinton’s official videos on 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. See Vote Different, posting of ParkRidge47 to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
6h3G-lMZxjo (Mar. 5, 2007). 
 315. Phil de Vellis, I Made the “Vote Different” Ad, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2007, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phil-de-vellis-aka-parkridge/i-made-the-vote-differen_b_43989.html. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Vote Different, supra note 314. 
LEE.DOC 9/3/2008  4:50:06 PM 
No. 5] WARMING UP TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT 1525 
YouTube combined at that time.  And the video drew more views than 
each of the other candidates’ entire collection of campaign videos on 
YouTube at the time.  According to a Nielsen study, the video drew 
seventy-five percent of all the traffic to videos related to the candidates 
on YouTube during March 2007.318  The number of total views would 
rival even the number of viewers for a popular show on cable TV. 
b. John Edwards “Feeling Pretty” Video 
Another popular video making fun of a presidential candidate in-
volved John Edwards “Feeling Pretty.”  It was far simpler than the 
“Hillary 1984” video.  It showed Edwards, with the help of a make-up 
person, obsessively primping his hair before an interview.  The primping 
lasted all of two minutes!  Someone acquired the footage and synchro-
nized Julie Andrews singing “I Feel Pretty” from West Side Story.319  It 
became a huge hit on YouTube, generating over one million views320 and 
drawing much attention in the media.321 
c. “Obama Girl” Video 
Not all of the user-generated videos about presidential candidates 
were negative.  Some, in fact, supported a presidential candidate, al-
though at times with iconoclastic verve.  The most famous video of all 
was the “Obama girl” video. 
It was the brainchild of Ben Relles, an ad executive, who hoped to 
upstage Hillary Clinton’s contest for her supporters to select her cam-
paign song.322  The video featured an actress, Amber Lee Ettinger, posing 
as “Obama girl,” who openly sings (or lip synchs) to a catchy, bubble-
gum tune that she has a “Crush on Obama.”  The song was sung by a col-
lege student, Leah Kauffman, and produced by Rick Friedrich.323  The 
mashup video includes (presumably) copyrighted photographs and foot-
age of Barack Obama, including parts of his famous 2004 Democratic 
Convention speech, mixed in with Relles’s original footage of Ettinger 
pining for Obama.  The “Obama girl” video drew more than 8.2 million 
views on YouTube,324 and generated widespread media attention, not to 
 
 318. Amy Schatz, YouTube Fuels—and Foils—Campaigns, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at A7. 
 319. John Edwards Feeling Pretty, posting of RogerRmjet to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=2AE847UXu3Q (Nov. 8, 2006). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, The Birth of the ‘Breck Girl’ Story Line, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Apr. 
23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/us/politics/23web-nagourney.html. 
 322. See Jake Tapper, Music Video Has a ‘Crush on Obama’: Risque YouTube Song Takes 
Obama Campaign by Surprise, ABC NEWS.COM, June 13, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story? 
id=3275802&page=1. 
 323. See “I Got a Crush. . .on Obama” by Obama Girl, posting of barelypolitical to YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKsoXHYICqU (June 13, 2007). 
 324. Id. 
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mention copycat mashup videos by others featuring a Hillary guy325 and 
Hillary gal,326 and Huckabee girl.327 
d. Citizen Mashups Involve a Legitimate Informal Copyright 
Practice 
Under our Five-Factor Informality Test, a strong case can be made 
that the informal copyright practices for these citizen mashup videos 
serve as a legitimate gap filler in our copyright system. 
Let us consider Factors 1, 2, and 5 together.  They all cut in favor of 
using an informal practice as a gap filler.  With respect to Factor 1, using 
copyrighted content in noncommercial citizen campaign videos has not 
yet been challenged in litigation.  The practice, of course, is very new, ba-
sically only a year or two old.  Under Factor 2, the issue presents a novel 
question of law, not only because of the newness of the practice, but the 
special importance we place on citizen participation in elections under 
the Constitution.  It falls squarely within a gray area in our copyright law.  
The closest case law appears to come from the commercial context with 
the use of portions of copyrighted footage for the making of biographical 
films.  Several courts have found fair use, but another has ruled against 
it.328  Under Factor 5, the relevant copyright holders have raised no ob-
jection to these political mashups, which cuts in favor of allowing the 
practice, especially because the practice involves political speech and 
citizen involvement in the national election of the President of the 
United States. 
As to Factor 3, colorable arguments in favor of fair use can be made 
in each case, although the length of borrowing from the entire Apple 
commercial in the “Hillary 1984” video and from the entire “I Feel 
Pretty” song in the John Edwards video make the fair use analysis more 
doubtful for those two videos compared to the “Obama girl” video. 
When determining fair use, courts look to the purpose of the use—
such as “for purposes . . . [of] criticism, comment, news reporting”—and 
consider the four fair use factors in section 107.329  Under the first fair use 
 
 325. See “I Got a Crush. . .on Hillary” (Take That Obama Girl!), posting of davedays on You-
Tube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLSWudoqtWE (Jan. 13, 2008). 
 326. See Hott 4 Hill-She’s Hott for Hillary!!, posting of Hott4Hill on YouTube, http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=-Sudw4ghVe8 (July 2, 2007). 
 327. See Huckabee Girl, posting of superdeluxecomedy to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=N7xgtAWfSWM (Jan. 30, 2008). 
 328. Compare Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) (unau-
thorized use of copyrighted footage, photographs, and music in documentary on Elvis was unlikely to 
be fair use), with Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (unau-
thorized use of twenty seconds of copyrighted movie featuring Peter Graves (excerpted from a movie 
trailer) was fair use in film biography on the actor), and Monster Commc’ns Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (unauthorized use of less than two minutes of copyrighted clip 
of Muhammad Ali in movie biography was fair use).  For further discussion, see also supra notes 180–
94 and accompanying text. 
 329. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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factor (purpose and character of use), the purpose in using copyrighted 
footage of the presidential candidates was to make a transformative use 
in a citizen’s political campaign video.330  The citizen videos involve criti-
cism and parodies of some of the presidential candidates, as well as 
commentary and support for others—all of which falls within recognized 
purposes of fair use.331  All of the citizen videos appear to be noncom-
mercial as well.  Even if some had a commercial element, the Supreme 
Court has explained that “the more transformative the new work, the 
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.”332 
The fair use argument is strengthened by the First Amendment 
concerns in protecting the ability of citizens to participate in public dis-
course about the election of the President.  Under Supreme Court prece-
dent, political speech is at the core of the First Amendment.333  As Justice 
Scalia has noted, “The First Amendment creates an open marketplace 
where ideas, most especially political ideas, may compete without gov-
ernment interference.”334  Protecting the ability of citizens to participate 
and express their views during a national election for the highest office of 
the land presents a concern of the greatest importance under the First 
Amendment.335  Although the Court rejected in Harper & Row the crea-
tion of a “public figure” exception to copyright,336 the case involved a sto-
len, unpublished manuscript of Gerald Ford’s memoirs being published 
commercially without his authorization.  By contrast, here, there has 
been no indication that any of the material in the citizen videos was sto-
len or that any copyright holder’s right of first publication was usurped. 
The second fair use factor (nature of the copyrighted work) pre-
sents a more mixed analysis.  The “Hillary 1984” video borrows from an 
Apple ad, as well as copyrighted footage of Clinton in a campaign 
speech.  As a news event, the Clinton speech receives narrower copyright 
 
 330. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he goal of copyright, 
to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such 
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.”). 
 331. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting”); see 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81 (parody fair use); see also Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (copying twenty-two stills from Zapruder film of Kennedy assassination was 
fair use in part because of “public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of 
President Kennedy”). 
 332. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 333. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988). 
 334. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 335. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978) (“Preserving the integ-
rity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of 
the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the government’ are interests of the high-
est importance.”); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 692–93 (1998) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“Given the special character of political speech, particularly during campaigns 
for elected office, the debate forum implicates constitutional concerns of the highest order, as the ma-
jority acknowledges.”). 
 336. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
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protection than the Apple ad.  Similarly, in the John Edwards “Feeling 
Pretty” video, the news footage of Edwards has a smaller scope of pro-
tection, but the “I Feel Pretty” song, as a creative work, receives full 
copyright protection.  In the “Feeling Pretty” video, the synchronization 
of a copyrighted sound recording might be viewed unfavorably by courts.  
Probably the strongest case for fair use is presented by the “Obama girl” 
video, since it borrows the smallest amount of copyrighted material and 
has its own original music. 
The third fair use factor (amount and substantiality of portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole) also is somewhat mixed.  
The “Hillary 1984” video relied on an entire Apple commercial, which 
cuts against fair use.  The same holds true for the John Edwards “Feeling 
Pretty” video, which relied on two minutes of the “I Feel Pretty” song.  
As the Supreme Court has noted, however, there are no bright-line rules 
for fair use.337  The “extent of permissible copying varies with the pur-
pose and character of the use,” and, at least in some cases, taking the en-
tire or a substantial portion of a copyrighted work does not negate a find-
ing of fair use.338  The “Obama girl” video presents an easier case for fair 
use, given its use of only snippets of footage of Obama. 
The fourth fair use factor (effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work) is debatable as well.  Using 
brief news footage of the presidential candidates in well-covered public 
debates or speeches probably has no financial impact at all on the copy-
right holders.  Also, the video of Edwards primping his hair, behind the 
scenes, probably would not be the kind of footage that a network would 
even think to license out.  However, in the case of the Apple commercial, 
Apple might have an arguable claim that the mashup video has harmed 
the marketability of the old commercial by making it less likely that Ap-
ple could ever reuse the commercial in an arresting way (although it is 
probably rare for a company ever to reuse an old TV commercial).  
Likewise, the copyright owners to the “I Feel Pretty” song could claim 
the lost revenue from a synch license.  My point, however, is not to prove 
that the political mashup videos are fair uses.  Instead, it is to show that 
colorable claims of fair use exist. 
Finally, if we look at Factor 4 under my Informality Test, high 
transaction costs for licenses support embracing the informal practice of 
citizen mashups.  Average citizens probably face high transaction costs to 
obtain licenses from an entity like Apple or a music publisher.  There is 
no guarantee that either would even respond right away, if ever, to a re-
quest from a small-time individual.  By the time the user cleared all the 
rights (assuming she could afford it), the presidential election may well 
be already over. 
 
 337. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 338. Id. at 586–87. 
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Thus, if we balance the Informality Test factors, most, if not all, 
support the acceptance of the informal practice of citizen campaign 
mashups.  Even if we concluded that the fair use defenses for the 
“Hillary 1984” and John Edwards “Feeling Pretty” videos were doubtful, 
if not unavailing, we still could accept the practice under the balance of 
the other factors in the Informality Test.  Of course, a copyright holder 
could eventually file a lawsuit against a citizen political mashup video—
which could change the balance of factors.  FOX News, in fact, sent 
cease-and-desist letters to both Senator John McCain and Governor Mitt 
Romney, demanding that each candidate remove from their campaign 
videos a small portion of copyrighted footage from their FOX News de-
bate.339  Both candidates invoked fair use and continued to use the clips 
in their video ads.  Although FOX rejected their fair use claim, it seems 
unlikely that FOX would sue two presidential candidates for using foot-
age of their own debate in campaign videos.  But it is possible.  Under 
my theory, we must embrace the possibility of further developments and 
changes to both informal and formal copyright practices.  By declaring an 
informal copyright practice legitimate now, we do not dictate that it must 
be so considered forever.  Copyright law evolves. 
4. User-Generated Movie Trailer Mashups 
Another popular form of user-generated video is the movie trailer 
mashup, which involves taking snippets of a movie and transforming 
them into a very short movie trailer, often in humorous ways unintended 
by the author of the movie. 
For example, Chris Rule made a one-minute mashup trailer of Mary 
Poppins, converting the Disney children’s classic into what appeared to 
be a trailer for a scary movie.340  The mashup trailer generated more than 
five million views.341  Someone else transformed the horror film The 
Shining into a one-minute trailer for a romantic comedy.342  Another per-
son mashed up two movies into a two-minute trailer called “Brokeback 
to the Future,” which reconfigured scenes from Back to the Future, syn-
chronized with music from Brokeback Mountain, to suggest a homosex-
ual love story between the characters played by Michael J. Fox and 
 
 339. See Jim Rutenberg, Fox Orders Halt to McCain Ad, N.Y. TIMES POL. BLOG, Oct. 25, 2007, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/fox-orders-halt-to-mccain-ad/; Jason Linkins, Fox News: 
Romney Is Violating Copyright Law, “We Will Respond,” HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 2, 2007, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2007/11/02/fox-news-romney-is-viola_n_70929.html. 
 340. See Janet Kornblum, Mashups Add Splice to Movies, USA TODAY.COM, Jan. 22, 2007, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-01-22-trailer-mashups_x.htm; The Original Scary ‘Mary Poppins’ 
Recut Trailer, supra note 247. 
 341. See The Original Scary ‘Mary Poppins’ Recut Trailer, supra note 247. 
 342. See The Shining Cut, posting of neochosen to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=KmkVWuP_sO0 (Feb. 7, 2006). 
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Christopher Lloyd.343  The number of mashup movie trailers probably to-
tals in the thousands and is likely to grow.344  Some people have even 
started a Web site to track the latest ones.345 
Under the Five-Factor Informality Test, movie trailer mashups are a 
legitimate informal copyright practice.  The analysis is similar to the 
analysis for political mashups, although the political speech involved in 
the campaign videos probably presents a more compelling case. 
First, the practice of movie trailer mashups is fairly new and has not 
been the subject of litigation.  Second, there is no settled copyright 
precedent regarding the practice, thus putting it within a gray area in our 
copyright law.  Third, the arguments for fair use are at least colorable, 
although perhaps more contestable for any synchronization of copy-
righted music (such as in the “Brokeback to the Future” video).  Each of 
the videos makes a noncommercial, transformative use of short clips—
totaling only one or two minutes—from a feature length movie; existing 
case law provides some support for fair use with such limited borrow-
ing.346  Each mashup trailer can also be considered parody fair use, since 
they make fun of the original movies whose scenes are reconfigured with 
a contrarian twist.347  Finally, the transaction costs are probably too high 
for any user to clear rights with the movie studios, none of whom have 
objected to the movie trailer mashups, despite—or perhaps because of—
their widespread circulation on YouTube and favorable publicity in the 
media. 
C. The Growth of User-Generated, “Fan” Material 
1. Fan Fiction 
Fan fiction is one of the oldest and most popular types of user-
generated, “fan” material.  Fan fiction dates back well before the Inter-
net, at least to the 1860s when fans wrote parodies and sequels of be-
loved Lewis Carroll works, such as Alice in Wonderland.348  The Internet 
has made fan fiction more popular and prominent by enabling people to 
share their fan fiction with others, in easy-to-search databases.349  Some 
of the more popular subjects of fan fiction include Harry Potter, Star 
Trek, and Star Wars, although the range of subjects is great and includes 
anime, books, cartoons, comics, games, movies, and television shows.350  
 
 343. See Brokeback to the Future, posting of orangeohm to YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=zfODSPIYwpQ (Feb. 1, 2006). 
 344. Kornblum, supra note 340. 
 345. See The Trailer Mash, http://www.thetrailermash.com/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 346. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text. 
 347. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 507 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1993). 
 348. See Meredith McCardle, Note, Fan Fiction, Fandom and Fanfare: What’s All the Fuss?, 9 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 433, 440 (2003). 
 349. Id. at 453. 
 350. See FanFiction.net, http://www.fanfiction.net (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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Basically, any part of our culture could become the subject of fan fiction.  
By 2003, one Web site, fanfiction.net, had more than 500,000 user-
generated works of fan fiction.351 
Several scholars have already discussed the uncertain status of fan 
fiction under copyright law.352  In order to write fan fiction, writers typi-
cally borrow characters and some story lines from copyrighted works, 
such as Harry Potter, without express permission or license from the au-
thors of the copyrighted works.  Such unauthorized use of copyrighted 
works could violate the copyright holders’ rights to copy, distribute, and 
make derivative works.353  On the other hand, fair use seems like a strong 
argument, particularly for noncommercial fan fiction.  Other copyright 
scholars have already elaborated a very respectable case for fair use in 
fan fiction, so I will not repeat the analysis here.354 
Instead, for our purposes, it is important to examine the practice of 
fan fiction as an informal copyright practice.  On whole, the five Infor-
mality Test factors support allowing the practice as an important gap 
filler in our copyright system. 
First, even though fan fiction has existed for years, no copyright 
holder has challenged it to a judgment in court.  Consequently, there is 
no case law that directly considers the legality of a third party’s use of 
copyrighted characters and story lines in fan fiction.  The Wind Done 
Gone case, involving a published sequel to Gone With the Wind written 
from the perspective of a slave, provides support for fan fiction, although 
the case involved a strong parody or criticism of the original work that 
may be absent in much fan fiction, and regardless, other courts might be 
less receptive to reuses of copyrighted characters.355  At least a colorable 
fair use claim exists for fan fiction,356 especially if noncommercial.  Also, 
there is a possible argument that the idea-expression dichotomy should 
be applied in a way to allow reuses of “culturally iconic literary charac-
ters.”357 
 
 351. McCardle, supra note 348, at 453. 
 352. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory 
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597 (2007); Katyal, supra note 37; Leanne 
Stendell, Fanfic and Fan Fact: How Current Copyright Law Ignores the Reality of Copyright Owner 
and Consumer Interests in Fan Fiction, 58 SMU L. REV. 1551 (2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: 
Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997); Mollie E. 
Nolan, Comment, Search for Original Expression: Fan Fiction and the Fair Use Defense, 30 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 533 (2006). 
 353. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 354. See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 352, at 612–20; Tushnet, supra note 352, at 664–81. 
 355. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2001); cf. Walt 
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757–58 (9th Cir. 1978) (unauthorized use of Disney charac-
ters in “counter-culture” comic books was not a parody fair use because defendant took too much 
Disney content). 
 356. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
 357. See Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal Space for 
Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 938 (2007); see also Leslie 
A. Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor: When Characters Outlive Their Copyrights, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & 
SPORTS L. REV. 437 (1994); Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Super-
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In addition, the transaction costs would be high for individuals to at-
tempt to obtain licenses from the copyright holders.  There is no easy, 
systematic way of trying to obtain a license, other than to try to locate 
and reach the copyright holder.  Half the challenge may be even getting a 
response from some of the more prominent copyright holders, such as 
J.K. Rowling, the author of Harry Potter.  On fanfiction.net, more than 
355,000 works of fan fiction exist for Harry Potter alone.358  Although 
Rowling has been very successful and probably has considerable re-
sources at her disposal, it is hard to imagine her support staff responding 
to that many requests for a license.  Moreover, if the relevant copyright 
holders start charging fan fiction writers license fees of any significant 
amount, the fees may turn out to be cost-prohibitive.  Just imagine an 
elementary school student who desires to write a short story involving 
Harry Potter asking her parents to borrow $100 so that she can pay a li-
cense fee. 
Factor 5 presents a mixed picture.  A few prominent authors whose 
works are often the subject of fan fiction have publicly supported the use 
of their characters in fan fiction, although the level of support sometimes 
varies or is qualified even among these authors.  While arguments can be 
made that some of the public statements by these authors give rise to im-
plied licenses, estoppel, or other defenses, these arguments are by no 
means certain.  Some of the authors’ public statements seem to hedge.  
And, in any event, Factor 5 is not contingent on determining whether an 
implied license or estoppel has occurred. 
J.K. Rowling has publicly supported use of her characters in fan fic-
tion, as long as the fan fiction is not commercial, obscene, misattributed 
as Rowling’s own work, or published in book format or in print; in an 
ongoing case, Rowling has sued the publisher and author of the planned 
publication of a Harry Potter lexicon in book format (although she has 
permitted an online version).359  Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry 
and Paramount Pictures have both publicly approved noncommercial 
Star Trek fan fiction, as long as proper attribution is given.360  On the 
other hand, a few authors have come out publicly against all fan fiction 
using their characters.  Anne Rice, for example, has stated on her Web 
site: “I do not allow fan fiction. The characters are copyrighted. It upsets 
me terribly to even think about fan fiction with my characters. I advise 
my readers to write your own original stories with your own characters. 
 
man: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional, Literary, and Pictorial Char-
acters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992).  But cf. Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Over-
looked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 940–66 (1999) (suggesting justifications for protecting 
“cultural objects” with copyright). 
 358. See FanFiction.net, Books, http://www.fanfiction.net/book/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 359. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Harry Potter and the Copyright Lawyer; Use of Popular Characters 
Puts ‘Fan Fiction’ Writers in Gray Area, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at A1; Stopping the Presses on a 
Potter Book, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at B8; Darren Waters, Rowling Backs Potter Fan Fiction, 
BBC, May 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/3753001.stm. 
 360. Katyal, supra note 37, at 516. 
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It is absolutely essential that you respect my wishes.”361  Rice reportedly 
sent out dozens of cease-and-desist letters to stop fan fiction of her work 
from being posted online.362  In between the two poles are a few authors, 
like George Lucas and Lucasfilm, who encourage some fan fiction but 
attempt to restrict the terms allowed for fan fiction of their works.363  Lu-
casfilm, for example, gave people the ability to post fan fiction on the 
Star Wars Web site, but then asserted a right of copyright over whatever 
fan fiction was posted.364  (Some people bristle at Lucas’s attempt to limit 
reuse of his work, given his apparently extensive borrowing from Japa-
nese culture and other works for his Star Wars movies.365) 
Adding up the Five Factors, fan fiction falls within a gray area of 
copyright law—and has for a number of years.366  That conclusion is con-
sistent with how the popular media portrays it, as evident in the title of a 
recent news article that read: Harry Potter and the Copyright Lawyer; 
Use of Popular Characters Puts ‘Fan Fiction’ Writers in Gray Area.367  Al-
though a few authors have publicly criticized fan fiction and expressed 
their disapproval (which cuts against the acceptance of the informal prac-
tice), none has taken it upon herself to challenge the practice in court.  In 
the past, several authors have sent cease-and-desist letters to stop fan fic-
tion of their works, but those letters, which have had only limited effec-
tiveness, have not ever led to a fully litigated case.368 
Perhaps for the works of those authors who object to fan fiction, the 
practice is more precarious under the Five-Factor Informality Test.  For 
example, it may well be that Anne Rice has effectively established her 
own informal practice in disallowing or discouraging fan fiction of her 
work.  Yet for most works, noncommercial fan fiction is a far more ac-
cepted practice.  At least until a copyright holder challenges the practice 
of fan fiction in court and a precedent is established, we should view 
noncommercial fan fiction as a legitimate, informal copyright practice. 
2. Fan Web Sites and Blogs 
Fan web sites and fan blogs are another popular form of UGC.  
Early on, during the mid-1990s, Hollywood seemed hostile to allowing 
such fan sites to blossom.  For example, in a much-publicized contro-
 
 361. AnneRice.com: Messages to Anne Rice Fans, http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-
MessagesToFans.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 362. See Nolan, supra note 352, at 556–57. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Katyal, supra note 37, at 511–12. 
 365. For the similarities between Lucas’s work and other works, see Jon Casimir, Star Wars Crib 
Notes, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 11, 2002, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/05/10/ 
1021002387791.html; Ridwan Khan, The Bushido of Star Wars, ANIME FRINGE, June 2004, http://www. 
animefringe.com/magazine/2004/06/feature/04.php. 
 366. Katyal, supra note 37, at 499. 
 367. Cha, supra note 359. 
 368. See Nolan, supra note 352, at 557. 
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versy, FOX network sent cease-and-desist letters to stop fans of The 
Simpsons and other shows from using copyrighted or trademarked mate-
rial.369  The cease-and-desist letters prompted twenty-seven fan sites to 
shut down and seventeen sites to remove FOX copyrighted material.370  
A few sites refused to do anything, while some even initiated a massive 
online protest against FOX that included protest sites and emails against 
FOX.371  Given all the negative publicity, FOX eventually relented and 
began to allow fan sites if they posted disclaimers stating that they were 
not affiliated with FOX.372  The use of disclaimers is now a fairly common 
practice among fan sites and for UGC generally—even though disclaim-
ers are unlikely to provide any defense to copyright infringement (al-
though they do help in terms of avoiding trademark infringement).  For 
example, one common disclaimer is the “no copyright infringement in-
tended” disclaimer prevalent among user mashup and fan videos on 
YouTube.  As one user-generated mashup for Grey’s Anatomy stated: 
DISCLAIMER: I am simply a fan of the show.  There is no copy-
right infringement intended.  I am not affiliated with abc, shon-
daland or any of its affiliates.  If there is a problem with this video 
being posted, please notify me and it will be removed promptly.373 
A search of YouTube for this kind of disclaimer resulted in more than 
200,000 videos.374 
Today, Hollywood studios appear far more receptive to fan Web 
sites.  (Imagine that.)  Many fan Web sites have been up for years, with-
out protest from Hollywood.  For example, Nohomers.net, which follows 
The Simpsons, has existed since 2001.375  The site contains numerous 
copyrighted images from the TV show.376  At the bottom of the Web 
page is the following disclaimer: 
“The Simpsons” TM and copyright FOX and its related companies.  
All rights reserved.  This website, its operators, and any content 
contained on this site relating to “The Simpsons” is not authorized 
by FOX.  NoHomers.net and its maintainers do not take responsi-
bility for the actions and comments made by members of “The No 
Homers Club.”377 
No Homers is easy to find through a Google search for “Simpson fan.”  
There are at least twenty-five other Simpsons fan sites, all easy to find 
 
 369. See Katyal, supra note 37, at 515. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Grey’s Anatomy Music Video Breathe Anna Nalick (Complete), posting of ElleBrand to 
YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CP5mFTq6vv0 (Nov. 5, 2006). 
 374. See YouTube, “No Copyright Infringement Intended” Video Search Results, http://www. 
youtube.com/results?search_query=no+copyright+infringement+intended (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 375. See NoHomers.net, Your Daily Dose of The Simpsons, http://www.nohomers.net/index.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 376. See NoHomers.net, Simpsons Image Gallery: The Simpson Family, http://www.nohomers. 
net/content/gallery/family/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 377. Id. 
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through Google.378  One site even provides a directory of the most popu-
lar Simpsons fan Web sites.379  Most of the fan Web sites contain copy-
righted images from the TV show, and a number even include copy-
righted footage from the show.380  Given the number of easy-to-find fan 
Web sites, some of which have been around over a decade,381 there can 
be no question that FOX has an informal practice of allowing these fan 
sites. 
The same holds true for American Idol, another popular FOX show 
that draws a huge fan following.  For example, Rickey.org has been relig-
iously blogging about American Idol since at least 2004.382  The blog is 
immensely popular among American Idol fans and even among the ac-
tual singers from the show who have met Rickey in person and appear on 
his blog.  By May 2008, Rickey.org had more than twelve million views.383  
Over the past few years, Rickey’s blog has expanded to included cover-
age for other television shows, such as Big Brother, Dancing with the 
Stars, Project Runway, So You Think You Can Dance, and Survivor.384  
But the blog is still known best for its American Idol coverage.  On the 
blog, you can find not only still photos from the show, but video clips of 
the performances as well.385  Rickey.org typically provides some com-
mentary about the Idol contestants’ performances, as well as whom he 
would like to see win the competition.386  Rickey’s blog posts routinely 
generate comments from other American Idol fans, who share their own 
views of the performances.387  Just as with the Simpsons fan blog, 
Rickey.org has a disclaimer on its site: “This blog is not affiliated in any 
way with FOX, American Idol, 19 TV Ltd., FremantleMedia, ABC, 
NBC, CBS, CW or Bravo.”388 
The number of easy-to-find fan sites for American Idol is even 
greater than the number for The Simpsons.  Based on my research, there 
are at least fifty Idol fan Web sites, most of which use copyrighted images 
from the TV show and a good number use copyrighted video clips from 
Idol as well.389  None of these unauthorized fan Web sites can be ex-
 
 378. See Erin Holmes & Edward Lee, The Simpsons Fan Websites Chart, Mar. 1, 2008 (on file 
with the University of Illinois Law Review). 
 379. See The Simpsons Directory, http://www.simponsdirectory.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 380. See Holmes & Lee, supra note 378. 
 381. See, e.g., Last Exit to Springfield, http://www.lardlad.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2008) (“Last 
Exit to Springfield © 1997–2007”); Simpsons Channel, http://www.simpsonschannel.com (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2008) (“This is an unofficial website owned and maintained by Adam Wolf, 1997–2008”). 
 382. See Rickey.org, February 2004, http://www.rickey.org/?m=200402 (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 383. See Rickey.org—American Idol 24/7, http://www.rickey.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 384. See id. 
 385. See, e.g., Danny Noriega’s American Idol Audition, http://www.rickey.org/?p=6991#more-
6991 (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 386. See Rickey.org, supra note 383. 
 387. See id. 
 388. See id. (under heading “About” at bottom of page). 
 389. See Erin Holmes & Edward Lee, American Idol Fan Websites Chart, Mar. 1, 2008 (on file 
with the University of Illinois Law Review). 
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plained well by formal copyright law, which would most likely consider 
them infringing given the lack of copyright permission.  Yet I believe it is 
fairly clear that FOX knows about the existence of these fan sites but has 
an informal practice of allowing them to flourish. 
Applying the Five-Factor Informality Test to the above fan sites 
presents a closer issue than the other UGC we have examined, particu-
larly for the fan Web sites containing copyrighted video or audio clips 
from the shows.  First, fan Web sites have not been the subject of litiga-
tion, which is not all that surprising given the folly of suing one’s own 
fans!  Second, the law is unsettled in this area, and will likely remain so 
until some copyright holder has the gumption to sue a fan. 
However, the argument for fair use may be less strong or more de-
batable, at least in some aspects, compared to the other UGC examined 
here.  Under the first fair use factor, the fan Web sites’ use of copy-
righted images or clips from the TV shows probably has at least some 
purpose in commenting on the show.  The extent of commentary, though, 
varies and can be quite minimal at times.390  Even with commentary, the 
republication of images, audio, or video clips does not seem as transfor-
mative on fan Web sites as either the mashup videos or the fan fiction 
discussed above.  The mashups and fan fiction used portions of copy-
righted material to create new, original works.  The fan Web sites seem 
to be using portions of copyrighted works to comment on them—which, 
although a recognized fair use purpose, might be considered by some to 
be less transformative than creating a video mashup or work of fan fic-
tion. 
Second, the nature of the copyrighted shows varies.  The Simpsons 
is a fictional, animated work, so it receives the full scope of copyright 
protection.  American Idol is a reality show competition with perform-
ances of copyrighted music, so it straddles between nonfiction in some 
parts, which deserve narrower copyright protection, and creative expres-
sion in other parts, which deserve full protection. 
Third, the amount of copyrighted material taken also varies.  The 
still images represent only a tiny fraction of any of the TV shows and do 
not offer a substitute for the show itself.  But the video or audio clips 
from the shows can capture, effectively, the “heart” of the show. 
Finally, the fourth fair use factor is debatable in this instance.  Hol-
lywood studios could argue that fan Web sites’ unauthorized use of con-
tent hurts the studios’ licensing of such material or cultivation of fan sites 
on official Web sites.  To the extent other viewers use the fan Web sites 
for time-shifted recordings of the shows, the fan sites might eat into the 
 
 390. Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (posting copyrighted materials of Scientology was not transformative where defen-
dant added little or no criticism), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 
1525 (D. Colo. 1995) (likely fair use for Web site opposing Scientology in creating electronic database 
of Scientology writings to criticize them). 
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advertising revenue for the shows.  On the other hand, the Hollywood 
studios do not appear to have developed a market for licensing with fan 
Web sites, and more and more networks are allowing users to freely em-
bed clips from the networks’ shows, now including The Simpsons (al-
though not yet American Idol).391  The studios may, in fact, benefit finan-
cially from all the publicity the fan Web sites bring to their shows, 
particularly the most successful fan Web sites—which typically rely on 
greater borrowing of copyrighted material.  In short, the argument for 
fair use is contestable, but at least colorable. 
Once we consider the remaining parts of the Informality Test, how-
ever, they militate in favor of recognition of the informal practice.  
Transaction costs of negotiating a license from the networks may be too 
high for individual fans.  After some initial protests from several copy-
right owners, a number of them now knowingly allow such fan Web sites.  
It is obvious to see why: Hollywood studios have a direct financial inter-
est in cultivating fans and viewers of their shows.  Many fan Web sites 
and blogs are created and read by teenagers, who represent the most de-
sirable age group for advertisers,392 so Hollywood studios probably are 
reluctant to regulate these Web sites for fear of upsetting the fan base for 
their shows.  Some studios probably even (secretly) love the successful 
fan Web sites that essentially provide the studios with both free advertis-
ing and an authentic advocate in the user-generated community.  Of 
course, the studios still retain the power to publicly denounce the prac-
tice of fan Web sites’ using their shows without permission or file a law-
suit against a fan Web site to establish precedent for this area.  Until they 
do, however, the copyright practices will continue to evolve informally. 
D. Summary 
This Part explained why the practices associated with a number of 
different kinds of UGC—i.e., citizen political campaign mashups, movie 
trailer mashups, fan fiction, and fan Web sites—should be considered le-
gitimate gap fillers in copyright law.  It bears emphasis that my analysis 
does not depend on proving fair use applies to all of these examples.  The 
issue may well be debatable or even doubtful in some cases, but it is only 
one factor in my overall analysis under the Five-Factor Test.  The lack of 
clarity in the law and the responses (or lack thereof) from the copyright 
holders also factor prominently in the analysis. 
Although I have attempted to present representative examples of 
UGC from the copious amounts of such material on the Web, my analy-
sis should not be mistaken for an argument that all UGC is necessarily 
 
 391. See supra notes 280–300 and accompanying text.  FOX has allowed embeddable videos from 
The Simpsons at hulu.com. 
 392. Cecilia Ogbu, Note, I Put up a Website About My Favorite Show and All I Got Was This 
Lousy Cease-and-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan Sites, Internet Culture, and Copyright Owners, 
12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 279, 285 (2003). 
LEE.DOC 9/3/2008  4:50:06 PM 
1538 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2008 
legitimate, or that the examples I discussed involve legitimate practices 
forever.  Different examples of UGC could present an entirely different 
set of factors, such as greater protest by copyright holders, a lawsuit filed 
against a user, or a more commercial user Web site.393  Even the exam-
ples I have used can change over time.  Neither copyright law nor copy-
right practices are static. 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMAL COPYRIGHT PRACTICES FOR THE 
COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
This Part concludes by examining the significance of adopting my 
theory of informal copyright practices.  The change is more than seman-
tic.  It provides the public and copyright policymakers a better under-
standing of how our copyright system, in fact, operates, which in turn can 
inform how future copyright disputes and debates should be resolved.  
Copyright issues need not always, or even typically, be resolved by Con-
gress or the courts.  Informal copyright practices provide a “third way” of 
dealing with copyright problems. 
A. Taking a More Realistic and Holistic Approach to Copyright 
In this Article, I have advocated for taking a more realistic and ho-
listic approach to copyright.  I would characterize the key components of 
this approach as follows. 
First, we need to recognize that practices, even informal ones, mat-
ter in copyright law.  Too much copyright scholarship has focused on 
formal copyright law—which, although very important, represents only a 
tiny fraction of the entire world of copyright relations.394  Even reform-
minded proposals in copyright scholarship have fixated on changing for-
mal copyright law.395  And to the extent “private ordering” in copyright is 
discussed, the scholarship often considers private ordering in the context 
of formal contracts.396 
Of course, formal copyright law and formal copyright licenses are 
important parts of our copyright system, and much scholarship should be 
devoted to examining them.  Yet there is a huge part of our copyright 
 
 393. For example, a photo agency sued gossip blogger Perez Hilton for allegedly using its copy-
righted images on his blog without permission.  See Robin Abcarian, Perez Hilton Takes Their Best 
Shots, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at A1. 
 394. For example, one could peruse some recent copyright articles.  See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Stand-
ing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 
TEX L. REV. 1799 (2007) (analyzing “opt out” position for digital libraries and recommending fair use 
and statutory solutions); Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007) (arguing for recalibration of merger doctrine). 
 395. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 53, at 1123–41; Liu, supra note 52, at 150–51. 
 396. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005); Loren, supra note 102, at 271; Viva 
R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45 (2007). 
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system—probably the substantial majority of it—that relies on informal 
practices that are never litigated and never subject to formal licenses.  
Often, these informal practices help to fill gray areas and gaps left open 
by formal copyright law.  This important part of our copyright system is 
all but ignored in copyright scholarship.  This Article has offered one 
theory for why informal copyright practices develop in our copyright sys-
tem—as important gap fillers without which our copyright system could 
not function. 
Once we recognize that some informal copyright practices are nec-
essary for our copyright system to function, we can get a better picture of 
the entire copyright system as a whole, particularly its deficiencies.  A 
systemic feature—or defect—in the Copyright Act is that, for the most 
part, its provisions do not inform the public, even when aided by copy-
right lawyers, of the legality of many different uses of copyrighted works 
ex ante.  This inherent uncertainty makes the Copyright Act even worse 
than the Tax Code, which, despite its complexity, provides millions of 
taxpayers at least with enough certainty for them to figure out how much 
taxes to pay each year—even providing the public with the option of 
electing the simpler, standard deduction.397  But, in copyright, there is no 
“standard” fair use or exemption. 
The question then becomes how to deal with this systemic uncer-
tainty in copyright law.  One way to deal with the problem is to clarify 
the Copyright Act with more amendments by Congress, more litigated 
cases in federal courts, and more rulemaking by the Copyright Office.  In 
other words, fill the gaps and gray areas in formal copyright law with 
more formal law.  This approach would probably be somewhat helpful, 
but, given the ever changing technological developments, it seems doubt-
ful that Congress and the courts could ever really catch up to fill all the 
gaps as even more are created.  Also, there are significant costs to adopt-
ing this approach.  As currently constructed, neither the federal courts 
nor the Copyright Office is set up to handle a substantial increase in 
copyright cases or workload.  More funding and resources would be 
needed.  And, given the time it takes to litigate a case through appeal, 
along with the possibility of a circuit split or just confusing opinions from 
the federal courts, there is no guarantee that increased litigation will do 
an adequate job in getting rid of gray areas in copyright law.  As far as 
Congress is concerned, given its reliance on interested stakeholders to 
draft copyright legislation, it seems very doubtful that such amendments 
would be all that clarifying or helpful to the public.  Congress could be 
subject to a “persistent asymmetry” in which copyright legislation repre-
sents primarily the well-organized lobbyists and media industries.398  We 
 
 397. See 26 U.S.C. § 63(c) (2000). 
 398. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 125, at 408; Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and 
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862 (1987).  As the Supreme Court has described, the 
1976 Copyright Act “was the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives of creators and 
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also must not forget that the primary source of the inherent uncertainty 
in the Copyright Act is its drafter, Congress.  There is no reason to be-
lieve that Congress can do a better job than it has done before. 
Another way to deal with the problem is to shift more effort to for-
mal licensing to fill the gaps of copyright law.  The recording industry, for 
example, typically includes both “work-for-hire” and assignment provi-
sions in their contracts with performers, in order to handle the legal un-
certainty surrounding whether their signed performers would even fall 
within the work-made-for-hire provision.399  Licenses are more common 
for commercial ventures, but they could also be used for noncommercial 
uses.  The “permission first” credo of some major copyright holders 
would probably favor this approach.  When in doubt, people should just 
get a license for every single contemplated use of a copyrighted work.  
The reform-minded Creative Commons has attempted to make this eas-
ier online by enabling copyright holders to attach blanket copyright per-
missions for the use of their works under terms they set ahead of time.400  
In this way, the transaction costs are removed because downstream users 
do not have to bargain for anything; they simply read the terms of the 
blanket license.  Although incredibly successful among individual copy-
right holders,401 the Creative Commons licenses do not yet appear to be 
used as widely among the major media copyright holders.  Until the ma-
jor copyright holders do (or adopt some alternative, user-friendly system 
of licensing), it is unlikely that formal licenses can fill all the gaps in 
copyright law.  Not even the major corporate copyright holders are 
staffed to handle the millions of requests for licenses that would probably 
occur on a monthly, if not weekly, basis if users had to ask for permission 
for every use of a copyrighted work.  The transaction costs for the users 
may well be prohibitive, particularly for noncommercial uses.  And many 
companies may prefer a strategic “hedge” that allows them to benefit fi-
nancially from unauthorized uses of their works (such as through fan 
Web sites) without ever formally endorsing or licensing the practice. 
A third option—the one proposed in this Article—is to rely on in-
formal copyright practices to handle at least some of the gaps and gray 
areas in formal copyright law.  Informal copyright practices can be lik-
ened to a less formal and less organized cousin of the Creative Commons 
license.402  Both address the problem of clearing “copyright permissions,” 
 
copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress.”  
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989). 
 399. Daniel Gould, Time’s Up: Copyright Termination, Work-for-Hire and the Recording Industry, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 96–97 (2007); see also Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 
64 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 400. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 45. 
 401. Nearly 149 million Creative Commons licenses exist.  See supra note 98 and accompanying 
text. 
 402. Cf. Carroll, supra note 400, at 46 (“For the time being, a number of implicit understandings 
have grown up around digital technologies, and these understandings have led to norms and implied 
LEE.DOC 9/3/2008  4:50:06 PM 
No. 5] WARMING UP TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT 1541 
and both can embody important norms in the digital age, such as allow-
ing noncommercial (re)uses of a work, provided attribution is given to 
the author.  An informal copyright practice and a Creative Commons li-
cense, however, are quite different in approach.  The Creative Commons 
license is a formal blanket copyright license, fixed by the author along 
with the dissemination of the work; therefore, it works squarely within 
our conventional understanding of copyright law and its preferred, if not 
required, practice of obtaining prior permission.  By contrast, an infor-
mal copyright practice is a dynamic practice relating to the use of copy-
righted works that begins informally, without a formal license or express 
permission from the copyright holder, but evolves over time in such a 
way that the practice may be accepted, by and large, by the copyright 
holder.  The “give and take” over the terms of the informal practice oc-
curs loosely, if not haphazardly, over time and space. 
My position is not that informal copyright practices should be the 
only approach we adopt to deal with gaps in copyright law.  It may turn 
out that some informal copyright practices are illegitimate under my 
proposed test or other basis.403  Also, there may be some informal copy-
right practices that Congress or the courts decide to formally adopt in 
copyright law—which would give even greater clarity and legitimacy to 
the practice in question.  I do not mean to suggest that Congress and the 
courts should abdicate their responsibility to fill gaps in copyright law.  
Instead, I argue that informal copyright practices must be one approach 
that we consider, given how our current copyright system is so poorly 
constructed to handle these gaps and gray areas in any other way.  In-
formal practices represent a loose kind of “give and take” among users, 
intermediaries, and copyright holders.  It is much looser and messier than 
formal copyright law.  There is no negotiation of a formal license.  In-
stead, the “negotiation” occurs at a macro level with users and copyright 
holders acting and responding to one another’s practices.  Although 
some policymakers and copyright scholars may disagree with this ap-
proach, the challenge for them is coming up with a viable alternative. 
Looking at informal practices can also help us evaluate ongoing 
copyright controversies.  This Article has examined in depth some of the 
practices related to UGC.  But we can apply the same approach to other 
controversies, such as the ongoing debate over digital rights management 
(DRM) and the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).404  Practically speaking, the most significant de-
velopment in the entire debate over DRM and the DMCA has come not 
in formal copyright law.  Instead, it has come from the negative response 
 
licenses that serve important coordinating functions.  As robust as these informal mechanisms are, 
however, greater clarity and coordination can often be had when copyright owners explicitly designate 
which copyright events they consider to be permissible.”). 
 403. Cf. Katyal, supra note 37, at 465 (discussing exclusion of minorities and women in copyright 
industries). 
 404. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). 
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of users, which in turn has led Steve Jobs of Apple iTunes, EMI, Univer-
sal Music Group, Warner Music Group, and Amazon to abandon DRM 
for music files.405  The music industry’s about-face has had secondary ef-
fects in the book publishing industry.  Major publishers such as Random 
House, Penguin Group, and Simon & Schuster also decided to abandon 
DRM on audiobooks.406  An informal copyright practice may not neces-
sarily tell us what the law ought to be, but at least if supported by wide-
spread acceptance, it can provide workable solutions for the time being. 
To us lawyers, informal copyright practices may seem unsatisfying 
and scary.  They are only informal, typically not contained in any writing, 
and therefore seem so precarious.  What if a copyright holder somewhere 
objects to the practice?  The informal practice might not stand up in 
court.  That is certainly possible, but not all that likely given how few 
copyright cases are litigated.  No matter how precarious informal copy-
right practices may appear to lawyers, those practices are what guide the 
conduct of millions of users far more than formal copyright law. 
B. Users Play a Far Greater Role in Copyright Law than Perceived 
Once informal copyright practices are considered as parts of our 
copyright system, we must recognize that users play a far greater role in 
the development of copyright law than is commonly perceived. 
Most copyright scholarship portrays users as having little, if any, 
role in copyright law’s development.  As Professor Cohen writes, “Copy-
right doctrine . . . is characterized by the absence of the user.”407  This 
view is buttressed by the fact that most, if not all, of the provisions in the 
Copyright Act were drafted by industry stakeholders, often without the 
inclusion of any representative acting on behalf of users.408  Even where 
formal copyright law favors users, copyright holders can impose greater 
formal restrictions on user rights through contract and the so-called “end 
user license agreement.”409 
This critique is largely accurate as a critique of formal copyright 
law, but it says nothing about what happens in practice.  The relatively 
few copyright cases filed each year must temper our understanding of the 
reach of formal copyright law.  Far more copyright relations are informal 
than formal; few ever get resolved by formal copyright law.  Although 
copyright holders do hold a lot of power over how their works are ex-
ploited, users are not powerless.  En masse, users can exert tremendous 
 
 405. See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, APPLE, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/ 
thoughtsonmusic/; Erick Schonfeld, Amazon Adds Warner Music to DRM-Free Roster, TECHCRUNCH, 
Dec. 27, 2007, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/12/27/amazon-adds-warner-music-to-drm-free-roster/. 
 406. See Brad Stone, Publishers Phase Out Piracy Protection on Audio Books, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
3, 2008, at C2. 
 407. Cohen, supra note 36, at 347. 
 408. See Litman, supra note 12, at 23. 
 409. See Moffat, supra note 396, at 50–51. 
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power in how copyrighted works are exploited.  Sometimes, users may 
even hold more power, collectively, than all copyright holders combined. 
With the huge growth of UGC online, users represent a powerful 
force in the copyright dynamic.  Users, not copyright holders, are the 
ones who have started the informal practices associated with UGC that 
eventually many copyright holders have tolerated and even openly em-
braced. 
C. “Warming” Versus “Chilling” Effects on Speech 
1. Gray Areas as Chilling 
Copyright scholarship has extensively discussed the numerous ways 
in which copyright law may be used by copyright holders to chill legiti-
mate speech, particularly fair uses of copyrighted works.410  The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) even started a project called the Chill-
ing Effects Clearinghouse to gather, in a searchable database, cease-and-
desist notices and DMCA notices sent from copyright holders to indi-
viduals and entities.411  To date, the project has collected over 1,600 
cease-and-desist letters.412  EFF adds hyperlinks to the letters to explain 
the legalese contained therein.  Law clinics at Harvard, Stanford, Berke-
ley, San Francisco, Maine, George Washington, and Santa Clara also as-
sist in the project.413  In a study of 850 cease-and-desist letters, Jennifer 
Urban and Laura Quilter concluded that thirty-one percent presented 
only weak claims of infringement.414 
According to the standard “chilling” argument, a major contributing 
factor to the chilling of speech is the uncertainty in the scope of copyright 
law and fair use.415  Uncertainty in the law may enable copyright holders, 
 
 410. See, e.g., Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 
30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219 (2007); Tushnet, supra note 182, at 582; Jennifer M. Urban & Laura 
Quilter, Efficient Process of “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); Rachael 
Braswell, Note, Consumer Gripe Sites, Intellectual Property Law, and the Use of Cease-and-Desist Let-
ters to Chill Protected Speech on the Internet, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1241 
(2007); Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of Copyright 
Protection and Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 145, 163 (2005). 
 411. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 412. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, Cease and Desist Notices: Copyright, http://www. 
chillingeffects.org/copyright/notice.cgi (last visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 413. See Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, supra note 411. 
 414. Urban & Quilter, supra note 410, at 667.  The MIT Free Culture group tracks on its Web site 
238,322 videos in YouTube to see how many are removed for alleged copyright violations.  YouTomb, 
http://youtomb.mit.edu (last visited Aug. 11, 2008).  As of August 2008, the Web site identified 8,129 
such videos removed from YouTube.  YouTomb, Statistics, http://youtomb.mit.edu/statistics/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2008). 
 415. Carroll, supra note 53, at 1148 (“Copyright law must respond to the rise of copyright owner 
aggression and its chilling effects and respond to increasing uncertainty surrounding uses of new tech-
nologies by providing greater ex ante certainty about the scope of fair use or by reducing the risks of 
relying on fair use through ex post relief.”). 
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particularly corporate ones, to scare people from making legitimate fair 
uses of copyrighted works by holding out the threat of litigation.  As Pro-
fessor Lessig likes to put it, “[F]air use . . . simply means the right to hire 
a lawyer to defend your right to create.”416 
I do not doubt that some of these concerns about “chilling” of 
speech by our copyright system are justified, particularly where the al-
leged fair use occurs in the commercial context.  In other writings, I have 
discussed the possibility of chilling myself.417 
2. Gray Areas as Warming 
Yet the concerns about “chilling” must be tempered by considera-
tion of another phenomenon that has completely escaped the attention 
of copyright scholars.  For lack of a better word, I will call the phenome-
non “warming.”418 
“Warming” describes the phenomenon when users make unauthor-
ized uses of copyrighted works based in part on the belief that it is ac-
ceptable because it is a larger-scale practice engaged in by others.  Be-
cause copyright law is often complex, unclear, and uncertain, users take 
their cues about what is an acceptable copyright practice by looking to 
what others are doing without challenge from copyright holders.  Uncer-
tainty in the law does not cause warming—or chilling, for that matter.  It 
all depends on how people react to an environment in which the law is 
uncertain.  To draw an analogy, the glass is neither half-full nor half-
empty.  Instead, it all depends on the perspective of the person viewing 
the glass.  Some may view it as half-full, others half-empty, while others 
may view it as both half-full and half-empty.  Over time, people’s view 
may change, influenced perhaps by other people’s perception.  The same 
holds true with uncertainty in copyright law.  Whether it lends itself to 
the chilling—or warming—of speech all depends on the public’s reaction 
to it. 
Take, for example, the growth of mashup videos online, such as the 
citizen political mashups or the movie trailer mashups discussed above.  
The phenomenon started out simply with one person making and sharing 
a mashup video online.  Soon, others began making mashups of their 
own.  Because copyright holders have not challenged or discouraged the 
practice—but many, in fact, have publicly supported it, even risk-averse 
individuals like me (who might not have risked making a video, given the 
uncertainty of copyright law) have begun creating and sharing mashups 
 
 416. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004). 
 417. See Lee, supra note 175, at 50–51; Lee, supra note 92, at 1313. 
 418. In legal scholarship, the term “warming” or “warming effect” has apparently been used only 
once before to describe the opposite effect to the chilling of speech.  See Thomas W. Hazlett & David 
W. Sosa, “Chilling” the Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 43 (1998).  I have not seen the term used formally in copyright schol-
arship. 
LEE.DOC 9/3/2008  4:50:06 PM 
No. 5] WARMING UP TO USER-GENERATED CONTENT 1545 
of their own, given what appears to be a growing acceptance of the prac-
tice.  This is a case where uncertainty in copyright law, a gray area, leads 
to warming, not chilling, of speech. 
My theory of warming is not predicated on people’s attempt—or 
lack thereof—to understand copyright law.  I do not assert that all users 
must consciously think about uncertainty in copyright law for warming to 
occur.  Some people might be completely oblivious to copyright law.  But 
that does not change the signaling that occurs through informal copyright 
practices that can lead to warming.  An activity that is widespread and 
that gains increasing public support from major copyright holders signals 
to people at least an informal acceptance of the practice.  The precise 
status of the practice under formal copyright law becomes irrelevant—
except in those infrequent occasions when a lawsuit is brought and fully 
litigated to completion. 
Warming explains why people have not been chilled from making 
photocopies for personal use, despite the uncertainty in formal copyright 
law.  It also explains why so much activity on the Internet appears to 
grow exponentially, drawing more users to engage in the practice—
whether it is blogging, writing fan faction, or creating mashups or other 
UGC.  In a networked environment, people can view what millions of 
others are creating.  The Internet is especially conducive to the “warm-
ing” of speech, given its network effects and its fostering of social net-
working communities in which people can easily see—and share—the 
creations of others online.  Warming is a form of bandwagon effect, 
which refers to the phenomenon of how people’s views can be shaped by 
how others view an issue.419  “[E]ach new person on [an] . . . upward 
bandwagon induces additional people to climb on.”420  The Internet itself 
is a huge breeding ground for bandwagon effects.421 
Very few copyright scholars have recognized this phenomenon.  To 
the extent gray areas in copyright are discussed in the literature, they 
more commonly are attacked as sources of potential chilling of creative 
endeavors.422  While in many cases that probably is true, there is nothing 
inherent in uncertainty in the law that automatically gives rise to chilling.  
A lot depends on context, such as whether the unauthorized use is com-
mercial or noncommercial, whether the copyright holders object, the 
strength of the fair use defense, how much of a gray area exists, and sim-
ply how people view the issue over time. 
 
 419. Cf. Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal Marriage: Inevitable or Reversible?, 41 FAM. 
L.Q. 491, 514–16 (2007) (discussing bandwagon effects). 
 420. Id. (quoting TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 69–82 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 421. See JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 5 
(2001) (“The largest and most successful bandwagon, apart from the telephone, has been the Inter-
net . . . . Perhaps most important, the Internet serves as a vast resource to facilitate free speech and 
free expression across the globe.”). 
 422. See sources cited supra note 410 and accompanying text. 
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For example, as Professor Katyal explains for fan fiction: 
The uncertainty over the status of fan fiction presents copyright 
scholars with an important lesson regarding the development of 
creativity in cyberspace.  While the formal laws of copyright reveal 
a set of tools for the unapologetic chilling of appropriative expres-
sion in cyberspace, many copyright owners tend to engage in a 
much more dynamic dialogue with their consumers and permit fan 
fiction to exist so long as it ensures the purity and control of the 
original creator.  At best, the result is the development of two paral-
lel markets that are both non-rivalrous and build upon each other 
for creativity.  The problem is that copyright law, as it is formally 
structured, enables a hierarchic division between the two that per-
mits the latter to be silenced if the expression proves objectionable 
or problematic, and here is where slash is so vital, and vulnerable, 
as a result.423 
Examining the inner-dynamic between formal copyright law and in-
formal copyright practices deserves far more inquiry than I can devote 
here.  I will share a few preliminary thoughts, however.  I believe the dy-
namic between the formal and informal worlds of copyright is far more 
fluid and multidirectional than is commonly thought.  Even in Professor 
Katyal’s example of a “slash” work of fan fiction (making the original 
male characters in a story into homosexual characters or with a homo-
erotic overtone424), I believe there is a lot more possible “give and take” 
between fan fiction writers and copyright holders than simply a “silenc-
ing” of speech as soon as a cease-and-desist letter is sent.  The fan fiction 
writer might remove the fan fiction but then repost it later, possibly un-
der a different username.  The writer might seek help from pro bono at-
torneys, such as those with the Chilling Effects at EFF, the Stanford Cen-
ter for Internet & Society Fair Use Project, or the Berkman Center at 
Harvard, which are all well known in the online community.  The writer 
might also organize an online protest and create bad publicity for the au-
thor.  Or the writer might simply do nothing, banking on the fact that no 
person has ever been sued for posting noncommercial fan fiction.  Al-
though it is possible that some authors (perhaps Anne Rice) do effec-
tively chill fan fiction writers from using their characters, the sheer 
amount of fan fiction on the Web suggests that the practice of writing fan 
fiction is not as precarious as one might think.  Even Katyal concedes 
that the legal efforts against fan fiction “have so far done little to stem 
the general growth of fan fiction in cyberspace.”425 
 
 423. Katyal, supra note 37, at 517; see also STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: 
CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 74 (2001) (noting 
the inability of the average Netizen to understand the complexities of intellectual property law com-
bined with the ease of use and the strong prevailing social norms that support widespread and indis-
criminate copying). 
 424. See Katyal, supra note 37, at 468. 
 425. Id. at 469–70. 
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Also, the dynamic between formal and informal copyright appears 
to have as one major fault line the divide between noncommercial and 
commercial uses.  Fair use is not supposed to hinge on the noncommer-
cial-commercial divide; it is but one factor in analyzing the purpose and 
character of the use.426  But, as a practical matter, noncommercial uses of 
copyrighted works in UGC do not generate much protest or concern 
among the copyright holders, while commercial ones do.427  For the fair 
use inquiry, such a divide is over- and under-inclusive.  Some noncom-
mercial uses should not be considered fair uses, while some commercial 
uses should.  Yet, if most copyright holders are worried only about any 
commercial uses of their works, the more problematic area to examine is 
what informal copyright practices should be adopted (if any) for such 
commercial uses.  This Article has focused on the noncommercial side of 
the equation; future inquiry must also examine the commercial side.428  
That is probably where “chilling” can have its greatest hold. 
Consistent with our holistic approach to copyright, it would be fruit-
ful to examine our copyright system and map out all those areas where 
either chilling or warming occurs.  Only then can we assess how well our 
copyright system is promoting progress and creativity. 
D. Giving Hollywood Some Credit 
Finally, we should give credit where it is due.  Examining the infor-
mal copyright practices that have developed around UGC should help us 
cut through a lot of the overblown rhetoric—on both sides—that has so 
plagued discussions of copyright issues.  To their credit, most Hollywood 
studios and other major media copyright holders have not rushed to shut 
down the general practice.  Although some cease-and-desist letters have 
been sent to fan sites, particularly early on, most media copyright holders 
allow—and many even publicly encourage—the growth of UGC.  The 
environment today for UGC seems far more hospitable than it did back 
in the mid-1990s.429  Although Hollywood studios may well have hopes of 
“monetizing” UGC one day, they should be applauded for freely allow-
ing and even encouraging people to engage in this creative pursuit.  The 
“rules” for UGC are by no means settled, but, for the time being, infor-
mal copyright practices among users and copyright holders have led to 
the creation of many user-generated works that are nothing short of 
breathtaking. 
 
 426. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 570 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
 427. One typical response comes from Jeffrey Ulin of Lucasfilm, who remarked, “If fans are using 
Star Wars material for fun, that’s one thing.  If someone tries to commercialize it, that’s where we’ve 
drawn the line.”  McBride, supra note 256. 
 428. See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
951, 1018–30 (2004) (discussing the need to amend copyright law to foster amateur creations). 
 429. Cf. Steve Silberman, The War Against Fandom, WIRED.COM, June 4, 1997, http://www.wired. 
com/culture/lifestyle/news/1997/06/4231. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Internet has exposed a systematic failure of the Copyright 
Act—it is not drafted in a way to provide people with sufficient ex ante 
guidance on whether particular uses of copyrighted works are permissi-
ble without formal licenses.  Written at an extremely high level of gener-
ality, the Act is plagued by ambiguities and gaps.  This systematic prob-
lem is compounded by the incredibly small number of copyright cases 
and even smaller number of copyright decisions published each year.  Al-
though formal licenses can ameliorate this problem, they do not provide 
a panacea, particularly when transaction costs are high or when copyright 
holders strategically “hedge” on licensing.  As an alternative, our copy-
right system relies on informal practices to help fill all the gaps left by 
formal copyright law.  This gap-filling function has been nowhere more 
prominent than in the Web 2.0 practices of UGC.  The tremendous 
growth of UGC has been supported by the development of informal 
copyright practices among users, intermediaries, and major media pro-
ducers alike.  Buttressed by the social networking features of the Inter-
net, a “warming” phenomenon has cultivated these practices by embold-
ening users to use copyrighted works, in the face of legal uncertainty 
over fair use and formal copyright law, by making it easier for people to 
see how others are using copyrighted works online.  Many of the major 
copyright holders have contributed to this warming of speech by support-
ing (even if only strategically for their own self-interest) the practice of 
UGC. 
 
